¹ The most recent discussions of the historic problem of Galicia are in Wereszycki, Henryk, “Dzieje Galicji jako problem historyczny,” Mało-polskie Studia Historyczne, Vol. I, No. 1 (1958), pp. 4–16Google Scholar; and Buszko, Józef, “Jeszcze o Galicji jako o problemie historycznym,”Google Scholaribid., Vol. II, No. 2–3 (1959), pp. 84–95. Wereszycki maintains that nationalism and Buszko that the class struggle played the key role in the relations between Galicia and Austria.

² See Tokarz, Wacław, Galicja w początkach ery józefińskiej w świetle ankiety urzędowej z roku 1783 (Cracow: Akademia Umiejętności, 1909)Google Scholar; and the remarks in Rutkowski, Jan, Historia gospodarcza Polski do 1864 r. (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1953), p. 284.Google Scholar

³ Lack of space does not permit us to discuss the Polish question in Austrian Silesia (Teschen). Although the Silesian Poles lived outside the province of Galicia, they had intimate relations with it and their deputies in parliament belonged to the Polish Club in the Reichsrat.

⁴ Austria's role in the first partition is pointed out in Kaplan, Herbert, The First Partition of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962)Google Scholar; and the two illuminating articles by Modelski, Teofil E.: “Wywód ks. W. Kaunitza z 1772 o podziale Polski,” Kwartalnik Historyczny, Vol. XXXI, No. 1–2 (1917), pp. 55–106Google Scholar; and “Rozbiór wywodu Kaunitza z 1772 r. o podziale Polski,” ibid., Vol. XXXVII, No. 1–2 (1923), pp. 88–124.

⁵ Maria Theresa called the partition a “Schandfleck.” See Hantsch, Hugo, Die Geschichte Österreichs, Vol. II: 1648–1918 (2nd ed., Graz: Styria Verlag, 1955), p. 218.Google Scholar

⁶ As Robert A. Kann has put it, the “loyalty of the Poles to the empire was one ‘on notice.’” See his The Habsburg Empire: A Study in Integration and Disintegration (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 66.Google Scholar Peter Sugar has remarked in a somewhat exaggerated manner that the Poles were “only marking time in the empire awaiting the restoration of independence.” See his “The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule,” Slavic Review, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (03, 1963), p. 56.Google Scholar

⁷ Nearly 100,000 recruits were drafted in an area that had a population of only 3,500,000. Abusive taxation and the excessive prices charged by the salt and tobacco monopolies created widespread discontent which led to the introduction of martial law in 1812.

⁸ Interference in Church affairs at times went to ridiculous extremes, as, for instance, when the governor decreed that the words “Queen of the Polish Crown pray for us” in the litany be replaced with “Queen of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria pray for us.” Cited in Tyrowicz, Marian (ed.), Galicja od pierwszego rozbioru do wiosny ludów 1772–1849: Wybór tekstów źródłowych (Cracow: Ossolineum, 1956), p. xviii.Google Scholar

⁹ This is admitted both by traditional Polish historians and the new Marxist historians. See Tokarz, , Galicja w początkach ery józefińskiej w świetle ankiety urzędowej z roku 1783, pp. 191 and 240–241Google Scholar; Bobrzyński, Michał, Dzieje Polski w zarysie (4th ed., 3 vols., Warsaw: Gebethner & Wolff, 1927–1931), Vol. III, pp. 10–11Google Scholar; Tyrowicz, , Galicja od pierwszego rozbioru do wiosny ludów 1772–1849, pp. xv–xviiGoogle Scholar; and Nauk, Polska Akademia, Historia Polski (3 vols., Warsaw: Państwowe wydawnictwo naukowe, 1958), Vol. II, Pt. 2, pp. 62–64.Google Scholar A very detailed treatment of the peasant question is in Rozdolski, Roman, Stosunki poddańcze w dawnej Galicji (2 vols., Warsaw: Państwowe wydawnictwo naukowe, 1962).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Older Polish historians such as Walerian Kalinka condemn this system as a deliberate Austrian attempt to destroy the position of the nobles vis-à-vis the peasants and thus to strike a blow against the only patriotic Polish group in the country. Recent historians do not go that far, but Tyrowicz admits that the above Austrian policies deepened the antagonism between the peasants and the landowners.

¹¹ See particularly Bobrzyński, , Dzieje Polski w zarysie, Vol. Ill, p. 4.Google Scholar

¹² The chancellor declared, “Der Polonismus ist nur eine Formel, ein Wortlaut, hinter dem die Revolution in ihrer krassesten Form steht, er ist die Revolution selbst.” As cited in Bibl, Viktor, Österreich 1806–1938 (2 vols., Zürich: Amalthea Verlag, 1939), Vol. II, p. 62.Google Scholar A good illustration of the way Austria treated Galicia is provided by the fact that in 1817 only one-sixth of the income derived from Galicia was spent on the province itself. Polska, jej dzieje i kultura (3 vols., Warsaw: Trzaska, Ewert, Michalski, 1927–1932), Vol. III, p. 141.Google Scholar

¹³ On both Austrian attitudes and the Polish efforts, see Dutkiewicz, Józef, Austria wobec powstania listopadowego (Cracow: Wydawn, Tow, Historycznego, 1933)Google Scholar; Bibl, , Österreich 1806–1988, Vol. I, p. 344Google Scholar; Kieniewicz, Stefan, Konspiracje Galicyjskie 1831–1845 (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1950), pp. 34 and 44Google Scholar; and Feldman, Józef, Sprawa polska w r. 1848 (Cracow: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1933), p. 245.Google Scholar

¹⁴ In support of the above assertions, it must be admitted that the Austrians made no preventive arrests even though they were forewarned that a revolution was on the point of breaking out. Furthermore, statements to the effect that the authorities feared no revolution because they had means at their disposal that might result in a brief period of bloodshed but would ensure tranquillity for years were freely made at the governor's office. The Kreishauptmann of Tarnów, Josef Breinl, and Colonel Ludwig von Benedek made payments to the peasants who were bringing dead or arrested revolutionaries to them. See especially Łoziński, Bronisław, Szkice z historii Galicji iv XIX w. (Lvov: Gebethner & Wolff and Gubrynowicz & Son, 1913)Google Scholar; and Schnür-Pepłowski, Stanisław,. Krwawa karta (Lvov: Gubrynowicz & Szmidt, 1896).Google Scholar Also see the brief treatments in Bobrzyński, , Dzieje Polski w zarysie, Vol. III, pp. 171–172Google Scholar; and Kukiel, Marian, Dzieje Polski porozbiorowe 1795–1921 (London: B. Świderski, 1961), pp. 285–287.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The most outstanding works of the postwar Marxist school are Kieniewicz, Stefan, Ruch chłopski w Galicji w 1846 roku (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1951)Google Scholar; and Wycech, Czesław, Powstanie chłopskie w roku 1846 (Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1956)Google Scholar; and Zychpwski, Marian, Rok 1846 w Rzeczpospolitej krakowskiej i Galicji (Warsaw: Książka, 1956).Google Scholar See also the collection of documents in Sieradzki, Józef and Wycech, Czesław (eds.), Rok 1846 w Galicji: Materiały źródłowe (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1958).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Bibl, , Österreich 1806–1938, Vol. II, p. 68Google Scholar, who mistakenly also asserts that the peasants who revolted were Ruthenians; von Sacher-Masoch, Leopold, Polnischc Revolutionen: Erinnerungen aus Galizien (Prague: F. A. Credner, 1863)Google Scholar; and Loserth, Johann, “Zur vormärzlichen Polenpolitik Österreichs,” Preussische Jahrbücher, Vol. CXII, No. 11 (05, 1903), pp. 249–287.Google Scholar Hantsch barely mentions the peasant uprising (See his Geschichte Österreichs, Vol. II, p. 335Google Scholar), and there is little evidence of new research or interest among Austrian historians in the events of 1846.

¹⁷ For instance, see von Sala, Moritz, Geschichte des polnischen Aufstandes vom Jahre 1846 (Vienna: Carl Gerold Sohn's Verlag, 1867).Google Scholar Heinrich Friedjung, while insisting that the jacquerie was a spontaneous movement, mentions Benedek's order that five gulden be given as a reward for a captive revolutionary. See Benedek's nachgelassene Papiere (Leipzig: Grübel and Sommerlatte, 1901), p. 15.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Austrian responsibility is stressed by the hardly pro-Polish von Oertzen, Friedrich Wilhelm, Alles oder Nichts: Polens Freiheitskampf in 125 Jahren (Breslau: Wilhelm Gottl. Korn Verlag, 1934), p. 128.Google Scholar See also Kann, Robert A., The Multinational Empire, 1848–1918: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy (2 vols., New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), Vol. I, pp. 228–230.Google Scholar While Kann denies that the Austrian government had any “divide et impera” designs, he admits that the authorities used the peasant outbreak as a warning to the Poles.

¹⁹ As, for instance, Aleksander Wielopolski's famous open letter to Metternich, which had clear Pan-Slavic overtones.

²⁰ The governor of Galicia referred to the events of 1846 as “gratifying,” while Archduke Louis talked about the “good fortune” of the Austrians.

²¹ See his Geschichte Oesterreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden 1809 (2 vols., Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1863–1865), Vol. II, p. 135.Google Scholar

²² Apart from works cited so far, the following are of particular value for the 1848 period: Smolka, Stanisław (ed.), Dziennik Franciszka Smolki 1848–1849 w listach do żony (Warsaw: Gebethner & Wolff, 1913)Google Scholar; Ziemialkowski, Florian, Pamiętniki (3 pts., Cracow: A. Koziański, 1904)Google Scholar; Sapieha, Leon, Wspomnienia z lat 1803 do 1863 (Lvov: H. Altenberg, 1912)Google Scholar; Gąsiorowska, Natalia (ed.), W stulecie wiosny ludów 1848–1948 (5 vols., Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1948–1953), Vol. IGoogle Scholar; Handelsman, Marceli, Adam Czartoryski (3 vols., Warsaw: Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie, 1948–1950), Vol. II, Pt. 3Google Scholar; Kukiel, Marian, Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770–1861 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burian, Peter, Die Nationalitäten in “Cisleithanien” und das Wahlrecht der Märzrevolution 1848–49. Zur Problematik des Parlamentarismus im alten Österreich (Graz: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1962)Google Scholar; Žáček, Václav, Čechové a Paláci roku 1848 (Prague: Orbis, 1947–1948)Google Scholar; Kieniewicz, Stefan, Adam Sapieha 1838–1903 (Lvov: Ossolineum, 1939)Google Scholar; and Kieniewicz, Stefan, Rok 1848 w Polsce: Wybór źródeł (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1948).Google Scholar

²³ Stadion reported to Vienna on May 3, 1848, that he was using the Ruthenians “zur Paralysierung der polnischen Bestrebungen für die Zwecke der Regierung.” As cited in Burian, , Die Nationalitäten in “Cis-leithanien,” p. 105.Google Scholar Springer observed that the “österreichische Patriotismus der Ruthenen beruhte vorzugsweise auf dem Gegensatze derselben zur polnischen Bevölkerung und besass für die Regierung nur in sofern Werth, als er die Ruhe in Galizien sicherte.” In his Geschichte Oesterreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden 1809, Vol. II, p. 6.Google Scholar

²⁴ As cited in Limanowski, Bolesław, Historia demokracji polskiej w epoce porozbiorowej (2nd ed., 3 pts., Warsaw: J. Mortkiewicz, n. d.), Pt. 3, p. 244.Google Scholar

²⁵ As quoted in Burian, , Die Nationalitäten in “Cisleithanien,” p. 102Google Scholar n. See also Ziemiałkowski, , Pamiętniki, Pt. 2, pp. 45–46.Google Scholar

²⁶ See especially Nauk, Polska Akademia, Historia Polski, Vol. II, Pt. 3, pp. 381–382.Google Scholar

²⁷ The most recent detailed treatment of the Polish role in the Reichsrat is given in Zdrada, Jerzy, “Udział koła polskiego w pracach ustawodawczych pierwszej austriackiej Rady Państwa: 1861–1862,” Małopolskie Studia Historyczne, Vol. V, No. 1–2 (1962), pp. 49–78.Google Scholar

²⁸ Around that time the old title “governor” (Gouverneur) was replaced by that of Statthalter (Namiestnik in Polish), which might be translated as viceroy. See Grzybowski, Konstanty, Galicja 1848–1914: Historia ustroju politycznego na tle historii ustroju Austrii (Warsaw: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1959), p. 65.Google Scholar

²⁹ Kann, , The Habsburg Empire, p. 122.Google Scholar See also Hantsch, , Geschichte Österreichs, Vol. II, p. 410.Google Scholar

³⁰ See Koźmian, Stanisław, Rzecz o roku 1863 (3 vols., Cracow: Spółka Wydawnicza Polska, 1894–1895), Vol. III, p. 292.Google Scholar On Austria and the uprising of 1863, see Wereszycki, Henryk, Austria a powstanie styczniowe (Lvov: Ossolineum, 1930).Google Scholar

³¹ This is the interpretation given in Bobrzyński, , Dzieje Polski w zarysie, Vol. III, p. 249Google Scholar; Kieniewicz, , Adam Sapieha, p. 190Google Scholar; Wereszycki, Henryk, Historia polityczna Polski w dobie popowstaniowej 1864–1918 (Warsaw: Wiedza, 1948), pp. 20–21Google Scholar; and Kukiel, , Dzieje Polski porozbiorowe, pp. 378–379.Google Scholar Postwar Polish historians have generally failed to point this out. For a radical criticism of the address, see Daszyński, Ignacy, Pamiętniki (2 vols., Cracow: ZRSS “Proletariat,” 1925–1926), Vol; I, p. 17Google Scholar; Feldman, Wilhelm, Stronnictwa i programy polityczne w Galicji 1846–1906 (2 vols., Cracow: Spółka Nakładowa Książka), Vol. I, pp. 62–63.Google Scholar For a conservative analysis by Stanisław Tarnowski, see Bobrzyński, Michał, Jaworski, Władysław L., and Milewski, Józef, Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego Galicji 1859–1873 (Warsaw: Gebethner & Wolff, 1905), pp. 250–301.Google Scholar

³² Indeed, Springer says that the Poles “allein waren von der Abneigung, welche Deutsche gegen das Slawenthum fühlten, ausgeschlossen.” In his Geschichte Oesterreichs, Vol. II, p. 332.Google Scholar

³³ For a good analysis of the social composition of the sejm, see Winiarski, Bohdan, Ustrój polityczny ziem polskich w XIX w (Poznań: Fiszer a Majewski, 1923), p. 221.Google Scholar

³⁴ The movement derived its inspiration from the national poet Taras Shevchenko and followed the leadership of such radicals as Mikhail Dragomanov. Its press organ Dilo was founded in 1880.

³⁵ Without going into an analysis of the Ukrainian grievances, one must agree with Hans Kohn that in “Galicia the position of the Ukrainians was incomparably better than the situation of the Ukrainians and Slovaks in neighboring Hungary.” See his article on “The Viability of the Habsburg Monarchy,” Slavic Review, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (03, 1963), p. 39.Google Scholar

³⁶ For these movements, see especially the already cited memoirs of Daszyński; the works of Wilhelm Feldman; Witos, Wincenty, Moje wspomnienia (3 vols., Paris: Instytut literacki, 1964–1965), Vol. IGoogle Scholar; Głabiński, Stanisław, Wspomnienia polityczne (Pelplin: Drukarnia i Księgarnia, 1939)Google Scholar; and Kozicki, Stanisław, Historia Ligi Narodowej (London: Myśl Polska, 1964).Google Scholar

³⁷ In his The Habsburg Monarchy 1815–1918 (2nd rev'd. ed., London: Hamish Hamilton, 1960), p. 180.Google Scholar

³⁸ The Austrians assumed this attitude because they were determined not to weaken the centralizing effect of the more representative Reichsrat. See Grzybowski, , Galicja 1848–1914, p. 97Google Scholar; and Winiarski, , Ustrój polityczny ziem polskich w XIX w, p. 221.Google Scholar

³⁹ Zeman, Z. A. B., The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire 1914–1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 250.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Kann, , The Multinational Empire, Vol. I, p. 231.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See his The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 99.Google Scholar

⁴² See Kieniewicz, , Adam Sapieha, p. 197.Google Scholar

⁴³ According to Kann, in 1907 one Polish deputy represented 52,000 electors while a German represented only 40,000. See his The Multinational Empire, Vol. II, p. 223.Google Scholar Winiarski gives the figures as 69,000 and 27,000, respectively, but he probably refers to an unspecified earlier period. See his Ustrój polityczny ziem polskich w XIX w, p. 219.Google Scholar See also Kann, , The Habsburg Empire, p. 98Google Scholar; and Hantsch, Hugo, Die Nationalitätenfrage im alten Österreich (Vienna: Herold Verlag, 1953), pp. 30–34.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See the figures in Kann, , The Multinational Empire, Vol. II, p. 313.Google Scholar