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Conceptual deficits without features: A view from atomism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2001

Roberto G. de Almeida
Roberto G. de Almeida
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec H4B 1R6, [email protected] www.psychology.concordia.ca
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Abstract

Humphreys and Forde fail to account for the ontology of the “features” that they claim are constitutive of concepts. This failure is common to decompositional theories of conceptual representation. Category-specific deficits can be better explained by a theory that takes inferential relations among atomic concepts to be the key characteristic of conceptual representation and processing.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , June 2001 , pp. 482 - 483
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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