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Article contents
Knowledge by default
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 November 2021
Abstract
The target article presents strong empirical evidence that knowledge is basic. However, it offers an unsatisfactory account of what makes knowledge basic. Some current ideas in cognitive neuroscience – predictive coding and analysis by synthesis – point to a more plausible account that better explains the evidence.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
Knowledge before belief
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Author response
Actual knowledge