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An 1853 Formula for Ottoman Victory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2009
Extract
Eighteen hundred and fifty-three was a fateful year in European diplomacy. The irritating and danger-laden Eastern Question once more moved out of the control of Europe's statesmen; and when the Ottoman and Russian empires locked in combat French and British leaders moved rapidly to form an alliance with the Turks. While objecting to implications by Tsar Nicholas that the government in Constantinople was “sick” and “dying,” the western nations testified to the validity of his remarks by their actions. Turkish moribundity was taken for granted in the next two years, and Turkey's allies were to treat her virtually as a satellite.
- Type
- War and Society: The Impact of War on Politics, Diplomacy, and Social Change
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- Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 1978
References
1 The events of 1853 are recounted in many places but perhaps most explicitly in Harold Temperley. England and the Near East: The Crimea (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1936), pp. 300–371.Google Scholar
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7 György Klapka was born at Temesvár in 1820. Entering the Austrian army in 1838, he joined the Hungarian revolutionaries in 1848. In early 1849 he replaced General Mészáros. As a general he commanded an army corps which played critical roles in several Hungarian victories, including those at Kapólna, Waitzen, and Komárom for two more months before being forced to surrender. Going into exile, Klapka continuously agitated for the Hungarian cause. In 1866 he was a Prussian major general, and in this capacity he organized a Hungarian legion in Upper Silesia. In 1867, having been 825S. J. G. Calthorpe, Letters from Headquarters (2nd ed., 2 vols., London: John Murray. 1857). Vol. I, pp. 17–18; Slade, Turkey ami the Crimean War, p. 101. 'The “Memoire sur la defense de l'Empire Ottoman contre l'invasion Russe” (hereafter cited as “Mfcmoire”) was completed at Constantinople on September 30, 1853. A copy is included as the second annex to Edouard Blondeel van Cuelebroeck, Belgian ambassador at Constantinople, to Henri de Brouckere, Belgian foreign minister, January 4, 1854 (see also same to same, January 5, 1854), which is housed in the Belgian Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et du Commerce Exterieure, Correspondance Politique: Legations, Turquie, Fasc. V (1854). 'Gyorgy Klapka was born at Temesvar in 1820. Entering the Austrian army in 1838, he joined the Hungarian revolutionaries in 1848. In early 1849 he replaced General Meszaros. As a general he commanded an army corps which played critical roles in several Hungarian victories, including those at Kap61na, Waitzen, and Komarom for two more months before being forced to surrender. Going into exile, Klapka continuously agitated for the Hungarian cause. In 1866 he was a Prussian major general, and in this capacity he organized a Hungarian legion in Upper Silesia. In 1867, having been allowed to return home, he won election to the Hungarian chamber of deputies. Between 1873 and 1877 he reorganized the Ottoman army. He died at Budapest in 1892.
János Czetz was born in 1822 at Gidofalva, Transylvania, and studied military affairs at Wiener Neustadt. In 1846 he joined the general staff of the Austrian army. He supported the Hungarian uprising of 1848, becoming General Mészáros' aide-de-camp. Kossuth next appointed him chief of the general staff in Transylvania. He played an important role in the army of General Józef Bern, who promoted him to general and gave him the command of Transylvania. Suffering a leg wound, he went into exile after the fall of Világos in August, 1849. In 1859 he was in Italy with Klapka and Kossuth organizing a Hungarian legion to fight against the Austrians. His later years were spent in Buenos Aires directing a military school. He died in Buenos Aires in 1904.
Both Klapka and Czetz wrote works on military subjects, including their memoirs, in which they emphasized their experiences in the Hungarian revolt. They were regarded as able officers, and their opinions on military topics were highly respected.
8 “Mémoire,” Pt. 1 (politique), p. 3.
9 Ibid., p. 4.
10 Ibid., p. 6.
11 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
12 Some 50,000 Russian troops were already in the Principalities at the time the “memoire” was written. Schroeder, Paul W., Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 43.Google Scholar Klapka's and Czetz's estimate of 200,000 as the maximum number of men available for operations against Turkey agreed with that of Urquhart. See his The Military Strength of Turkey, p. 112.
13 “Mémoire,” Pt. 2 (militaire), pp. 1–2.
14 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
15 Ibid., pp. 3–5.
16 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
17 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
18 Guerrilla warfare against the Russians had been going on in the Caucasus for years. Particularly prominent as a rebel in that region was a Daghestan chieftain, the legendary Schamyl. See Blake, R. L. V. ffrench, The Crimean War (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1972), pp. 22–25.Google Scholar
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21 Ibid., p. 9.
22 Ibid. There was widespread agreement that Georgia was among Russia's most vulnerable provinces. See Handelsman, Marceli, Czartoryski, Nicolas Ier el la question du Proche Orient (Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 1934), p. 43.Google Scholar
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24 Ibid., pp. 11–13.
25 Ibid., p. 13.
26 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
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29 Klapka, George, The War in the East (London: Chapman and Hall, 1855), p. 61.Google Scholar See also pp. 39–61. On p. 36 Klapka briefly refers to advice previously given to the sultan for a Caucasus-oriented campaign. This is the closest reference to the “mémoire” anywhere in the literature. Even Kinglake, the Crimean War's major historian, mentions neither advice sought by the sultan nor any of the fighting on the Caucasus front. The French and English leaders apparently never knew of the “mémoire,” and Klapka was certainly correct in believing that they gave very little consideration to the idea of an offensive in the Caucasus. It should be noted that Klapka was strongly suspected of being the author of an anonymous pamphlet. La conduite de la guerre en Orient (Brussels, 1855), an emphatic denunciation of allied leadership in the field by “a General Officer,” which triggered a response from Napoleon III himself in Le Moniteur on April 11, 1855. See Gooch, . The New Bonapartist Generals in the Crimean War, pp. 66–68 and 169–172.Google Scholar