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Accessed, accessible, and inaccessible: Where to draw the phenomenal line

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Jesse Prinz
Jesse Prinz
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514. [email protected]://www.unc.edu/~prinz
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Abstract

One can distinguish among perceptual states that have been accessed by working memory, states that are accessible, and states that are inaccessible. Block compellingly argues that phenomenology outstrips access but wrongly implies that phenomenology outstrips accessibility. There is a subjective difference between Sperling cases and inattentional blindness, which suggests that phenomenology occurs under conditions of accessibility, and not inaccessibility.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 521 - 522
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

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