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Free-energy pragmatics: Markov blankets don't prescribe objective ontology, and that's okay

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Inês Hipólito Open the ORCID record for Inês Hipólito [Opens in a new window]  and
Thomas van Es
Inês Hipólito
Affiliation:
Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 10117 Berlin, Germany [email protected] http://www.ineshipolito.org/
Thomas van Es
Affiliation:
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium; [email protected]
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Abstract

We target the ontological and epistemological ramifications of the proposed distinction between Friston and Pearl blankets. We emphasize the need for empirical testing next to computational modeling. A peculiar aspect of the free energy principle (FEP) is its purported support of radically opposed ontologies of the mind. In our view, the objective ontological aspiration itself should be rejected for a pragmatic instrumentalist view.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e198
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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