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How to elicit sound probabilistic reasoning: Beyond word problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Vittorio Girotto
Affiliation:
Department of Arts and Industrial Design, University IUAV of Venice, Convento delle Terese, 30123 Venice, [email protected]://www.iuav.it/English-Ve/Department/dADI-dep/Faculty-te/Vittorio-G/index.htm
Michel Gonzalez
Affiliation:
Laboratory of Cognitive Psychology, University of Provence and CNRS, Centre St Charles, 13331 Marseilles, France. [email protected]://www.up.univ-mrs.fr/document.php?pagendx=3614&project=lpc

Abstract

Barbey & Sloman (B&S) conclude that natural frequency theorists have raised a fundamental question: What are the conditions that compel individuals to reason extensionally? We argue that word problems asking for a numerical judgment used by these theorists cannot answer this question. We present evidence that nonverbal tasks can elicit correct intuitions of posterior probability even in preschoolers.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

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