Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-22T14:29:33.354Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

How to play if you must

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Hans Haller*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA24061

Abstract:

Beyond what Colman is suggesting, some residual indeterminacy of Nash equilibrium may remain even after individual rationality is amended. Although alternative solution concepts can expand the positive scope (explanatory power) of game theory, they tend to reduce its accuracy of predictions (predictive power). Moreover, the appeal of alternative solutions may be context-specific, as illustrated by the Stackelberg solution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)