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Markov blankets as boundary conditions: Sweeping dirt under the rug still cleans the house

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Javier Sánchez-Cañizares Open the ORCID record for Javier Sánchez-Cañizares [Opens in a new window]
Javier Sánchez-Cañizares*
Affiliation:
Mind-Brain Group at the Institute for Culture and Society (ICS), University of Navarra, 31009 Pamplona, Spain [email protected] https://www.issr.org.uk/fellows/user/496/
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Abstract

Bruineberg et al. underestimate the ontological weight of Markov blankets as actual boundaries of systems and lean toward an instrumentalist understanding thereof. Yet Markov blankets need not be deemed mere tools. Determining their reality depends on the fundamental problem of distinguishing between system and environment in physics, which, in turn, demands a metaphysical bedrock backed by a realist stance on science.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e207
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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