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Bismarck on Austrian Parliamentarianism, 1867–1890
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2009
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There is general agreement among historians that Otto von Bismarck never really approved of the principles of parliamentary government advocated by the nineteenth century progeny of the French Enlightenment, even though he could tolerate particular parliamentary institutions when he considered it practical to do so.1 Thus, while he looked upon political theorizing about natural laws of society and the natural rights of man—the philosophical bases of modern parliamentarianism—as futile efforts to oversimplify the complex nature of social and political organization and regarded revolutionary attempts to implement such rationalizations as sinful and arrogant intermeddling in the divinelyordained, hierarchical social order, he, nonetheless, rejected the rigidly legitimist anti-liberal concepts espoused by the post-1848 Metternichian reactionaries. While the latter called for a total repression of all revolutionary movements, Bismarck, perceiving the futility of sheer negativism, sought to capture revolutionary forces and enlist them in the service of the traditional ruling circle wherever it was possible to do so.
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References
1 For excellent analyses of Bismarck's political ideas, see Hajo, Holborn, “Bismarck's Realpolitik,” The Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXI (1960), pp. 84–98Google Scholar; Otto, Pflanze, “Bismarck's Realpolitik,” The Review of Politics, Vol. XX (1958), pp. 492–514Google Scholar; and Rein, Gustav A., “Bismarcks Royalismus,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, Vol. V (1954), pp. 330–349Google Scholar. For more detailed treatments, see Otto, Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: the Period of Unification, 1815–1871 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Rein, Gustav A., Die Revolution in der Politik Bismarcke (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1957)Google Scholar; and Hans, Mombauer, Bismarcks Realpolitik ah Ausdruck seiner Weltanschauung (Berlin: Emil Ebering Verlag, 1936).Google Scholar
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3 Holborn, “Bismarck's Realpolitik,” pp. 91–92.
4 See Hermann, Oncken, “Die Baden-Badener Denkschrift uber die Deutsche Bundesreform (July, 1861),” Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. CXLV (1931), pp. 106–130Google Scholar; Enno, Kraehe, “Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation,” The American Historical Review, Vol. LVI (1951), pp. 291–294Google Scholar; Clark, Chester W., Franz Joseph and Bismarck (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 345–346, 397, and 467Google Scholar; and Heinrich, von Poschinger (ed.), Bismarck und die Parliamentarier (3 vols., Breslau: Trewendt Verlag, 1894), Vol. I, pp. 60–61.Google Scholar
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18 Bismarck to Schweinitz, Berlin, January 12, 1870, Bismarck: die gesammelten Werke, Vol. VIb, Doc. No. 1475, p. 209.
19 Unpublished report by Schweinitz with marginal comments by Bismarck, Vienna, February 8, 1870, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 59, Vol. I, Doc. No. 412.
20 Bismarck to Schweinitz, Berlin, February 12, 1870, Bismarck: die gesammelten Werke, Vol. VIb, Doc. No. 1500, p. 242.21Bismarck to Schweinitz, Berlin, February 20, 1870, Ibid., Doc. No. 1512, p. 254.
22 Bismarck to Schweinitz, Berlin, February 7, 1871, Wertheimer, Andrássy, Vol. I, p. 551.
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32 Wertheimer, Andrássy, Vol. II, p. 138.
33 Marginal comments by Bismarck on an unpublished report by Wäcker-Gotter, consul in Budapest, November 27, 1878, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 58 (“Correspondence with the Consul in Pest concerning Conditions in Hungary”), Vol. VII, Doc. No. 6678. Wäcker felt that Herbst's objections had been well taken and contended that he, like the Austro-German Liberals, would “have raised the competence question in the same way.” Bismarck interjected: “[Wäcker is] thus also a Herbst!”.
34 Marginal comments by Bismarck on an unpublished report by Prince Reuss, ambassador in Vienna, November 30, 1878, Ibid., Doc. No. 6672.
35 Remarks by Hei'bert von Bismarck, the chancellor's son and secretary, to Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, in an unpublished letter dealing with the chancellor's views, August 9, 1883, Ibid., Vol. IX, Doc. No. 3696.
36 This view was shared by William I and Prince Reuss. See the letter from Ernst, Kleist, a Berlin journalist, to Julius Lang of the Prager Wochenblatt, Berlin, February 4, 1879, Arthur, Skedl (ed.), Graf Eduard Taaffe: die politische Nachlass (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1922), pp. 2520–2522; and Reuss to Biilow, Vienna, February 8 and April 24, 1879, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 70 (“General Austrian Affairs”), Vol. I, Doc. No. 700; and Vol. II, Doc. No. 2290. It should be noted, however, that Reuss soon changed his mind. See Wertheimer, Bismarck im politischen Kampf, pp. 495–496.Google Scholar
37 Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, pp. 178–179. Prince Reuss had already reported the vigorous campaigning by Slavophile forces prior to the Reichsrat elections of the late summer. He had also indicated that the Taaffe ministry openly supported the anti-German forces during the campaign and that after the elections the majority of the new Reichsrat had a Germanophobe orientation. This information was dispatched to Berlin in letters dated June 30, July 10, and July 18, 1879. See German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 70, Vol. I, Doc. Nos. 3690, 3707, and 4149.
38 The alliance aroused a somewhat greater nationalistic enthusiasm in Austria than in the German empire. See Carroll, E. Malcolm, Germany and the Great Powers, 1866–1914: a Study in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938), pp. 159–160Google Scholar; and Karl, Hatzfeld, Das deutsch-österreichische Bündnis von 1879 in der Beurteilung der politischen Parteien Deutschlands (Berlin: Emil Ebering Verlag, 1938), passim. Erich Eyck has pointed out in his Bismarck: Leben und Werk (3 vols., Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1941–44), Vol. Ill, pp. 341–342, that most Reich-Germans were unaware that the Austrian-Germans were losing their position of power and influence in the Habsburg monarchy and that the alliance would inevitably accelerate this trend.Google Scholar
39 The statements which Bismarck made in the fall of 1879 to Emperor William I and to the French ambassador about the alliance existing in German public sentiment were probably motivated by ulterior political considerations. In actual fact, Bismarck had little regard for public opinion and little sympathy with the nonsensical assertions of many Germans that the alliance provided a logical conclusion to the process of German unification begun in the 1860's. See Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, pp. 196–197; Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford: Ozford University Press, 1954), p. 262Google Scholar; Rothfels, Bismarck, der Osten und das Reich, pp. 58–59; and Karl, Schünemann, “Die Stellung Österreich-Ungarns in Bismarcks Bündnispolitik,” Archiv für Politik und Geschichte, Vol. VI (1926), pp. 549–594Google Scholar. On the question of whether Bismarck was a German nationalist or a Prussian patriot, see Otto, Pflanze, “Bismarck and German Nationalism,” The American Historical Review, Vol. LX (1955), pp. 548–566; and also his Bismarck and the Development of Germany, pp. 3–14.Google Scholar
40 Marginal comments by Bismarck on a letter from Reuss, Vienna, April 17, 1880, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 70, Vol. VI, Doc. No. 2248. Bismarck was surprised that Taaffe suspended one of the ministers for only a year.
41 In June Reuss reported that, due to the outcome of the elections of 1879, the Czechs were acting as though they had at last won their fight against Deutsehtum, that the Austro-Germans were facing the future with growing anxiety, and that federalism seemed to be just around the corner. Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, June 5, 1880, Ibid., Vol. VII, Doc. No. 3408. On July 17 Reuss informed Bismarck that, in an effort to get Czech support for the annual military budget, Taaffe had initiated a number of language ordinances obliging all judicial and administrative officials in Bohemia and Moravia to render their decisions in the language of the petitioners and to conduct the trials in the language of the accused. These innovations meant that local civil servants would be compelled to speak both German and Czech—a distinct handicap to the Germans, who as a rule refused to learn Czech, while the Czechs were usually bilingual. Prince Reuss concluded that the new language ordinances would convert Austria into a federal state and that the complete suppression of the German element would quickly follow. Ibid., Vol. VII, Doc. No. 3712. Bismarck apparently wrote nothing at all to Reuss in response to these reports.
42 The chancellor's comments forwarded by Herbert von Bismarck to Dr. Moritz Busch, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, Kissingen, July 7, 1881, Ibid., Vol. X, Doc. No. 4271.
43 The “national historical school,” a product of eighteenth century German cameralism and the teachings of Friedrich Liszt in the 1840's, included the leading economists in German universities during the 1870's and 1880's. The leading figures in the movement were Adolph Wagner, Gustav Schmoller, and Lujo Brentano. In a manifesto at Eisenach in 1872 the leaders of the “national historical school” declared war upon Classical Liberalism and demanded that the state be more than a “passive policeman” and assume the role of regulating and planning the entire economy in the interest of all the people.
44 The Foreign Office to Berchem, Legationsrat in the Vienna embassy, Berlin, January 19, 1884, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 58, Vol. X, Doc. No. 233.
45 Berchem to Bismarck, Vienna, November 6, 14, and 18, 1880, ibid., File 70, Vol. VIII, Doc. Nos. 6999, 7177, and 7277.
46 The chancellor's instructions forwarded by Herbert von Bismarck to Dr. Busch, Friedrichsruhe, November 18, 1880, Ibid., Doc. No. 7177.
47 The chancellor's instructions forwarded by Herbert von Bismarck to Dr. Busch, Kissingen, July 7, 1881, Ibid., Vol. X, Doc. No. 4271.
48 Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, July 25, 1881, Ibid., Doc. No. 4606.
49 The chancellor's comments forwarded by Dr. Busch to Reuss, Berlin, July 30, 1881, Ibid., Doc. No. 4647.
50 In his Memoirs, edited by Voigt, F. A. (4 vols., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1931), Vol. IV, pp. 399–400Google Scholar, Bernhard von Bülow notes that the Austrian Liberal, “who often suffered under Prince Bismarck's unfriendly treatment,” was referred to by the chancellor as an “autumn crocus”—a term that deeply offended Dr. Herbst, since the autumn crocus is a poisonous plant which blossoms in the late fall (der Herbst) but bears fruit a year later.
51 Speeches by Bismarck on June 12 and 14, 1882, Bismarck: die gesammelten Werke, Vol. XII, pp. 362–364.
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53 The Foreign Office to Berchem, Berlin, January 19, 1884, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 58, Vol. X, Doc. No. 233.
54 On the subject of Pan-Germanism in Austria, see Eduard, Pichl, Georg Schönerer und die Entwicklung des Alldeutschtums in der Ostmark (6 vols., Vienna: Alldeutscher Verein fur die Ostmark, 1913), Vol. I, pp. 97–101Google Scholar; Molisch, Geschichte der deutschnationalen Bewegung in Österreich, passim; and Meyer, Henry Cord, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815–1945 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), pp. 39–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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56 Poschinger, Also sprach Bismarck, Vol. Ill, pp. 41–42. Schönerer's clique was under the illusion that, although Bismarck officially con- demned Pan-Germanism, he privately agreed with Schönerer's goals. See Schnee, “Bismarck und der deutsche Nationalisms in Österreich,” p. 143. How completely Bismarck detested the Pan-German movement may be deduced from his reaction to an incident which took place in 1883. When Schönerer's followers staged their first demonstration in Vienna on March 5 in honor of Richard Wagner and annoyed Francis Joseph by singing Die Wacht am Rhein in front of various government buildings, Bismarck was delighted to learn that the government dispersed the mob with force and had Schönerer arrested. On Reuss' report describing the measures taken against the demonstrators the chancellor entered the marginal comment: “Quite natural and justifiable.” Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, March 12,1883, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 70, Vol. XV, Doc. No. 1130.
57 Bismarck to Reuss, Berlin, July 7,1885, Ibid., Vol. XX, Doc. No. 6422.
58 Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, June 5,1885, Ibid., Doc. No. 4561.
59 Reuss to Bismarck, Vienna, November 8, 1885, Wertheimer, Bismarck im politischen Kampf, p. 495.
60 Bismarck made no official comment on Reuss' observations; but when Count Wedel, the German military attaché in Vienna, bemoaned the fact that the Germans were in greater disrepute at court since the elections, the chancellor made the following notation in Wedel's report: “That is natural!” Wedel to Bismarck, June 30, 1885, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 70, Vol. XX, Doc. No. 5422. Also, in a letter to Wedel, Bismarck remarked that the Germans were justly suffering the consequences of having forced a parliamentary system on the emperor. Bismarck to Wedel, July 1, 1885, Ibid., Doc. No. 5422.
61 Bismarck to Reuss, Berlin, February 4, 1886, Ibid., Doc. No. 1555.
62 Bismarck's instructions for Reuss forwarded by Rantzau, the chan- cellor's son-in-law and councillor, to the Foreign Office, Friedrichsruhe, November 21,1886, Ibid., File 84 (“The Czechs”), Vol. I, Doc. No. 14167.
63 Memorandum by Herbert von Bismarck, Vienna, October 15, 1888, Die Groase Politik, Vol. VI, Doc. No. 1352, pp. 346–349. Several Austro- German representatives who favored the government's military program asked Bismarck to persuade the “Herbst clique” to abandon its traditional opposition to increased appropriations for the army. They suggested that an appeal by Bismarck in the Reich-German official press would carry great weight among members of the German club in the Austrian Reichsrat. Bismarck refused this request, however, because he feared that his intervention would be looked upon in Austria as evidence of “some special relationship between us and the Austro-Germans” and would thus offend the emperor. The chancellor's instructions forwarded by Herbert von Bismarck to Reuss, Berlin, December 7, 1888, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 73 (“Austro-Hungarian Military Affairs”), Vol. XVII, Doc. No. 14163.
64 See Rothfels, Bismarck, der Osten und das Reich, pp. 64–66; and Meyer, Mitteleuropa, p. 47.
65 Taaffe referred to his system as one of fortwurstein. Reuss described it in a similar vein. He maintained that the Austrian minister “works and thinks by the day and hates to be questioned about the future of the monarchy.” Reuss to Bismarck, November 8, 1885, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 70, Vol. XXII, Doc. No 10,125. Good analyses of the Taaffe System may be found in Hantsch, Die Geschichte Österreichs, Vol. II, pp. 414–439; May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, pp. 191–226; and von Czedik, Alois Freiherr, Zur Geschichte der k.-k. österreichischen Ministerien, 1861–1916 (4 vols., Teschen: Prochaska Verlag, 1917–1920), Vol. I, pp. 339–391.Google Scholar
66 Bismarck to Andrassy, Varzin, December 18, 1879, Bismarck: die gesammelten Werke, Vol. XIV/II, Doc. No. 1626, p. 912.
67 The chancellor's instructions forwarded by Herbert von Bismarck to Dr. Busch, Friedrichsruhe, November 18, 1880, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Austria, File 70, Vol. VIII, Doc. No. 7177.
68 The chancellor's instructions for Reuss forwarded by Herbert von Bismarck to Dr. Busch, Kissingen, July 30, 1881, Ibid., Vol. X, Doc. No. 4647.
69 The chancellor's comments forwarded by the Foreign Office to Wedel, Berlin, July 1, 1885, Ibid., Vol. XX, Doc. No. 5422.
70 In 1888, when Bismarck learned of the intention of Czech nationalists to participate in the Paris Fair and thereby demonstrate “the cultural unity of the lands of St. Wenceslas,” he was especially concerned that the lenience of the Taaffe regime toward the Slavs was inviting treasonable activity on the part of the Czechs. See Wertheimer, Bismarck im politi8chen Kampf, p. 507.
71 See Friedrich, Engel-Janosi, Österreich und der Vatikan (2 vols., Graz: Verlag Styria, 1958), Vol. II, pp. 109–125.Google Scholar
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73 Wedel to Bismarck, Vienna, June 30, 1885, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Atistria, File 70, Vol. XX, Doc. No. 5422; Schweinitz to Bismarck, Petersburg, January 10, 1887, Ibid., Vol. XXII, Doc. No. 345; Reuss to Holstein, Vienna, February 1, 1887, Norman, Rich and Fisher, M. H. (eds.), The Holstein Papers (4 vols., Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1955–1963), Vol. Ill, p. 203Google Scholar; Alfred, von Waldersee, Denkwiirdigkeiten (3 vols., Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1922–1923), Vol. I, p. 294; and Ballhausen, Bismarck-Erinnerungen, p. 359.Google Scholar
74 In the earliest studies of Bismarck's diplomacy during the critical years from 1885 to 1888, the alliance with Austria was viewed as the most important and the most stable element in Bismarck's international system. See Fuller, Joseph V., Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1922), pp. 321–322Google Scholar; and Eduard, Heller, Das deutsch-österreichische Bündnis in Bismarcks Aussenpolitik (Berlin: E. S. Mittler Verlag, 1925), passimGoogle Scholar. von Falkenstein, Heinz Trützschler went so far in his Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr des Jahres 1887 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt für Politik und Geschichte, 1924), p. 153Google Scholar, as to state that Bismarck “always showed his intentions to Austria in a spirit of the utmost loyalty and candor.” However, in “Die Stellung Österreich-Ungarns in Bismarcks Bündnispolitik,” Archiv für Politik und Geschichte, Vol. IV (1926), pp. 549–594, Karl Schünemann challenged this thesis by pointing out how leery Bismarck was of Austrian ambitions in the Balkans. The Schünemann thesis has been further reinforced by Peter, Rassow in his Die Stellung Deutschlands im Kreise der Grossen Máchte, 1887–1890 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1959)Google Scholar; and by Wilhelm, Mommsen in his Bismarck: ein politisches Lebensbild (Munich: F. Bruckmann Verlag, 1959). The conflict of interests between Berlin and Vienna during the crisis of 1887- 88 has been explained in detail by William L. Langer in his European Alliances and Alignments, pp. 365–407.Google Scholar
75 See Behrendt, Die polnische Frage und das öaterreichisch-deutsche Bündnis, pp. 28–78.
76 Wertheimer, Bismarck im politischen Kampf, pp. 502–506.
77 Ibid., p. 511.
78 Wolfgang, Horsch, Unstimmigkeiten im deutsch-österreichischen Bündnis Ende 1888 und Anfang 1889 (Urach: Bühlersche Verlag, 1931), passim.Google Scholar
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81 Francesco, Crispi, Memoirs (3 vols., London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912–1914), Vol. Ill, pp. 24–25. Bismarck expressed himself in a similar vein to others. He told Ambassador Schweinitz on October 18, 1888, that he was seriously thinking about dropping Austria because of the growing disunity of the army. See Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, Vol. II, p. 130. In a cabinet meeting nine days later he stated that “the Austrian alliance is evaporating because it is losing its inner vitality.” See Ballhausen, Bismarck-Erinnerungen, p. 480.Google Scholar
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