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Conscious thinking, acceptance, and self-deception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Keith Frankish
Keith Frankish
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire MK7 6AA, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/philos/frankish.htm
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Abstract

This commentary describes another variety of self-deception, highly relevant to von Hippel & Trivers's (VH&T's) project. Drawing on dual-process theories, I propose that conscious thinking is a voluntary activity motivated by metacognitive attitudes, and that our choice of reasoning strategies and premises may be biased by unconscious desires to self-deceive. Such biased reasoning could facilitate interpersonal deception, in line with VH&T's view.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 20 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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