Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2brh9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T05:14:56.420Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Deciphering mirror neurons: Rational decision versus associative learning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2014

Elias L. Khalil
Elias L. Khalil*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia. [email protected]://eliaskhalil.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The rational-decision approach is superior to the associative-learning approach of Cook et al. at explaining why mirror neurons fire or do not fire – even when the stimulus is the same. The rational-decision approach is superior because it starts with the analysis of the intention of the organism, that is, with the identification of the specific objective or goal that the organism is trying to maximize.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 206 - 207
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L. & Rizzolatti, G. (1996) Action recognition in the premotor cortex. Brain 119 (Part 2):593–609.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Khalil, E. L. (2011) The mirror neuron paradox: How far is understanding from mimicking? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 77:86–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khalil, E. L. (2013) Practical beliefs vs. scientific beliefs: Two kinds of maximization. Theory and Decision 74:107–26. doi: 10.1007/s11238-012-9338-z.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, A. (1976a) Of propriety of action. In: The theory of moral sentiments, Part I, ed. Raphael, D. D. & Macfie, A. L., pp. 9–66. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, A. (1976b) Of those systems which deduce the principle of approbation from self-love. In: The theory of moral sentiments, Part VII, ed. Raphael, D. D. & Macfie, A. L., pp. 315–17 (Section iii, Chapter 1). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar