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Adaptive misbeliefs are pervasive, but the case for positive illusions is weak

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

David Sloan Wilson  and
Steven Jay Lynn
David Sloan Wilson
Affiliation:
Departments of Biology and Anthropology, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 12902. [email protected]://evolution.binghamton.edu/dswilson/
Steven Jay Lynn
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902. [email protected]://www2.binghamton.edu/psychology/people/faculty/steven-lynn.html
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Abstract

It is a foundational prediction of evolutionary theory that human beliefs accurately approximate reality only insofar as accurate beliefs enhance fitness. Otherwise, adaptive misbeliefs will prevail. Unlike McKay & Dennett (M&D), we think that adaptive belief systems rely heavily upon misbeliefs. However, the case for positive illusions as an example of adaptive misbelief is weak.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 539 - 540
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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