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Imaginative scrub-jays, causal rooks, and a liberal application of Occam's aftershave

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2008

Nathan J. Emery
Affiliation:
School of Biological and Chemical Sciences, Queen Mary College, University of London, London, E1 4NS, United Kingdom
Nicola S. Clayton
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 3EB, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.sbcs.qmul.ac.uk/people/[email protected]/pages/staffweb/clayton/

Abstract

We address the claim that nonhuman animals do not represent unobservable states, based on studies of physical cognition by rooks and social cognition by scrub-jays. In both cases, the most parsimonious explanation for the results is counter to the reinterpretation hypothesis. We suggest that imagination and prospection can be investigated in animals and included in models of cognitive architecture.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright ©Cambridge University Press 2008

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