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Conceptual discontinuity involves recycling old processes in new domains

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

David Landy ,
Colin Allen  and
Michael L. Anderson
David Landy
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173. [email protected]/~dlandy
Colin Allen
Affiliation:
Cognitive Science Program and Department of History & Philosophy of Science, Indiana University, Bloomington IN 47405. [email protected]://www.agcognition.org
Michael L. Anderson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, PA 17603. [email protected]
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Abstract

We dispute Carey's assumption that distinct core cognitive processes employ domain-specific input analyzers to construct proprietary representations. We give reasons to believe that conceptual systems co-opt core components for new domains. Domain boundaries, as well as boundaries between perceptual–motor and conceptual cognitive resources may be useful abstractions, but do not appear to reflect constraints respected by brains and cognitive systems.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , June 2011 , pp. 136 - 137
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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