¹ Among notable early critics, Moriz Edler von Angeli, Wien nach 1848 (Vienna, 1905), and Eduard Bartels von Bartberg, Der Krieg im Jahre 1866 (Leipzig, 1867) and Der Krieg im jahre 1859 (Bamberg, 1894), were probably the most important. Other critical observers included R. W.Seton–Watson and Colonel Thomas á Court Repington, while the most vociferous detractors of their ally included Generals Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen (Berlin, 1919), and Max Hoffman, War Diaries and Other Papers, 2 vols. (London, 1929).

² For an excellent summary of the historiography of the Austro–Hungarian mobilization and deployment and its bias, see Tunstall, Graydon A. Jr, Planning for War against Russia and Serbia: Austro–Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871–1914 (New York, 1993), 189–209.Google Scholar

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