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Counterfactuals need not be comparative: The case of “As if”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2008

Keith D. Markman  and
Matthew N. McMullen
Keith D. Markman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701
Matthew N. McMullen
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Montana State University–Billings, Billings, MT 59101. [email protected]@msubillings.eduhttp://markman.socialpsychology.org/http://mcmullen.socialpsychology.org/
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Abstract

Byrne (2005) assumes that counterfactual thinking requires a comparison of facts with an imagined alternative. In our view, however, this assumption is unnecessarily restrictive. We argue that individuals do not necessarily engage in counterfactual simulations exclusively to evaluate factual reality. Instead, comparative evaluation is often suspended in favor of experiencing the counterfactual simulation as if it were real.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 461 - 462
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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