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Are beliefs the proper targets of adaptationist analyses?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 January 2010
Abstract
McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) description of beliefs, and misbeliefs in particular, is a commendable contribution to the literature; but we argue that referring to beliefs as adaptive or maladaptive can cause conceptual confusion. “Adaptive” is inconsistently defined in the article, which adds to confusion and renders it difficult to evaluate the claims, particularly the possibility of “adaptive misbelief.”
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010
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