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Experience, attention, and mental representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2002

Justin Broackes
Justin Broackes
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912 [email protected]
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Abstract

O'Regan & Noë make plausible that perception involves mastery of sensory-motor dependencies. Their rejection of qualia, however, is less persuasive; as is their view that we see only what we are attending to. At times they seem to oppose “internal representation” in general; I argue that they should in fact only be rejecting crude conceptions of brain picturing.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 24 , Issue 5 , October 2001 , pp. 978 - 979
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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