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Competence, reflective equilibrium, and dual-system theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Wesley Buckwalter  and
Stephen Stich
Wesley Buckwalter
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY 10016-4309. [email protected]://wfs.gc.cuny.edu/JBuckwalter/index.html
Stephen Stich
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1107. [email protected]://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/
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Abstract

A critique of inferences from “is” to “ought” plays a central role in Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) defense of descriptivism. However, the reflective equilibrium strategy described by Goodman and embraced by Rawls, Cohen, and many others poses an important challenge to that critique. Dual-system theories may help respond to that challenge.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 251 - 252
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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