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Hybrid vigor and conceptual structure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Frank Keil
Frank Keil
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520. [email protected]
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Abstract

Machery rightly points out a diverse set of phenomena associated with concepts that create challenges for many traditional views of their nature. It may be premature, however, to give up such views completely. Here I defend the possibility of hybrid models of concept structure.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 215 - 216
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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