¹ Liddell Hart, Basil H., The British Way in Warfare: Adaptability and Mobility (London, 1942).Google Scholar See also Lawrence, Freedman, “Alliance and the British Way in Warfare,” Review of International Studies 21 (1995): 145–58,Google Scholar and Alex, Danchev, “Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach,” Journal of Military History 63 (1997): 313–37.Google Scholar

² For example, Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York, 1973);Google ScholarKiernan, Frank A. Jr and Fairbank, John K., eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, Mass., 1974);CrossRefGoogle ScholarBaxter, William P., The Soviet Way of Warfare (London, 1986).Google Scholar See also Hanson, Victor Davis, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York, 1989).Google Scholar

³ Snyder, Jack L., The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, RANDR-2154-AF (Santa Monica, Calif., 1977).Google Scholar

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⁵ McInnes, Hot War, Cold War, 3.

⁶ Rothenberg, Gunther E., “The Shield of the Dynasty: Reflections on the Habsburg Army, 1649–1918,” in this volume, and in his previous works, including The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, Ind., 1976; reprint ed., 1998);Google ScholarNapoleon's, Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792–1814 (Bloomington, Ind., 1982); The Military Border in Croatia, 1740–1881 (Chicago, 1966); and The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522–1747 (Champaign–Urbana, III., 1960).Google Scholar

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⁸ Lawrence, Sondhaus, In the Service of the Emperor: Italians in the Austrian Armed Forces, 1814–1918 (Boulder, Colo., 1990), 59–60.Google Scholar

⁹ Hanson, Victor Davis, “Western Military Dynamism and the Legacy of Hellenism,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Chicago, III., January 8, 2000.Google Scholar

¹⁰ With its own population booming at a rate higher than that of Austria–Hungary, Germany, in fact, did not maintain such a level of military strength in peacetime. Only on the eve of World War I did the army insist on, and the Reichstag fund, an expansion of the army to a level of strength equal to 1 percent of the population.

¹¹ Owen, Connelly, Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns (Wilmington, Del., 1987), 1.Google Scholar

¹² For more detail on the arguments raised in the following paragraphs, see Lawrence, Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architect of the Apocalypse (Boston, 2000).Google Scholar