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Carving nature at its joints using a knife called concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Justin J. Couchman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260. [email protected]@[email protected]@buffalo.edu
Joseph Boomer
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260. [email protected]@[email protected]@buffalo.edu
Mariana V. C. Coutinho
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260. [email protected]@[email protected]@buffalo.edu
J. David Smith
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260. [email protected]@[email protected]@buffalo.edu

Abstract

That humans can categorize in different ways does not imply that there are qualitatively distinct underlying natural kinds or that the field of concepts splinters. Rather, it implies that the unitary goal of forming concepts is important enough that it receives redundant expression in cognition. Categorization science focuses on commonalities involved in concept learning. Eliminating “concept” makes this more difficult.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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