¹ Barker, Thomas M., Double Eagle and Crescent: Vienna's Second Turkish Siege and Its Historical Background (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1967)Google Scholar; Doppeladler und Halbmond—Das Entscheidungsjahr 1683 (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1982).Google Scholar The out-of-print American edition should be compared with the German version. Although the latter contains many improvements, some materials of the original had to be omitted. Most of the other new publications have a popular, antiquarian, local-historical or pedagogical character. The strictly scholarly contributions seek to clarify secondary issues and have not produced much that is novel with respect to either data or interpretation. The chief positive result of the many books, articles and professional gatherings has been largely an effort, albeit not entirely successful, to transcend narrow, religiously, dynastically and nationally based ideologies of the past. This holds true especially for Germanophone Austrian historiography. See the judiciously balanced critique of the literature by Vocelka, Karl, “1683:1983. Ein Jubiläum? Fortschritt oder Stagnation der historiographischen Aufbereitung der zweiten Wiener Türkenbelagerung,” Mitteilungen des Instituts für öslerreichische Geschichtsforschung, XCII (1984), 165–194.Google Scholar The more significant new studies will be cited in this article.

² Barker, , Double Eagle, pp. 149–151Google Scholar; Barker, , Doppeladler, pp. 151–153.Google Scholar

³ Barker, , Double Eagle, note 90, p. 403Google Scholar; Barker, , Doppeladler, note 74, p. 382.Google Scholar

⁴ Barker, , Double Eagle, pp. 55–63Google Scholar; Barker, , Doppeladler, pp. 64–73.Google Scholar

⁵ Werner, Ernst, “Das Osmanenreich im 17. Jahrhundert—Systemverfall und Systemstabilisierungsversuche,” in Waissenberger, Robert, ed., Die Türken vor Wien—Europa und die Entscheidung an der Donau 1683 (Salzburg: Residenz Verlag, 1982).Google Scholar Like most Sammelwerke, this volume is a mishmash of serious studies based upon original ideas and fresh research as well as less useful, entirely derivative pieces. The chronological table contains gross errors. Printed on glossy paper by a trade publisher, the book also reproduces seventeenth-century illustrations.

⁶ Barker, , Double Eagle, pp. 68–72Google Scholar; Barker, , Doppeladler, pp. 79–81.Google Scholar

⁷ Barker, , Double Eagle, p. viii.Google Scholar

⁸ Abrahamowicz, Zygmunt, “Kara Mustafa Pascha,” in Waissenberger, , ed., Die Türken vor Wien, pp. 241–250.Google Scholar

⁹ For a good working definition of ideology, see Cress, Lawrence Delbert, Citizens in Arms: The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p. xii.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Abrahamowicz, Zygmunt, “Der politische und ökonomische Hintergrund des Wiener Feldzuges von Kara Mustafa,” Studia Austro-Polonica, III (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1983), 7–44, and passim.Google Scholar

¹¹ Barker, , Double Eagle, p. 70.Google Scholar Clearly, most cultures tolerate violence and indeed legitimize it (armies). However, on occasion the degree of acceptance is especially marked. What is of fundamental interest to the historian is how, over time, the level is reduced. Cf. Elias, Norbert, Über den Prozeβ der Zivilisation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977).Google Scholar

¹² Abrahamowicz, the best-informed Western researcher, has gleaned what are possibly the last kernels of new knowledge. Cf. “Islamische Quellen zur Geschichte des Türkenjahres 1683,” typescript photocopy, International Congress of Military History, Vienna, 1983. (On file, Heeresgeschichtliches Museum Wien). It should be noted that the Turkish sources utilized in Barker, Double Eagle, are now available, expanded and emended with regard to details, in a single volume reflecting a well-coordinated international scholarly effort: Kreutel, Richard and Teply, Karl, Kara Mustafa vor Wien: 1683 aus der Sicht türkischer Quellen (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1982).Google Scholar

¹³ Géza Perjés, “Die Türkenbelagerung Wiens im Jahre 1683—Arbeitshypothese zum Verständnis der Motivierung der osmanischen Staatsführung,” typescript. See also Mohács (Budapest: Magvetö, 1979)Google Scholar and “The Battle of Mohács and the Disintegration of Medieval Hungary,” East European Quarterly, XV (1981), 153–162.Google Scholar Perjés has held to his conception for some fifteen years. See “Az országut szélére vetett ország” [A Country Cast upon the Periphery of History], Kortárs, nos. 11 and 12, 1971, and no. 1, 1972.

¹⁴ Cf. Luttwak, Edward N., The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century a.d. to the Third (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Leitsch, Walter, “Warum wollte Kara Mustafa Wien erobem?”, Jahrbuch für Geschichte Osteuropas, XXIX (1981), 494–515, esp. 511–512.Google Scholar The virtues of Leitsch's exhaustively annotated treatise are that it underlines the Ottoman perception of Habsburg weakness as a cause of hostilities and provides a new source-reference confirming domestic military pressures upon the Porte. Its main flaw—apart from the idea of a general assault—is a basically contradictory thesis (cf. pp. 449 and 511). Leitsch's citations of Double Eagle (pp. 502, 510) also suggest that he misunderstood the English text.

¹⁶ They derive from the Thirty Years War but vary greatly from the situation about to be described.

¹⁷ Çeliker, Fahri, “Zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens und Ursachen der Misserfolge” (sic), typescript photocopy, International Congress of Military History, Vienna, 1983, passim.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Barker, , Double Eagle, note 78, pp. 419–420.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Cf. Duffy, Christopher, Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660–1860 (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1975).Google Scholar

²⁰ In (no author), Bedrohung und Befreiung Wiens: Materialien zum Vertragszyklus 1683 (Vienna: Gesellschaft für österreichische Heereskunde [Heeresgeschichtliches Museum Wien], 1983), pp. 33–46.Google Scholar

²¹ In Studia Austro-Polonica, III, 81–110 (quotation, p. 96). See also Wimmer, Jan, Wiedeń 1683: dzieje kampanii i bitwy (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1983), p. 270.Google Scholar The volume is also available in a condensed German version (which lacks the fine maps and the scholarly apparatus of the original) as Der Entsatz von Wien 1683 (Warsaw: Verlag Interpress, 1983). Cf. pp. 152–153.Google Scholar

²² For technical military questions, especially regarding fortifications, the most up-to-date survey is Broucek, Peter, Hillbrand, Erich and Vesely, Fritz, Historischer Atlas zur zweiten Türkenbelagerung Wiens (Vienna: Deuticke, 1983).Google Scholar

²³ Wimmer, Jan, “Le déblocage de Vienne en 1683 et la part que les Polonais y prirent,” Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire, LII (1982), 63.Google Scholar

²⁴ Dr. Broucek suggests the following examples: Gradisca in 1617 (Wallenstein), Nördlingen in 1634 (Gallas and the Cardinal Infante), Thionville in 1637 (Piccolomini) and Rocroi in 1643 (Condé).

²⁵ Barker, , Double Eagle, pp. 322–324Google Scholar; Barker, , Doppeladler, pp. 304–305.Google Scholar

²⁶ Wimmer, “Le déblocage de Vienne en 1683,” pp. 82, 92.Google Scholar Cf. Düriegel, Günter, Wien 1683—die zweite Türkenbelagerung (Vienna: Böhlau, 1981), pp. 113–114.Google Scholar

²⁷ Wimmer, , Wiedeń 1683, pp. 336–338Google Scholar, and Der Entsatz, p. 208.

²⁸ Wimmer, “Le déblocage de Vienne en 1683,” p. 82.Google ScholarAbrahamowicz, (“Islamische Quellen,” p. 6)Google Scholar stresses that the Ottoman sources all credit the Poles as having contributed “decisively” to the Kahlenberg victory and to the subsequent successes along the Danube in western Hungary. However, the statement is of a rather general character and might be construed as exculpatory. Admittedly, the case is stronger with regard to the Danubian campaign.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 57

³⁰ Ibid., p. 83.

³¹ Wojcík, Zbigniew, “Johann III. Sobieski—ein polnischer Staatsmann,” in Waissenberger, , ed., Die Türken vor Wien, p. 183.Google Scholar

³² Colonel Wimmer's assertion that the “chief” share of (personal?) glory should go to Sobieski conflicts with his willingness, in another place, to divide credit equally (“Le déblocage de Vienneen 1683,” pp. 90–91, Der Entsatz, pp. 289–290). However, he is undoubtedly correct in stressing the symbolical importance of Sobieski's achievement for later generations of Poles (ibid., p. 290).

³³ See Schaendlinger, Anton C., “Die Entdeckung des Abendlandes als Vorbild: ein Vorschlag zur Umgestaltung des Heerwesens und der Außenpolitik des osmanischen Reiches zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts,” in Heiss, Gernot and Klingenstein, Grete, eds., Das osmanische Reich und Europa 1683 bis 1789: Konflikt, Entspannung und Austausch, in Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, X (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1983), 89–112.Google Scholar Also in the same publication: Yenişehirlioǧlu, Filiz, “Western Influence on the Ottoman Architecture in the 18th Century” (sic), pp. 153–178Google Scholar; Stajnova, Michaila, “Neue Richtungen im künstlerischliterarischen Schaffen der osmanischen Türkei zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts,” pp. 179–193.Google Scholar See also Kopčan, Vojtech, “Die tschechoslowakische Literatur zu den Türkenkriegen,” in Die Türkenkriege in der historischen Forschung (Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1983), pp. 79–97, esp. 92–94.Google Scholar The title of another joint study, (no author), Die Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683 und ihre Auswirkungen für die politische, kulturelle und geistige Entwicklung der Balkanvölker, in Mitteilungen des bulgarischen Forschungsinstituies in Österreich, vol. II (Vienna:. Bulgarisches Forschungsinstitut, 1983)Google Scholar, is, unfortunately, a misnomer. The articles all deal not with the consequences of the siege but rather with a variety of earlier, general Eastern European themes. One piece does address the antecedents of the subject.

³⁴ The ultimate consequence of the defeat at Vienna and later reverses was acceleration of the process of decline in the central government's authority. See Ortayli, İlber, “Die gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Folgen der zweiten Belagerung Wiens für das osmanische Reich,” Studia Austro-Polonica, III, 199–206.Google Scholar

³⁵ Halil İnalcik, “The Northern Front 1683–1700.” Paper delivered at the 1983 Indiana University colloquium.

³⁶ Béenger, Jean, “Ludwig XIV. und Frankreichs Streben nach der Vormachtstellung in Europa,” in Waissenberger, , ed., Die Türken vor Wien, pp. 37–45.Google Scholar

³⁷ Redlich, Oswald, Das Werden einer Groβmacht: Österreich in der Zeit von 1700 bis 1740, 4th ed. (Vienna: R. M. Rohrer, 1962).Google Scholar The tercentennary celebration, with its spate of special museum exhibits, especially in Austria, was indicative of a long-standing popular fascination with the topic. The most spectacular show of the “Türkenrummel” was organized in Vienna's Künstlerhaus by the Municipal Historical Museum but, unfortunately, was marred by serious Turcological blunders and the use—in only slightly modified form—of published historical maps without attribution.

³⁸ Allmayer-Beck, Johann Christoph, “Bedrohung und Befreiung Wiens 1683: eine weltgeschichtliche Einführung,” in (no author), Bedrohung und Befreiung Wiens 1683, pp. 1–12.Google Scholar

³⁹ Although not within the immediate purview of this article, mention should be made of the work of the Czech archivist Jaroslav Macek, who has unearthed the only fresh source materials for the events of 1683. The data show, inter alia, that the Vienna garrison was probably able to communicate with the Austrian field army on a regular basis notwithstanding the siege. Macek, Jaroslav, “Kaspar Zdenko Kaplíř von Sullowitz und seine Bedeutung für die Verteidigung der Stadt Wien—ein Beitrag zum Türkenjahr 1683,” Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur, XXVII (1983), 203–224.Google Scholar Czech depositories may yet provide other illuminating factual details. Cf. Macek, , “Böhmische und mährische Archivalien zur Geschichte des Jahres 1683,” Scrinum: Zeitschrift des Verbandes österreichischer Archivare, XXI–XXX (1979–1984), 431–444.Google Scholar