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Adaptive self-directed misbeliefs: More than just a rarefied phenomenon?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 January 2010
Abstract
I argue that adaptive, self-directed misbeliefs are likely more prevalent and important than McKay & Dennett (M&D) claim. Humans often falsely interpret their own behavior in terms of culturally afforded categories. Despite their falsity, such self-interpretations are often adaptive because of our disposition to behave consistently with them. This makes us easier to interpret by similarly enculturated interactants.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010
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