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Adaptive self-directed misbeliefs: More than just a rarefied phenomenon?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Tadeusz W. Zawidzki
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052. [email protected]://www.gwu.edu/~philosop/faculty/Zawidzki.cfm

Abstract

I argue that adaptive, self-directed misbeliefs are likely more prevalent and important than McKay & Dennett (M&D) claim. Humans often falsely interpret their own behavior in terms of culturally afforded categories. Despite their falsity, such self-interpretations are often adaptive because of our disposition to behave consistently with them. This makes us easier to interpret by similarly enculturated interactants.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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