Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-08T02:35:58.497Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Languages of thought need to be distinguished from learning mechanisms, and nothing yet rules out multiple distinctively human learning systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2008

Michael Tetzlaff
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. [email protected] [email protected] http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/
Peter Carruthers
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. [email protected] [email protected] http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/

Abstract

We distinguish the question whether only human minds are equipped with a language of thought (LoT) from the question whether human minds employ a single uniquely human learning mechanism. Thus separated, our answer to both questions is negative. Even very simple minds employ a LoT. And the comparative data reviewed by Penn et al. actually suggest that there are many distinctively human learning mechanisms.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright ©Cambridge University Press 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Barrett, H. C. & Kurzban, R. (2006) Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review 113:628–47.Google Scholar
Carruthers, P. (2006) The architecture of the mind: Massive modularity and the flexibility of thought. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Collett, M. & Collett, T. S. (2000) How do insects use path integration for their navigation? Biological Cybernetics 83(3):245–59.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Collett, M., Harland, D. & Collett, T. S. (2002) The use of landmarks and panoramic context in the performance of local vectors by navigating honeybees. The Journal of Experimental Biology 205(6):807–14.Google Scholar
Collett, T. S., Fry, S. N. & Wehner, R. (1993) Sequence learning by honey bees. Journal of Comparative Physiology A 172(6):693706.Google Scholar
Dyer, F. C. & Dickinson, J. A. (1996) Sun-compass learning in insects: Representation in a simple mind. Current Directions in Psychological Science 5(3):6772.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (1987) Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gallistel, C. R. (1998) Symbolic processes in the brain: The case of insect navigation. In: An invitation to cognitive science, vol. 4: Methods, models, and conceptual issues, 2nd, edition, ed. Osherson, D.. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Giurfa, M., Zhang, S., Jenett, A., Menzel, R. & Srinivasan, M. V. (2001) The concepts of “sameness” and “difference” in an insect. Nature 410(6831):930–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marcus, G. F. (2001) The algebraic mind: Integrating connectionism and cognitive science. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Menzel, R., Greggers, U., Smith, A., Berger, S., Brandt, R., Brunke, S., Bundrock, G., Hülse, S., Plümpe, T., Schaupp, F., Schüttler, E., Stach, S., Stindt, J., Stollhoff, N. & Watzl, S. (2005) Honeybees navigate according to a map-like spatial memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 102(8):3040–45.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Riley, J. R., Greggers, U., Smith, A. D., Stach, S., Reynolds, D. R., Stollhoff, N., Brandt, R., Schaupp, F. & Menzel, R. (2003) The automatic pilot of honeybees. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, B 270(1532):2421–24.Google Scholar
Tetzlaff, M. J. (2006) Bee-ing there: The systematicity of honeybee navigation supports a classical theory of honeybee cognition. Doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/3507.Google Scholar