¹ See Langer, William L., European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 381–407, 415–447, and 452–453Google Scholar; and Peter, Rassow, Die Stellung Deutschlands im Kreise der Grossen Mächte 1887–1890 (Wiesbaden: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz in Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag, 1959), pp. 24–42Google Scholar. Rassow has analyzed numerous statements concerning Bismarck's conception of a two-front war. His evidence indicates that the chancellor's statements were at times contradictory and ambiguous. He concludes that Otto von Bismarck was unable to determine how a two-front war could be successfully directed; therefore, the chancellor viewed such a war as a “deadly threat for the empire.” Rassow is reluctant to accept the argument that Bismarck would have tried to avoid a two-front war by making a separate peace with Russia at the expense of Austria-Hungary. See also the following three earlier works: von Falkenstein, Heinz Trützschler, Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr des Jahres 1887 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924)Google Scholar; Fuller, Joseph Vincent, Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1922)Google Scholar; and Karl-Ernst, Jeismann, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges im europäischen Staatensystem mit besonderem Blick auf die Bismarckzeit (Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag, 1957)Google Scholar.

² Memorandum of Count von Berchem, Maximilian, Berlin, August 19, 1887, Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914 (40 vols., Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922–27) (hereafter cited as “Die Grosse Politik”), Vol. V, pp. 192–194Google Scholar; Otto von Bismarck to Heinrich VII Reuss, Kissingen, August 23, 1887, ibid., pp. 194–195; Reuss to Otto von Bismarck, Vienna, August 29, 1887, ibid., pp. 195–198. See also Trützschler von Falkenstein, Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr des Jahres 1887, pp. 105–115; Fuller, Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith, pp. 205–224; and memorandum of Franz von Rottenburg to Berchem, Kissingen, August 20, 1887, German Foreign Ministry Archives 1867–1920, microfilmed at Whaddon Hall for the General Library, University of California, Berkeley (hereafter cited as “University of California Films of German Archives”), ser. I, reel 5, frame 476, No. Dt. 128 secr. The last number refers to the original German file number. Throughout this article citations to the University of California Films of German Archives I and II refer to German foreign ministry documents which were not published in Die Grosse Politik or in von Bismarck, Otto Eduard Leopold, Die gesammelten Werke (15 vols., Berlin: Otto Stollberg Verlag und Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1924–1935)Google Scholar.

³ von Bismarck, Otto to Reuss, , Kissingen, , August 23, 1887, Die Grosse Politik, Vol. V, p. 195Google Scholar.

⁴ For the text of the Treaty of Dual Alliance, see Die Grosse Politik, Vol. Ill, pp. 102–104. Throughout this paper the terms “Austria” and “Austrians” are used in their more general sense to refer to all parts of the Habsburg empire.

⁵ Bojanowski (German Consul-General in Budapest) to Reuss, with marginal comments by Otto von Bismarck, Budapest, November 24, 1885, University of California Films of German Archives, ser. I, reel 221, frame 241, No. Oest. 83. In the margin Bismarck wrote concerning the Dual Alliance: “Our alliance is a defensive one, not a business partnership set up for profit.”

⁶ Herbert Bismarck to Reuss, Berlin, December 10, 1886, University of California Films of German Archives, ser. I, reel 5, frames 311–316, No. Dt. 128 secr.

⁷ Bismarck, , Die gesammelten Werke, Vol. XIII, pp. 212 and 228–229Google Scholar.

⁸ Rich, Norman and Fisher, M. H. (eds.), The Holstein Papers (4 vols., Cambridge, Eng.: University Press, 1955–1963), Vol. II, pp. 331–335Google Scholar. Aware of Austria's weaknesses and fearful of Russia's intentions, Holstein, in January, 1887, admitted “pushing as hard as I can to bring about an Austro-Italian alliance.” Ibid., p. 332. Holstein believed that the February, 1887, renewal of the Triple Alliance and the March, 1887, Black Sea Agreements between England, Italy, and Austria represented the triumph of his personal diplomatic goals and efforts. “Thus my exertions of the past six months have been crowned with success,” he wrote concerning these agreements in a letter of March 14, 1887. See ibid., p. 335. Helmut, Krausnick, Holsteins Geheimpolitik in der Ära Bismarck 1886–1890 (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1942), pp. 48–55 and 58–60Google Scholar. Krausnick's account, based on documents in the Austrian state archives, provides a long description of Holstein's communications with the Austrians. During the fall of 1886 Holstein had assured the Austrians that Chancellor Bismarck was not as pro-Russian in the Bulgarian affair as his son Herbert.

⁹ Rich, and Fisher, , The Holstein Papers, Vol. II, p. 331Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 332.

¹¹ Ibid. See also Norman, Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II (2 vols., Cambridge, Eng.: University Press, 1965), Vol. I, pp. 210–211Google Scholar. On the same pages Rich cites several examples of Holstein's failure to appreciate the political wisdom of Bismarck's plans during the first half of 1887.

¹² For example, see Fuller, Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith, pp. 321–322. This volume is one of the most intensive and biased studies of Bismarck's twilight diplomacy that has been written by a responsible scholar. According to Fuller, the Bismarckian alliance structure was the result of a breakdown in policy planning and imagination, a performance “consummate in duplicity and brutality,” which inevitably led to the downfall of his empire. For summaries and analyses of the historical debate on the compatibility of the Reinsurance Treaty and the Austro-German Alliance, see Trützschler von Falkenstein, Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr des Jahres 1887, pp. 90–104; Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, pp. 423–424; and Otto, Becker, Bismarck und die Einkreisung Deutschlands (2 vols., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960), Vol. I, pp. 63–105Google Scholar.

¹³ For the terms of the Reinsurance Treaty, see Pribram, Alfred Francis (ed.), The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879–1914 (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1920–1921), Vol. I, pp. 274–281Google Scholar. See also Die Grosse Politik, Vol. V, Ch. XXXIV, for the documents concerning the negotiations which led to its signing. The Reinsurance Treaty obliged Germany to give moral and diplomatic support to the Russians when they eventually seized the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. The Mediterranean Agreement, however, provided for the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas. See Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, Vol. I, pp. 94–95.

¹⁴ For the texts of the Treaty of the Second Triple Alliance and the Mediterranean Agreement of March 24, 1887, see Pribram, , The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, Vol. I, pp. 98 and 104–115Google Scholar. A detailed discussion of Bismarck's role in the Mediterranean Agreement negotiations may be found in Trützschler von Falkenstein, Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr dea Jahres 1887, pp. 78–89. This 1924 account was based on documents in Die Grosse Politik and a few unpublished German Foreign Office dispatches and reports. A survey of the Mediterranean Agreement negotiations from the perspective of the Austrian and Italian foreign ministries and English Foreign Office may be found in Medlicott, W. N., “The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887,” Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. V, No. 13 (June, 1926), pp. 66–88Google Scholar. Medlicott attempted to prove that Bismarck's role in these negotiations was not as predominant as historians had earlier supposed. Yet the moves which Medlicott attributed to the independent actions of Kálnoky were probably influenced to a large extent by Bismarck's advice. This view is supported by the comments of Bismarck's ambassador in Vienna; Reuss admitted that Bismarck's dispatches were so persuasive “that Kálnoky and his Kaiser were convinced by them and not by my ‘persuasive arts,’ to which the dispatch appealed.” Rich, and Fisher, , The Holstein Papers, Vol. III, pp. 203–204Google Scholar.

¹⁵ The German historian Peter Rassow has discovered a document in the Friedrichsruh archives which indicates the relative value which the Bismarcks placed upon the Reinsurance Treaty. In a letter which Herbert von Bismarck sent to his brother William on June 19, 1887, the state secretary described the terms of the treaty as “fairly inconsequential,” except for the fact that in case of a crisis they would “keep the Russians off our necks for an additional six to eight weeks.” See Rassow, Die Stellung Deutschlands, p. 226.

¹⁶ See University of California Films of German Archives, ser. I, reel 10, frames 358–361, No. Dt. 137 secr. See post, pp. 243–244 for the complete text of the document. The rough first draft of the above letter, which is also dated October 26, 1887, can be found in University of California Films of German Archives, ser. I, reel 10, frames 356–357. Otto von Bismarck's original instructions concerning this dispatch are given in a memorandum of Count Kuno von Rantzau, Friedrichsruh, October 19, 1887, ibid., frames 354–355.

¹⁷ This general theme of Germany's role as observer in Balkan affairs was the only reference in Radowitz' memoirs concerning the chancellor's instructions during the last half of 1887. By that time the concept of Germany as a neutral observer had become a well-worn admonition to Bismarck's Near Eastern expert. In his memoirs, Radowitz made no mention of Bismarck's October statements about future European wars. See von Radowitz, Joseph Maria, Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Botschafters Joseph Maria von Radowitz, 1839–1890, edited by Holborn, Hajo (2 vols., Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1925), Vol. II, p. 275Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Rich, and Fisher, , The Holstein Papers, Vol. II, p. 332Google Scholar. Peter Rassow, in commenting on this particular section of Holstein's diary, expressed the opinion that Otto von Bismarck never went along with this “wild” viewpoint of Herbert's (i. e., the concept of separating the western and eastern wars). Yet a few pages later he pointed out that in December, 1887, the chancellor spoke of separating the two spheres of future conflict. Rassow derived his thesis about the chancellor's ambivalent attitude toward a two-front war out of these contradictions in Bismarck's various statements. See Rassow, Die Stellung Deutschlands, pp. 27 and 33–34. See also ante, p. 227, n. 1.

¹⁹ This statement stands in contradiction to a promise which Bismarck made three months later. On January 24, 1888, he assured the Austrians that if Russian military preparations went so far that they left no doubt about Russia's aggressive aims, Germany would mobilize to ward off an attack on Austria. See von Bismarck, Herbert to Reuss, , Berlin, , January 24, 1888, Die Grosse Politik, Vol. VI, pp. 86–87Google Scholar. Bismarck's willingness to clarify the casus foederis at this time may be explained in part by his desire to obtain Austrian support for a military convention with Italy; Bismarck sought Austrian approval of plans to transport Italian troops through Austrian territory. See Die Grosse Politik, Vol. VI, Ch. XLI; and University of California Films of German Archives, ser. II, reel 1, frames 6–124 (October 3, 1887-December 7, 1887). The Austro-Italian military agreements were signed on January 28 and April 14, 1888. See Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, pp. 446–448. Another reason for Bismarck's change in attitude towards the casus foederis was his desire for immediate publication of the text of the Treaty of Austro-German Alliance. He finally succeeded in convincing the Austrians to allow its publication on February 3, 1888. See Die Grosse Politik, Vol. V, pp. 288–290. See also Reuss to Otto von Bismarck, Vienna, January 21, 1888, ibid., pp. 283–284; and Herbert von Bismarck to Reuss, Berlin, January 24, 1888, ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 86–87. Therefore, one could argue that Bismarck's promise of January 24, 1888, was merely a tactical move aimed at immediate diplomatic goals. It is possible that Bismarck's basic plans as outlined on October 26, 1887, remained unchanged by the commitment made to Austria three months later.

²⁰ For opposing views on the value which Bismarck placed on the Austrian alliance, see Eduard, Heller, Das deutsch-österreichisch-ungarische Biindnis in Bismarcks Aussenpolitik (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1925), pp. 81–85 and 114–117Google Scholar; Karl, Schünemann, Die Stellung Österreich-Ungarns in Bismarcks Bündnispolitik (Berlin: Inaugural Dissertation, University of Berlin, 1926), pp. 58–59, 70, and 77Google Scholar; and Wilhelm, Mommsen, Bismarck: ein politisches Lebensbild (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1959), pp. 179–190Google Scholar. Heller, an ardent advocate of the Mitteleuropa idea, saw Austria as the most important and necessary element in Bismarck's international politics. Schünemann answered Heller's argument by stressing Bismarck's cautious and hesitant approach to the Austrian situation. The issue no longer seems worth debating. Most recent scholars agree that Bismarck did not intend his alliances to be permanent arrangements, unaffected by changed circumstances. It is difficult to refute Schünemann's interpretation of the tentative or relative value which Bismarck placed on the Austrian alliance. Wilhelm Mommsen has also stressed the provisional character of this alliance. Recently he has speculated that if Russia and Austria-Hungary had continued to clash, Bismarck would have chosen Russia as his alliance partner. See his Bismarck: ein politisches Lebensbild, p. 190. Although this assertion is impossible to prove, it should be pointed out that Herbert von Bismarck' October 26, 1887, dispatch reinforces Mommsen's thesis that Bismarck was not an exponent of the policy of Nibelungentreue in his relations with Austria-Hungary.

²¹ Medlicott, W. N., “Austria-Hungary and the War Danger of 1887,” Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. VI (December, 1927), pp. 437–441Google Scholar. On the basis of documents written by Kálnoky on August 18, 1887, and January 1, 1888, Medlicott concludes that “there can be no doubt as to Kálnoky's belief both in the loyalty of his ally and in the practical breakdown of the Alliance of the Three Emperors.” Ibid., p. 439.

²² von Bismarck, Otto to Reuss, , Friedrichsruh, , December 15, 1887, Die Grosse Politik, Vol. VI, pp. 24–28, especially p. 27 n.Google Scholar; Otto von Bismarck to Reuss, Priedrichsruh, December 27, 1887, ibid., p. 68. In both of these dispatches the German chancellor indicated that a German declaration of war against France might follow the outbreak of an Austro-Russian war. The editors of Die Grosse Politik, however, refused to accept these statements as proof that Bismarck had planned an aggressive war against France at the end of 1887. They explained Bismarck's reference to the need for “an immediate attack on France” as an argument used to restrain Austria from attacking Russia. See ibid., p. 27. But Herbert von Bismarck's October 26 dispatch to Radowitz cannot be explained on these grounds. In fact, there remains a basic question concerning Bismarck's intentions in the two December dispatches mentioned above. If Bismarck intended to use the information on the inevitability of a Franco-German war as a tactical feint to restrain Austria, why did he explicitly instruct Reuss to keep the information secret? See ibid., pp. 28 and 68. One could counterbalance this objection by maintaining that Bismarck wanted to manipulate and restrain not only his Austrian ally but his ambassador in Austria as well. In light of Reuss' undue encouragement of Austrian military preparations in early December, 1887 (see ibid., pp. 24–25; and Rich, , Friedrich von Holstein, Vol. I, pp. 217–220, especially the footnote references on p. 218), Bismarck possibly created the specter of a Franco-German war as an antidote to Reuss' preoccupation with a probable Austro-Russian war. Yet this writer is still left with the impression that Bismarck's speculations about a preventive war against France amounted to more than mere maneuvers to manipulate Reuss. With Europe on the brink of war in December, 1887, the chancellor was earnestly grappling with urgent problems that bordered between political policy and military strategy. Bismarck's concern about the priority of political decisions over military ones is reflected in the last sentence of the December 27, 1887, dispatch where it was expressly stated that the chancellor hoped that Kálnoky would join him “in preventing or at least postponing the war, and that we would not let military advisers take this responsibility out of our hands.” Die Grosse Politik, Vol. VI, p. 69.Google Scholar Karl-Ernst Jeismann has read and thought more about the problem of preventive war during the whole Bismarckian era than any other contemporary scholar. After a three-page discussion of how Bismarck's two December, 1887, dispatches were primarily tactical devices, Jeismann had to admit that it was possible that Bismarck's military speculations might have been more than simple temporary expedients: “Behind the undebated tactical significance of these decrees lies yet a deeper political consideration,” he wrote, “and one cannot say with certainty whether in the event of the predicted circumstances the chancellor might indeed not have recommended the preventive war against France.” See Jeismann, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges, p. 124. According to Jeismann, the December dispatches fall primarily into the category of “preventive war as a tactical expedient in diplomatic dealings.” Ibid., p. 159. But Jeismann fails to mention or to explain that Reuss was instructed to keep the information dealing with a preventive war secret. Had Herbert von Bismarck's October 26, 1887, dispatch to Radowitz been available to Jeismann, he would perhaps have placed more emphasis on the seriousness of Bismarck's 1887 plans for a preventive war against France. See Jeismann, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges, pp. 121–124.

²³ Copy of a telegram written by Sadoullah Pacha, Turkish ambassador to Austria-Hungary, Vienna, October 6, 1887, appended to Report No. 219 of Radowitz to Otto von Bismarck, Therapia, October 12, 1887, University of California Films of German Archives, ser. II, reel 85, frames 331–334, No. Bulg. 20. In his description of the conversation between Kálnoky and Sadoullah Pacha on October 6, 1887, Kálnoky asserted that “in the moment of danger she [Germany] will be on the side of Austria-Hungary.” Following this sentence a marginal comment by Otto von Bismarck indicates his cautious immediate reaction: “If we, engaged in a war with France, are strong enough for this.” Ibid., frame 333.

²⁴ Memorandum of Count Kuno von Rantzau, Friedrichsruh, October 19, 1887, University of California Films of German Archives, ser. I, reel 10, frame 355, No. Dt. 137 secr.

²⁵ Ibid., frames 354–355. See also ante, p. 236, n. 23.

²⁶ Die Groaae Politik, Vol. VI, pp. 27 and 68.

²⁷ Memorandum of Count Kuno von Rantzau, Friedrichsruh, October 19, 1887, University of California Films of German Archives, ser. I, reel 10, frame 355.

²⁸ Hajo, Holborn, Deutschland und die Türkei (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1926), p. 1Google Scholar. See ibid., pp. 46–49, for Holborn's excellent survey of German-Turkish relations between 1887 and 1889. Although it was published in 1926, Holborn's study still has value, because the author had access to unpublished German Foreign Office documents and to Radowitz' unpublished papers. Holborn stresses the theme of “disinterestedness” in Bismarck's Near Eastern policy. Although anxious to maintain friendly relations with the sultan and eager to win an influential position in Constantinople, Bismarck, according to Holborn, never retracted his original opinion that Germany was an “impartial” observer in Near Eastern affairs. At the end of the 1880's, however, Bismarck was more inclined than before occasionally to use his influence in Constantinople for immediate tactical purposes. See ibid., p. 69. See also Rich's succinct synopsis of Bismarck's Near Eastern policy in his Friedrich von Holstein, Vol. I, pp. 175 and 214–216. Rich lucidly explains how Bismarck attempted to balance Russian power in the Near East without involving Germany. “In doing this,” Rich writes, “Bismarck painstakingly kept Germany free from commitments in Eastern Europe on the grounds that Germany had no interest in that area and that her primary need was to face the threat from France… It was hardly a straightforward policy, but it did keep Russia temporarily out of the arms of France and it did preserve the peace of Europe.” Ibid., p. 175.

²⁹ Holborn, Deutschland und die Türkei, pp. 59–60. Using unpublished German Foreign Office documents, Holborn describes in detail Radowitz' conversation with the sultan during the second week of October, 1887, concerning German complaints against Russia. Bismarck gave Radowitz permission to make the sultan fully aware of Russia's dangerous revolutionary and anti-German activities. Holborn, however, points out that this conversation of early October represented the “outer limit” of Bismarck's anti-Russian policy in Turkey at that time. Ibid., p. 60. For the unpublished reports of Radowitz and dispatches from Berlin to Turkey during the first two weeks of October, 1887, see University of California Films of German Archives, ser. II, reel 85, frames 288–321, No. Bulg. 20. Otto von Bismarck's switch to the advocacy of an anti-Russian position in Constantinople is most clearly evident in frames 289–291, 302, and 320. For the background and further indications of Bismarck's shift to an anti-Russian position in Constantinople, see Die Grosse Politik, Vol. V, pp. 200–201, 203–205, 324, and the footnotes on pp. 324–325. On October 20, 1887, Bernhard von Bülow, the German chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg, reported Russian concern about the recent change in German attitude towards Russia, especially in Constantinople. Bismarck's marginal comment on the above report provides a curt characterization of the new German attitude towards Russia: “Distrust, naturally.” Die Grosse Politik, Vol. VI, pp. 117–118, especially p. 118, n. 3. See also Rich, Friedrich von Holstein, Vol. I, pp. 214–216.

³⁰ See Holborn, Deutschland und die Türkei, p. 60.

³¹ von Bismarck, Herbert to Rantzau, , Berlin, , October 21, 1887, Bussmann, Walter (ed.), Staatssekretär Graf Herbert von Bismarck: aus seiner politischen Privatkorrespondenz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), pp. 477–478Google Scholar.

³² See Die Grosse Politik, Vol. V, p. 324; and Vol. VI, pp. 47 and 50, ns. 6 and 7. See also Jeismann's account in Das Problem des Präventivkrieges, p. 120.

³³ See ante, p. 236, n. 23. See also Report No. 217 of Radowitz to Otto von Bismarck, Therapia, October 10, 1887, University of California Films of German Archives, ser. II, reel 85, frames 319–321, No. Bulg. 20. The concluding lines of this report suggest that Radowitz himself tended to exaggerate Germany's support for Austria. In his conversation with Turkish officials, Radowitz stressed that the friendship between Austria and Germany was “unshakable,” and that it would not “be undermined by the Bulgarian question.” Ibid., frame 321.

³⁴ See ante, pp. 238–239, n. 29.

³⁵ Marginal comment made by Otto von Bismarck on Report No. 217 of Radowitz to Otto von Bismarck, Therapia, October 10, 1887, University of California Films of German Archives, ser. II, reel 85, frame 321, No. Bulg. 20. Bismarck wrote this comment alongside Radowitz' description of the sultan's irresolute attitude and his unwillingness to discuss political problems in depth.

³⁶ University of California Films of German Archives, ser. I, reel 10, frames 358–361, No. Dt. 137 secr. This document was not published in either Die Grosse Politik or Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke. The author of the present article is responsible for the English translation. The original German text reads as follows: Berlin 26. Oktober 1887 Graf [Herbert] Bismarck an den Botschafter in Constantinople Sicher, No. 214, Vertraulich Aus Ew. gefälligem Bericht No. 219 vom 12. c. hat der Herr Reichskanzler mit Befriedigung ersehen, dass Graf Kálnoky dem türkischen Botschafter in Wien gegenüber eine feste Sprache führt. Seine Durchlaucht hält dies einmal für nützlich, um den Türken mehr Vertrauen und mehr Muth zum Widerstande zu geben, und ist ferner der Ansicht, dass die Auffassung des österreichischungarischen Ministers, wie sie sich in Ihrem Berichte wiederspiegelt, im Grossen und Ganzen durchaus richtig ist. Beim naheren Eingehen auf den letzteren äusserte sich Fürst Bismarck folgendermassen: ‘Wir fühlen uns von Russland nicht nur nicht freundlich behandelt sondern geradezu bedroht durch seine französischen Demonstrationen. Dass wir mit Frankreich in einigen Jahren, früher Oder später, zum Kriege kommen werden, ist vorauszusehen und unvermeidlich, die Parteinahme Russlands für Frankreich also eine direkte Bedrohung für uns. Ich glaube nicht, dass Russland nach dem Orient hin einen offensiven Vorstoss zu machen beabsichtigt, und wenn Russland von Oesterreich angegriffen werden sollte, so wäre das an und für sich noch kein casus foederis für uns. Der Gedanke, qu'au moment du danger I'Allemagne serait du côté de I'Autriche, ist zwar theoretisch richtig, practisch werden wir aber zu Oesterreichs Unterstützung nicht viel übrig haben, weil der deutschfranzösische Krieg gleichzeitig mit dem österreichisch-russischen ausbrechen wird. Bei der Sicherheit, mit der wir den Ersteren voraussehen, wird es für uns nothwendig sein, in dem Falle des russisch-österreichischen Krieges unsererseits Frankreich anzugreifen, so dass dann ein orientalischer Krieg von Oesterreich, Italien, wahrscheinlich England und der Balkanstaaten verbündet gegen Russland und in West-Europa ein deutsch-französischer Krieg gleichzeitig geführt werden würden. Die Pforte würde dann die Wahl haben, ob sie mit ihren früheren Vasallen Bulgaren, Rumänen und Serben auf Seiten Oesterreich-Italien-Englands gegen Russland oder auf Seiten Russlands gegen die Verbündeten kämpfen will. ‘Wir werden den französischen Krieg aufzunehmen uns nicht scheuen, da wir voraussehen, dass wir ihn nicht vermeiden können. Einen russischen Krieg würden wir ohne Noth nicht führen, da wir keine Interessen haben, die dadurch gefördert werden könnten, und die Russen nur durch Hetzereien für französisches Geld und Mangel an politischer Bildung gegen uns aufgeregt werden.’ Ew. wollen das Vorstehende als lediglich für Ihre eigene Information bestimmt ansehen.