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The argumentative theory of reasoning applies to scientists and philosophers, too

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

John A. Johnson
John A. Johnson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, DuBois, PA 15801. [email protected]://www.personal.psu.edu/~j5j/
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Abstract

Logical consistency demands that Mercier and Sperber's (M&S's) argumentative theory of reasoning apply to their own reasoning in the target article. Although they hint that their argument applies to professional reasoners such as scientists and philosophers, they do not develop this idea. In this commentary, I discuss the applicability of argumentative theory to science and philosophy, emphasizing the perils of moral reasoning.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , April 2011 , pp. 81 - 82
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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