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An Application of Game Theory: Cost Allocation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2014

Jean Lemaire
Jean Lemaire*
Affiliation:
Université Libre de Bruxelles
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Summary

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The allocation of operating costs among the lines of an insurance company is one'of the toughest problems of accounting; it is first shown that most of the methods used by the accountants fail to satisfy some natural requirements. Next it is proved that a cost allocation problem is identical to the determination of the value of a cooperative game with transferable utilities, and 4 new accounting methods that originate from game theory are proposed. One of those methods, the proportional nucleus, is recommended, due to its properties. Several practical examples are discussed throughout the paper.

Keywords

Game theorycost allocation
Type
Research Article
Information
ASTIN Bulletin: The Journal of the IAA , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , April 1984 , pp. 61 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © International Actuarial Association 1984

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