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Mental states during dreaming and daydreaming: Some methodological loopholes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 September 2001

Peter Chapman  and
Geoffrey Underwood
Peter Chapman
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United [email protected]@nottingham.ac.uk www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk
Geoffrey Underwood
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United [email protected]@nottingham.ac.uk www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk
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Abstract

Relatively poor memory for dreams is important evidence for Hobson et al.'s model of conscious states. We describe the time-gap experience as evidence that everyday memory for waking states may not be as good as they assume. As well as being surprisingly sparse, everyday memories may themselves be systematically distorted in the same manner that Revonsuo attributes uniquely to dreams.

[Hobson et al.; Revonsuo]

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 23 , Issue 6 , December 2000 , pp. 917 - 918
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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