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The limits of individualism are not the limits of rationality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Susan Hurley
Susan Hurley*
Affiliation:
PAIS, University of Warwick, CoventryCV4 7AL, United Kingdomwww.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley
*
[email protected]
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Abstract:

Individualism fixes the unit of rational agency at the individual, creating problems exemplified in Hi-Lo and Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games. But instrumental evaluation of consequences does not require a fixed individual unit. Units of agency can overlap, and the question of which unit should operate arises. Assuming a fixed individual unit is hard to justify: It is natural, and can be rational, to act as part of a group rather than as an individual. More attention should be paid to how units of agency are formed and selected: Are the local processes local or nonlocal? Do they presuppose the ability to understand other minds?

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003 , pp. 164 - 165
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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References

Note

1. It is widely recognized that Prisoners’ Dilemma can be interpreted evidentially, but less widely recognized that Newcomb's Problem and some (but not all) other cases of supposed evidential reasoning can be interpreted in terms of collective action.