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Foresight has to pay off in the present moment1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

George Ainslie
George Ainslie
Affiliation:
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville, PA 19320. [email protected] picoeconomics.com
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Abstract

Foresight requires not only scenarios constructed from memories, but also adequate incentive to let these scenarios compete with current rewards. This incentive probably comes from the efficacy of the scenarios in occasioning present emotions, which depends not on their accuracy per se but on their uniqueness as compared with other possible occasions for emotion.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 313 - 314
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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