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Cooperative Game Theory and its Insurance Applications

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2014

Jean Lemaire
Jean Lemaire*
Affiliation:
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, USA
*
Department of Insurance and Risk Management, Wharton School, 3641 Locust Walk, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218.
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Abstract

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This survey paper presents the basic concepts of cooperative game theory, at an elementary level. Five examples, including three insurance applications, are progressively developed throughout the paper. The characteristic function, the core, the stable sets, the Shapley value, the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are defined and computed for the different examples.

Type
Invited Paper
Information
ASTIN Bulletin: The Journal of the IAA , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , April 1991 , pp. 17 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © International Actuarial Association 1991

References

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