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Access for what? Reflective consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Michael Snodgrass  and
Scott A. Lepisto
Michael Snodgrass
Affiliation:
Department of Adult Ambulatory Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48105. [email protected]@umich.edu
Scott A. Lepisto
Affiliation:
Department of Adult Ambulatory Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48105. [email protected]@umich.edu
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Abstract

Can phenomenality without access occur? We suggest that the crucial issue is not to show phenomenality that cannot be accessed, but whether phenomenality sometimes simply is not accessed. Considering this question leads to positing a distinct, second form of consciousness: Reflective consciousness. The most important form of access is then from phenomenal (first-order) to reflective (second-order) consciousness.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 525 - 526
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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