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The determinants of proxy treadmilling in evolutionary models of reliable signals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 May 2024

Keith D. Harris Open the ORCID record for Keith D. Harris [Opens in a new window]
Keith D. Harris*
Affiliation:
Department of Ecology, Evolution and Behavior, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
*
Corresponding author: Keith D. Harris; Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Identifying the conditions of proxy treadmilling is crucial for determining whether reliable signals can persist over time. I present a framework that maps evolutionary models of reliable signals according to their assumptions regarding the effects of Goodhart's law. This framework can explain the contrasting outcomes of different modelling approaches, and identify in which models proxy treadmilling is expected to occur.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e74
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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