Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T17:17:09.525Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Delusions and misbeliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Max Coltheart
Max Coltheart
Affiliation:
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia. [email protected]/~max
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Beliefs may be true or false, and grounded or ungrounded. McKay & Dennett (M&D) treat these properties of belief as independent. What, then, do they mean by misbelief? They state that misbeliefs are “simply false beliefs.” So would they consider a very well-grounded belief that is false a misbelief? And why can't beliefs that are very poorly grounded be considered delusions, even when they are true?

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 517
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)