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Knowledge before belief: Evidence from unconscious content

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Linda A. W. Brakel Open the ORCID record for Linda A. W. Brakel [Opens in a new window]
Linda A. W. Brakel*
Affiliation:
Departments of Philosophy and Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI48109, USA The Michigan Psychoanalytic Institute, Farmington Hills, MI48334, USA. [email protected]
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Abstract

This commentary supports knowledge prior to belief, but from a different angle, supplementing the target article's central thesis. The target article evaluates belief-representations versus knowledge-representation in others. This commentary considers one's own unconscious knowledge, which can be prior to belief of any sort. Two examples are offered: one from clinical psychoanalysis, another involving a cognitive psychology duck/rabbit experiment.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e145
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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