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Metacognition may be more impaired than mindreading in autism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

David M. Williams ,
Sophie E. Lind  and
Francesca Happé
David M. Williams
Affiliation:
Institute of Child Health, University College London, London, WC1N 1EH, United [email protected]
Sophie E. Lind
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, City University, London, EC1V 0HB, United [email protected]
Francesca Happé
Affiliation:
Social, Genetic, and Developmental Psychiatry Research Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, London, SE5 8AF, United Kingdom. [email protected]
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Abstract

This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 162 - 163
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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