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Maybe this old dinosaur isn’t extinct: What does Bayesian modeling add to associationism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 August 2011

Irina Baetu
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, England, United Kingdom. [email protected]
Itxaso Barberia
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montréal, QC, H3A 1B1, Canada. [email protected]
Robin A. Murphy
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UD, United Kingdom. [email protected]@psy.ox.ac.ukhttp://web.me.com/robinmurphy/oxford/Welcome.html
A. G. Baker
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montréal, QC, H3A 1B1, Canada. [email protected]

Abstract

We agree with Jones & Love (J&L) that much of Bayesian modeling has taken a fundamentalist approach to cognition; but we do not believe in the potential of Bayesianism to provide insights into psychological processes. We discuss the advantages of associative explanations over Bayesian approaches to causal induction, and argue that Bayesian models have added little to our understanding of human causal reasoning.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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