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How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Keith Frankish
Keith Frankish
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Open University, Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire MK7 6AA, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/philos/frankish.htm
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Abstract

Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 145 - 146
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

Carruthers, P. (2006) The architecture of the mind: Massive modularity and the flexibility of thought. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carruthers, P. (2009) An architecture for dual reasoning. In: In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, ed. Evans, J. St. B. T. & Frankish, K., pp. 109–27. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Frankish, K. (2009) Systems and levels: Dual-system theories and the personal-subpersonal distinction. In: In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, ed. Evans, J. St. B. T. & Frankish, K., pp. 89–107. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar