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Foresight, function representation, and social intelligence in the great apes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2012

Mathias Osvath ,
Tomas Persson  and
Peter Gärdenfors
Mathias Osvath
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lund University, SE-22100 Lund, Sweden. [email protected]://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=693&[email protected]://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=692&[email protected]://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=691&lang=eng
Tomas Persson
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lund University, SE-22100 Lund, Sweden. [email protected]://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=693&[email protected]://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=692&[email protected]://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=691&lang=eng
Peter Gärdenfors
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lund University, SE-22100 Lund, Sweden. [email protected]://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=693&[email protected]://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=692&[email protected]://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=691&lang=eng
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Abstract

We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , August 2012 , pp. 234 - 235
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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