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The Way to Understand the Nature and Extent of Judicial Independence in China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 September 2018

Yanrong ZHAO*
Affiliation:
China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing
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Abstract

In order to portray the true extent of judicial independence in China’s judicial practices, this article first clarifies the contested meanings of “judicial independence” within Chinese judicial circles and provides a detailed literature review of the main school of thoughts on the extent of judicial independence in China. In contrast to the existing literature—most of which sees judicial independence in China as stagnant—this thesis suggests employing the strategic interaction approach to study the development of impartial adjudication in China and argues that the extent of adjudicative independence is evolving with the amount of judicial discretion afforded by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to judges.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press and KoGuan Law School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University 2018 

1. OBJECTIVES OF THIS ARTICLE

The idea of judicial independence (司法独立) originated in Europe and was further developed in the US by America’s founding fathers.Footnote 1 As a multifaceted concept, in a narrow definition, it first served as a touchstone for determining the degree of the court system’s capacity to impartially administer justiceFootnote 2 and is regarded as essential to the preservation of law and liberty.Footnote 3 Furthermore, it is also believed to have a close link with the political structure of separation of powers designed to minimize government tyranny.Footnote 4 Thus, the introduction of this significant notion to China’s political frameworkFootnote 5 has caused considerable debate among Chinese scholars, Western scholars, and between Western and Chinese scholars.Footnote 6

China is conventionally portrayed as being without judicial independence in a country ruled by a single Party without the political structure of separation of powers.Footnote 7 Moreover, this criticism also has its roots in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s historical policy on the judiciary (司法). As many Western and Chinese scholars have noted, after the CCP was founded in 1921, the Marxist-Leninist approach of “using law as a tool—to remould society, suppress class enemies and enforce Party policy,”Footnote 8 rather than protecting individual rights—became doctrine. The courts were to serve as instruments for suppressing the enemies of the state. So, as Avino comments, “justice was politicised, class distinctions were made in enforcing justice, and mass trials for political indoctrination were introduced.”Footnote 9 Such features became an important part of the so-called “lawless” communist system that existed under the rule of Mao Zedong, especially from the Judicial Reform Movement to the end of the Cultural Revolution.Footnote 10 In fact, between 1966 and 1976, during the Cultural Revolution, the preliminarily formed legal system was seriously damaged. Government departments and judicial organs were obstructed while the Constitution and laws were abolished or otherwise disabled. Correspondingly, there was vehement discussion of the ideas of judicial independence and the separation of powers, which were contrary to an instrumental concept of justice. During the period of Cultural Revolution, Chinese scholars argued that the ideas of “separation of powers” and “judicial independence” were spurious; these ideas were put forward to cover the nature of the bourgeois state, which was “to suppress the rebellions of the working class and maintain the bourgeois state,” and thus “could never become a reality.”Footnote 11

However, since the end of the Cultural Revolution, China has implemented extensive reforms to develop a political and institutional transition to facilitate economic growth. This transition involves the CCP’s high expectations for the judiciary, given the crucial role of law in ensuring predictability and the stability of property and profits in market-oriented societies.Footnote 12 In order to meet these expectations, judicial reform (司法改革) began in the 1980s with the main goal of establishing a state “rule according to the law.”Footnote 13 Consequently, the importance of judicial independence has been rediscovered in China not only among academics and judicial officials, but also in the background and basis of the CCP’s so-called new policy of “The People’s Republic of China Governs the Country According to Law and Makes It a Socialist Country under Rule of Law (依法治国,建设社会主义法治国家).”Footnote 14 Hundreds of new laws have been passed and the role of the courts has been expanded. However, in relation to two issues, namely the extent of judicial independence and understanding the factors that influence the judicial decision-making in today’s China, there are still serious debates and sometimes completely opposite viewpoints among scholars, Party-state officials, and even the public.Footnote 15 Some scholars argue that Chinese judges continue to enjoy little judicial independenceFootnote 16 and the courts are “fused to the state, embedded in and subordinated to the rest of the government bureaucracies.”Footnote 17 Other scholars assert that, as a result of China’s judicial reform, “the judiciary has become more competent, authoritative, and independent.”Footnote 18 There are still others who hold a very sharp view that, in China, judicial independence has been completely established, even more than China needs!Footnote 19

Nevertheless, taking a close look at the debates on the extent of judicial independence in China, one can observe that the current debates somehow resulted in the scholars’ different ways to define and measure judicial independence. As will be discussed in the following sections of this article, while some scholars focus on judicial adjudication (审判) to explore the different factors that influence the judges’ decision-making process, other scholars study judicial independence based on the framework of the US style of “separation of powers,” thus criticizing that China has no judicial independence, since its political structure is different from the US style. Moreover, the approaches that different scholars employ to measure the extent of judicial independence are also varied. Appealing to different definitions and measuring approaches to study the extent of judicial independence in China, the scholars painted a blurred picture of it.

However, if there is no consensus on the current situation of judicial independence in China, it will be hard to figure out the existing problems that create obstacles to an independent judiciary (独立的司法), and thus it will be hard to propose effective and satisfying measures to continue judicial reform. Therefore, identifying the extent of judicial independence and the real obstacles to judicial independence is now a matter of urgency.

Moreover, giving a chronological review of the development of the CCP’s judicial policies on courts, one can also notice that the extent of judicial independence in China is not fixed, but varies with the amount of judicial discretion afforded by the CCP to judges, and is deeply influenced by China’s traditional legal philosophy and the CCP’s revolutionary and pre-revolutionary history. During Mao’s era, especially in the Cultural Revolution period, due to the CCP’s negative attitude on the role of the courts, there was almost no judicial independence. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, in the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin’s era, the CCP has decided to develop a professional and independent judicial system as the main avenue for dispute revolution. As a result, the CCP gradually delegated the judicial power to the courts and self-refrained its influence on the normal specific case handling, which resulted in the gradual improvement of adjudicative independence. However, during the Hu-Wen era, the CCP has again tightened its control on the judiciary since the early 2000s, thus exerting more pressure on the independent adjudication. The judicial policy on courts changed again in the Xi Jinping era.

Therefore, in order to portray the true extent of judicial independence in China’s judicial practices, based on China’s social and political environments, this article first clarifies the contested meanings of “judicial independence” in discussions about, and within, Chinese judicial circles. In contrast to the existing literature—most of which sees judicial independence in China as stagnant—this article borrows Tiede’s definition of regarding judicial independence as a dynamic one to study judicial independence in China, and further argues that the independence of judicial adjudication in China varies with the amount of discretion afforded by the CCP to judges at different times on different issues. It then provides a detailed literature review of the three main schools of thought on the extent of judicial independence in China, and suggests exploring the strategic interaction approach to study the factors that might affect the impartiality of judicial adjudication and how those factors influence and shape the judges’ decision-making process to identifying the extent of judicial independence and the real obstacles to judicial independence in China.

2. DEFINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Any analysis of judicial independence must begin with a core meaning. However, “despite an almost universal consensus as to its normative value”Footnote 20 of judicial independence, it might be “one of the least understood concepts” in the fields of political science and law.Footnote 21 A concrete or consistent definition of the term remains disturbingly contested “even in economically advanced liberal democracies known for the rule of law.”Footnote 22 In Theodore Becker’s words, “we all know what it means,”Footnote 23 yet “its full significance, intricacies, and implications still seem beyond our reach.”Footnote 24 Kornhauser even suspected that politicians and scholars “deliberately” left the term undefined because “they want to keep the term amoebic to change shape to fit the particular context in which it is used.”Footnote 25 Consequently, there arises the great need to define judicial independenceFootnote 26 before we can decide what makes a judiciary more or less independent.Footnote 27

2.1 Some Core Issues in Defining Judicial Independence

Based on Eli M. Salzberger’s research, in order to define what judicial independence is, the first step is to define the subject and object of itFootnote 28 or, in Russell’s words, to define what exactly is meant by “judicial” and what is meant by “independent.”Footnote 29 Clearing the meaning of “judicial” (司法) is especially important in studying China’s judicial independence, since it is not a legal term with a clear meaning in China. The 1982 Constitution of China does not use the term “judiciary” or “judicial system” (司法系统), but stipulates the court and the procuratorate, respectively.Footnote 30 Thus, for the common people in China, the judicial system generally not only refers to the court and procuratorate system, but also includes the police bureau (公安局) and judicial bureau (司法局). At the same time, Chinese scholars sometimes use “judiciary” to refer to the court system and, at others, to refer to the court and procuratorate system,Footnote 31 yet, in the international scholarship, “judicial system” generally refers to the court system or judges collectively.Footnote 32 In this research, the researcher uses “judicial system” as synonymous with “court system.”

While limiting the judicial system to the court system, “judicial” could still refer to individual judges, the overall court system, or part of the court system such as a specific lower and higher court. As Ferejohn argues, it is entirely possible that individual judges are independent but the courts in which they work are dependent on other branches of government.Footnote 33 Therefore, in developing a more workable definition, scholars should also clearly identify whether they are referring to individual judges, a single court, or the whole judicial branch. It is in this sense that some scholars argue that judicial independence is a “multifaceted concept”Footnote 34 and can be broken down into different subcomponents: personal decision independence, internal independence, external independence, and collective independence.Footnote 35 In order to simplify the argument to this thesis, I will use the norms of personal independence of individual judges, the collective independence of a single court, and the overall court system to advance this thesis.

After defining “judiciary” as an individual judge, a single court, or the court branch as a whole, the second step is to identify from what the judiciary is independent.Footnote 36 Since courts do not exist or operate in a vacuum, a number of external factors, some political and some social, will influence judges’ opinions.Footnote 37 Thus it is generally accepted that the term “independent” is a relative term. Nothing in this world is absolutely independent; courts are never entirely independent. Therefore, the concept must be defined in relation to something else. In Tiede’s argument, in the political context, “this generally means independence from such things as the legislature, the executive, higher courts, individual litigants, and corruption, to name just a few examples.”Footnote 38

Since the term “judicial independence” is ambiguous, it has been interpreted differently by various legal scholars in relation to different legal systems.Footnote 39 The blueprint of judicial independence is usually based on an idealized version of Anglo-American institutionFootnote 40 as the idea of judicial independence is carried forward in the US and is regarded as the “hallmark” of the US political system.Footnote 41 Thus, some discussions of the origin and substance of judicial independence in the US can provide us with many meaningful revelations.

In the US, judicial independence is deeply rooted in the concern of Framers of the US Constitution about “unbridled governmental prerogative can easily engender an unending cycle of tyranny followed by revolt” from English experience.Footnote 42 The Framers of the US Constitution decided to create a national government restrained by internal checks and balances from tyrannical abuses of its power under the theory of separation of powers. By creating a Constitution authorized directly by the will of the people, the legislative and executive powers are limited to ultimately preserving the security of individual rights. In addition, recognizing the dangers inherent in unbounded power, in order to ensure the separation of powers plan could succeed, the Founders of the US Constitution “went beyond the legacy of British and colonial history”Footnote 43 to create an independent judiciary that was absolutely separate and distinct from the executive and legislative branches, and granted it the power to hear all cases “arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.”Footnote 44 The judiciary thus was mandated to check abuses of constitutional limitations by the other two branches. As a result, this innovation pushes the judiciary into an “unaccustomed role a co-equal branch of government, with the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution’s limitations on the powers claimed by the national government itself.”Footnote 45

In the US, judicial independence relates not only to the individual judges, but also to the scope of authority of the judiciary (法院系统); the judiciary as an institution is independent from the legislative and executive branch. However, “at the most basic level,”Footnote 46 the “essence” or the “core feature” of judicial independence is the preservation of the judiciary as a distinct institution, as one that can adjudicate cases as a “neutral third” with impartiality.Footnote 47 As noted by Martin Shapiro, the requirement of “impartiality” is at the root of the “social logic” of the court for fear that dispute resolution becomes a “two against one” situation.Footnote 48 That means that the dispute can only be resolved by a neutral third party “who can be trusted to settle controversies after considering only the facts and their relation to relevant laws.”Footnote 49 Based on the above belief, Kaufman notes that, dating at least to the time of Lord Coke,Footnote 50 the hallmark of every true judicial tribunal has been impartial adjudication.Footnote 51 The long struggle to separate courts and judges from other institutions and functionaries of the government in England was designed to place judges above the self-interest that motivates the disputing parties.Footnote 52 The significance of identifying the essence of judicial independence as “impartial adjudication” is that it explains that judicial independence is not an end in itself; rather, it is a way of impartially making judgments as a means to achieving justice. Correspondingly, this thesis will focus on “impartial adjudication” to study judicial independence in China.

In addition, since traditionally administrative agencies have had the greatest power to influence the decision-making process of the judiciary, judicial impartiality is most seriously compromised when another branch of government appears as a party to the litigation. To prevent administrative agencies from enlisting the judiciary in a campaign to undermine the Constitution, the judiciary “must be insulated from congressional or executive attempts to distort the independent exercise of judicial judgment.”Footnote 53 Thus, more than an affirmative grant of authority to the judiciary, Article III of the US Constitution also explicitly prohibits interference with the exercise of judicial power by the legislative and executive branches. This safeguard, called the second trait of independence—“political insularity”Footnote 54 —ensures that judges should not be used by other political authorities as tools to achieve political goals, nor punished for preventing their realization. In order to achieve this objective, the judiciary is institutionally separate and distinct from “other branches of the government”Footnote 55 and is “electorally unaccountable.”Footnote 56 At the same time, the Constitution of the US guarantees that judges and justices can enjoy the lifelong appointments with undiminished salaries to strengthen the judges’ ability to resist the possible political pressures.Footnote 57 In theory, this independence, plus its constitutional review power to the legislative and executive acts, allows courts to “stand as the ultimate guardians of our fundamental rights.”Footnote 58 Later, the separation of powers was extended by case-law from merely specific prohibitions of salaries and tenure provisions to “embrace all significant intrusions upon the exercise of the judicial power.”Footnote 59 In these ways, the US Founders ensured that federal judges maintained their independence from political bodies, not only in relation to their appointment and salaries, but also more significantly by providing them with the power of constitutional review.Footnote 60 Impartiality and insulation from pressures by political branches are essential attributes of judicial power.

Although the judiciary’s role in the impartial adjudication is generally agreed, there are debates on the judiciary’s other role of constitutional interpretation to check and balance the legislative and executive branches. As Shapiro argues:

in a great many nations, judicial independence is conceived not in terms of a tripartite constitution with checks and balances but simply in terms of a professional judiciary sufficiently insulated from other governmental influences to operate within its own sphere under the law.Footnote 61

It is true that judicial independence regarding separation of powers is, as Garapon argues, “too closely linked to the American perception of politics and obviously grounded in American history.”Footnote 62 For example, in the courts of Great Britain, Czarist Russia, and other European countries, judicial independence is mainly about independent adjudication. The court system in these countries also enjoys significant levels of independence depending on the degree to which the judicial institution has a distinct and discrete role in case adjudication. To guarantee their independent adjudication function, through strict institutionalization of the court system, these court systems are “detached from the interest of the political system, the concerns of powerful social groups, and the desires of the general public.”Footnote 63 However, they do not enjoy a co-equal status with government and have no power of constitutional review.

Furthermore, even Larkins, a US scholar, who believes that “judicial independence is not meaningful if the courts cannot exercise it to check the arbitrary or unjust exercise of power by political actors,”Footnote 64 admits that, in countries that are experiencing transition from a historically dependent judiciary into an institution that can operate forcefully vis-à-vis other political and societal institutions, this transition can operate properly only when courts “are comfortable and secure in their position as constitutional adjudicators.”Footnote 65 He argues that this applies to countries for which the first step is to provide the judiciary with an environment to undergo a process of institutionalization.Footnote 66 In Larkins’s view:

a more institutionalized judiciary is by default more independent not only because one of its defining characteristics is autonomy, but also because an institutionalized judicial system implies one which has a broad scope of authority within the political system.Footnote 67

Larkins believes that, if it develops properly in a stable political environment and becomes stronger over time, the judicial system could eventually become an organization with “adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherency,”Footnote 68 which in the end would enable the judiciary to assert their independence within the constitutional system.

That is the same in China. According Article 126 of the Constitution of China (1982), which is regarded by scholars as the origin of independent adjudication in China,Footnote 69 “the people’s courts exercise judicial power (审判权) independently, in accordance with the provisions of law and not subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organisation or individual.”Footnote 70 Although many Chinese scholars use the term “judicial independence” (司法独立) to study the status of judges in the decision-making process, quite a few Chinese scholars specifically use the term “adjudicative independence” (审判独立) to demonstrate the uniqueness of China’s judicial independence.Footnote 71 As Professor Chen Guangzhong argues, “‘judicial independence’ is an international legal term, which is commonly used in the international legal document. It generally refers to the courts and judges’ adjudicative independence.”Footnote 72 Meanwhile, many international scholars use “judicial independence” mainly referring to adjudicative independence.Footnote 73 Therefore, this article will use the term “judicial independence” to process this study, but mainly focus on adjudicative independence to study the position of court system or judges and factors that influence judges’ decision-making process.

2.2 The Approaches to Measure Judicial Independence

After defining some core issues about what the term “judicial independence” means, another controversial issue is how to measure the extent of adjudication independence. Different scholars use different approaches to measure it, and often confuse the approach of measuring with the definition of it. Following the Constitution of the US, which positively prohibited the interference of other political actors in the judicial system, a prominent way of researching judicial independence is to refer to “a variety of formal institutional protections that are designed to induce impartiality or power or both”Footnote 74 using an institutional approach. Some scholars even confuse it with the definition of judicial independence and call it the “institutional definition” of judicial independence.Footnote 75 Within this approach, scholars “focus on institutional or structural variables that allegedly enhance or inhibit judicial independence”Footnote 76 such as life tenure, judicial-controlled judges’ appointments, promotion and dismissal, and judicial-controlled administration of the budgets. The pursuant of independent courts hinges exactly on the assumption that the institutional shields prevent external actors from influencing judicial output, which in turn ensures equal responsibility and protection under the law and provides stable protection of property rights.Footnote 77 Consequently, many scholars believed that institutional judicial independence is higher when there are more structural safeguards against interference by non-judicial actors in the judicial decision-making process.Footnote 78

Scholars focus on institutional guarantees against undue influence on judicial decision-making at least in part because it is an easily operated way of measuring the degree of judicial independence, since “identifying these structural shields is a fairly straightforward measurement task.”Footnote 79 However, this approach has been criticized by a few scholars who argue that it does not define judicial independence explicitly, but simply states which conditions are conducive to its existence.Footnote 80 In addition, there is mounting empirical evidence that makes this assumption problematic. For instance, Clark created a “judicial effectiveness score” to measure the institutional independence of Latin American Supreme Courts. In his test, he used indicators such as tenure guarantees, methods of appointment and removal of judges, and salary guarantees for each court. However, surprisingly, he found that courts such as those in Argentina, which are generally supposed to be less independent, actually gained much higher scores than those apparently more independent ones.Footnote 81 In a study of the Italian judiciary, Guarnieri found that the institutionally independent Italian judiciary could not guarantee neutral judgment when the political department was one party of the litigation and individual judges were under the undue influence of the media and the mafia.Footnote 82 The “global best practices”Footnote 83 developed within the institutional approach to promote the level of judicial independence is also criticized as ignoring culture and downplaying “local politics and the competing interests that often undermine reform efforts.”Footnote 84 Therefore, although some of the institutional guarantees against undue influence on judicial decision-making are conducive to the development of judicial independence, the “international best practices” cannot be used to decide the existence or extent of judicial independence. Correspondingly, this article takes the position that the institutional configuration of the judiciary should be treated as an independent variable in the analysis of judicial independence, but should not be used as a measure of its independence.

The institutional definition of judicial independence also gives rise to occasional disconnect between de jure and de facto judicial independence.Footnote 85 Clark further argues that judicial independence also has a behavioural definition,Footnote 86 namely “the extent to which judges’ choices are self-determined and/or effective.”Footnote 87 In order to measure behavioural judicial independence, some scholars employ “judicial rulings against the government approach.”Footnote 88 These scholars examine the outcomes of the courts as a reference to measure judicial independence. By examining the frequency with which courts decide cases against the government, the scholars argue that, if the courts did this often, it might be inferred that they enjoy enough independence to challenge the government when political wrongdoings arise. On the contrary, given that most judicial decisions favour government policy, it is reasonable to deduce that the courts are unable to critically supervise the government policy or behaviour.Footnote 89 However, while evidence that courts have ruled against the government may signal a healthy judiciary, once again, this approach does not explain specifically from what the judiciary must be independent in order to issue such anti-government decisions.Footnote 90 Therefore, this thesis will not apply “judicial rulings against the government approach” to measure judicial independence in China.

2.3 The Definition of Judicial Independence Used in this Study

Since it is difficult to identify and measure judicial independence using both “the institutional approach” and “the outcome-against-government approach,” a variety of scholars employ another approach to study judicial independence that is grounded in the positive political theory of law, namely the “strategic interaction approach.”Footnote 91 These scholars do not focus on specific institutional variables or preferences of justices for the best policy outcomes. Instead, as McNollgast shows, judicial independence is essentially linked to the judiciary’s need to rely on other branches to enforce its judgments.Footnote 92 The Constitution of the US designed a check and balance power structure. Each branch is independent from each other, but also dependent upon each other. Therefore, McNollgast argues that, if judges, government, and law-makers all seek to pursue their own incompatible policy objectives, in order to accomplish its purpose, each group needs to take the others into account. Moreover, a court must depend on the government to implement its interpretations of the laws. Similarly, the government must obtain support from the legislative branch if it wants to implement its policy and is to be given sufficient resources to enforce the court’s decisions.Footnote 93 Meanwhile, the courts’ authority in interpreting and enforcing law depends on the powers and resources delegated by the legislation.

Thus, based on the positive political theory, which “is concerned with understanding political phenomena through the use of analytical models which, it is hoped, lend insight into why outcomes look the way they do and not some other way,”Footnote 94 the court is “constrained to act within limits that are acceptable to other political actors” in pursuing its own policy objectives.Footnote 95 This theory is echoed by Epstein and Knight, who explain that “justices are strategic actors” who realize that the attainment of their goals depends on their understanding of the preferences of other actors.Footnote 96 Accordingly, they looked at the interaction between different levels of courts as well as the interaction between the judiciary and other branches of government with elected members to study the judges’ decision-making process.Footnote 97 Using such a strategic interaction model, McNollgast finds that “judicial independence waxes and wanes with changes in the political composition of our three branches of government.”Footnote 98 According to this approach, judicial independence is better defined as “strategic interaction” among political actors that is not fixed, but fluctuates.Footnote 99

Borrowing from McNollgast’s positive political theory, Tiede proposes a two-part definition of judicial independence: “‘judicial independence’ can and should be defined as the judiciary’s independence from the executive, as measured by the amount of discretion that individual judges exercise in particular policy areas.”Footnote 100 First, “at a minimum, judicial independence is defined as the judiciary’s independence from the executive branch in any given country.”Footnote 101 Tiede explains that he defines it in this way because, in America’s political structure, courts can never be completely independent from the legislature, as it is supreme in making the laws that judges interpret in particular cases and it provides funding for courts and their personnel.Footnote 102 Second, derived from McNollgast, who posits that judicial independence is discretion that fluctuates depending on the political composition of government and strategic interaction between branches of government,Footnote 103 Tiede further explains that, if the judiciary is independent from the executive, it may be measured by the amount of discretion delegated by the legislative body to the individual judges “at any particular moment in time, concerning any specific area of the law.”Footnote 104 Meanwhile, in Tiede’s views, the amount of judges’ discretion at any specific time also relates to the issue at stake. When the law-makers regard some issues as politically salient, they can use different legislative skills to curtail or expand the amount of discretion that judges may enjoy to make decisions in particular areas of the law. For example, legislative bodies can intentionally make legal provisions in a general and vague language to provide judges with wider discretion in deciding how to apply the law in specific cases; or they can offer specific instructions to judges to curtail judges’ discretion.Footnote 105 Defined in this way, judicial independence “is not fixed or stagnant, but is fluid and changeable.”Footnote 106

The first part of Tiede’s definition of judicial independence has some problems. Since he accepts the positive political theory and admits that judicial independence is a relative term,Footnote 107 he simply limits the object of judicial independence to the executive, not including the legislative conflicts with his previous views. As explained by positive political theory, judges, government, and law-makers all need to take others into account if they seek to pursue their own incompatible policy objectives.Footnote 108 Even in the US, the judicial system cannot be completely independent of the executive, as the justices in the Supreme Court are nominated by the president and the implementation of judgment also depends on the executive. Thus, sticking to the relative meaning of judicial independence, the object of judicial independence should be defined in a particular political regime. All the factors that could influence impartial adjudication should be identified through detailed fieldwork and analyzed as to their effects on impartial adjudication.

However, the second part of Tiede’s definition regards judicial independence as “not fixed or stagnant, but as fluid and changeable according to the amount of judicial discretion afforded to judges at any particular time on different issues”Footnote 109 and does shed light on a useful way to study and understand judicial independence in China. Within the US power structure, the legislative body enjoys the power to make law to expand or limit the discretion of judges. Hence, Tiede argues that judicial independence fluctuates according to the legislative instruction.Footnote 110 In China’s political framework, we need to change the legislative body to the CCP because the CCP is the real source of any power in China.

Using Tiede’s definition of regarding judicial independence as a dynamic one to study judicial independence in China has several advantages. First, it reflects the reality of China’s politics and acknowledges that courts may be dependent on other branches of government for funding and personnel choices and certainly on the CCP’s delegation of judicial powers that the judiciary enjoys. Second, it provides us with a practical way of measuring the degree of judicial independence in China, which is by examining how judges make decisions within the range of acceptable discretion granted to them by the CCP.Footnote 111

Admitting Tiede’s definition is a useful means to study judicial independence in a dynamic way, there are still other problems about what the discretion is, since there is also little agreement on the exact meaning of “discretion.”Footnote 112 However, the basic meaning of discretion is generally used by courts, judges, and legal scholars simply to “a person [who] has the authority to decide, or unconstrained choice.” For example, Professor Westen states that “discretion means … an area within which the discretion-holder has authority to adopt, or not to adopt, whatever rule he deems fit.”Footnote 113 Thus, it is clearer to replace “discretion” with “authority” of the judiciary or judges.

However, examining the authority of judicial independence to identify and measure judicial independence is still a hard task, as the extent of judicial authority is not fixed. Thus Larkin suggests that, instead of looking for evidence of independence, it is much easier to look for evidence of dependence.Footnote 114 This means one should identify obstacles to the exercise of independence—that is, to judges’ impartiality and insularity and the courts’ institutional scope of authority. Larkin further explains that “too often scholars look for independence when it is quite likely that in its pure form it does not exist anywhere. Judicial dependence, by contrast, exists in virtually every political system and is much more easily identifiable.”Footnote 115

Assessing judicial independence in this manner is to be conducted through a careful interpretive exercise in which the structural conditions of the courts are analyzed along with the judiciary’s functional relationship with other political institutions. Identifying the obstacles to judicial independence in the context of an interpretive exercise can provide great insights into the strength of a judicial branch.Footnote 116 Therefore, to study the nature and extent of judicial independence in China, this article argues that we should comprehensively apply this approach and the strategic interaction approach to conduct a detailed examination of the different factors that influence independent adjudication, how the courts interact with these factors, and how judicial behaviour is influenced and the decision-making process is shaped in a given—Chinese—structural condition of the court.

3. DEBATES ON CHINA’S JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

As discussed above, the idea of judicial independence was developed in Europe and carried forward in the US by America’s founding fathersFootnote 117 and serves as a touchstone for measuring the extent to which a nation’s courts can be considered to have the ability to impartially deliver justice, between individuals as well as individuals and government.Footnote 118 It was first introduced into China in the late Qing Dynasty as a goal of judicial reform,Footnote 119 and was accepted by the Beiyang and Nanjing Republic government as rhetoric to legitimate their authority.Footnote 120 The independence adjudication was also stipulated in the first Constitution of new China in 1954.Footnote 121 Unfortunately, nearly all the modern legal concepts and the legal construction were destroyed in the Revolutionary Culture. As a result, when this Western notion was reintroduced into China after 1979, much research was devoted to the general theory of judicial independence in international scholarship, but the comprehensive research on the situation of judicial independence in China is comparatively small.Footnote 122 Through careful examination of current literature, three main schools of thought can be identified based on their different approaches to study judicial independence in China: the “International Best Practice” School, the “China’s Special Condition,” and the “Strategic Interaction” School. Both the “International Best Practice” and the “China’s National Situation” Schools employ the institutional approach to study judicial independence, but the latter school insists that China’s different institutional designs must be understood properly. In contrast, although without being made explicit, the third school employs the strategic interaction approach to study judicial independence.

3.1 The “International Best Practice” School

The traditional wisdom of the international scholarship is to criticize China for its lack of judicial independence due to China’s institutional obstacles—chiefly the CCP’s leadership without US-style separation of powers.Footnote 123 This school of thought defines judicial independence in a broad way, connecting it with the political structure of “separation of powers” and claim that judicial independence means judges should have “judicial review powers.”Footnote 124 Believing that judicial independence refers to “a variety of formal institutional protections designed to induce impartiality or power or both,”Footnote 125 these scholars focus on “institutional and structural variables that allegedly enhance or inhibit judicial independence”Footnote 126 —the so-called “international best practice”Footnote 127 —to assess and measure China’s judicial independence. Consequently, the one Party system is regarded as “the most significant structural challenge to an independent judiciary in China”Footnote 128 and the courts’ connection to the CCP “presents major institutional obstacles to judicial independence.”Footnote 129 Specifically, many scholars believe that, because of the Party’s veto power in the appointment and promotion process and the power to sanction and dismiss judges, judges in China have no security of tenureFootnote 130 ; and that most Chinese judges are appointed for political reasons, yet lack legal training.Footnote 131 As a result, judges are believed to be pressured to make decisions that favour the interests of the Party,Footnote 132 otherwise they would find themselves out of favour and risk the loss of their offices.Footnote 133

To the unique institutional arrangements in China’s judiciary—the Political and Legal Committee (PLC 政法委员会) and adjudication committee (审判委员会)—one major view is that the PLCs were established by the CCP to “ensure that courts and judges act in accordance with Party dictates”Footnote 134 and asserts that the adjudication committee can be readily imagined as “nothing more than an ideological enforcer, routinely disciplining judges who put legal craft above Party loyalty.”Footnote 135 Consequently, it has been concluded that, even though the Chinese Constitution provides the independent adjudicative power to courts, in practice, “judges follow the dictates of the Party’s leadership.”Footnote 136 In addition to this criticism of the CCP’s role in the judiciary, the fact that courts at all levels are dependent on budgets adopted by government agencies is also criticized by some scholars as a further barrier to judicial independence.Footnote 137 Thus some scholars argue that by far “the greatest threat to judicial independence in China” comes from the fact that “judges are dependent on local governments for appointment, promotion, and, until recently, funding and material security.”Footnote 138 Moreover, Avino further points out that “the Supreme People’s Court, upper-level judicial officers, the procuratorate, the people’s congress and the masses” also hold the power to oversee the work of judges, which reduces the judges’ adjudicative independence.Footnote 139

Defining judicial independence in the framework of “separation of powers” and applying “the international best practice” approach to measure the extent of judicial independence in China, this school of thought argues that China should reform its judiciary according the “rule of judicial (司法规律)” and thus criticizes China’s court system and judges with different institutional arrangements in China’s political structure as having no judicial independence in general. Nevertheless, in their specific analysis of China’s judicial system, many scholars still focus on the institutional arrangements that guarantee adjudicative independenceFootnote 140 and provide some useful institutional variations that affect judicial adjudicative independence in particular, such as the tenure of judges, the process by which judges are appointed and promoted, the funding resources of courts, etc. These variations have significant influence on independent adjudication.

However, since these variations are derived from the theoretical analysis of the institutional design modelled in the US political theory, if they are used to be the necessary conditions to assess the situation of a judicial system in other countries, this approach fails to respect specific culture and politics. As Antoine Garapon argues, the institutional approach ignores culture and politics and is inconsiderate of the way legal systems actually develop.Footnote 141 Suli shares Garapon’s idea and further notes that China “should not take a model deeply embedded in the historical, institutional, theoretical, and discursive contexts of the West, decontextualize it, and accept it uncritically as the standard of reference for China’s experience.”Footnote 142

In addition, the “International Best Practice” School also has problems in providing credible evidence to support its claims and ignores the real practices of the judiciary and the changing situation of the extent of judicial independence in China over the past 40 years. Actually, nearly 40 years after the CCP decided to change its ideology from “rule by man” (人治) to “rule of law” (法治), although the effect of “rule of law” in China is debated,Footnote 143 the real practice of the judiciary has changed a lot. For example, although, according to the Judges Law, the standing committees of the people’s Congress at the corresponding levels have the power to appoint or remove judges,Footnote 144 in reality, very few judges were removed from their office without proper cause. At the same time, with the changing situation of the judicial system, the style of judges’ selection and promotion and funding resources are gradually controlled by the courts themselves.Footnote 145

3.2 The “National Situation” School

The institutional approach of advocating international best practices in China is challenged by the “China’s National Situation” School, which argues that, rather than referring to “international best practice,” the existing situation in China must be taken into account to better understand judicial independence there.Footnote 146 Using a historical-cultural approach, this school refutes the “universal civilization” idea.Footnote 147 Rather than regarding judicial independence as “a variety of formal institutional protections,”Footnote 148 this school connects judicial independence to the core feature of the rule of law: impartiality in judicial adjudication.Footnote 149 Therefore, contrary to the “more independence, more justice” theory supported by the first school, they argue that judicial independence is not an end in itself, but mainly aims to sustain judicial impartiality in judicial adjudication.Footnote 150

Based on this theory, this school first examines the Party’s leadership over judicial matters. Zhu Suli, for example, argues that the CCP is “an integral component around which the judicial system revolves” and must be treated “as a constituent element of the political and legal system or as a constitutional structure.”Footnote 151 As a result, “no matter how much it deviates from the ‘standard’ or the experience of Western countries,” this system “should be seen as something normal and not as a freak or an anomaly produced by mistaken theories and viewpoints.”Footnote 152

Zhu Suli’s argument raises a debate on how to assess the CCP’s influence on the judiciary. Contrary to many scholars’ arguments that the CCP’s leadership is the main institutional obstacle to an independent judiciary,Footnote 153 Zhu Suli emphasizes that, since the beginning of the reform era, the Party’s influence “has diminished” and “its role has changed toward macro-management and policy setting” because of “the considerable de facto separation of the Party and state that has been taking place since the early 1990s.”Footnote 154 The Party’s own goals that require a fair and efficient resolution of disputes are also noted to avoid overstating the degree and nature of Party influence.Footnote 155 In order to better understanding the Party’s influence on specific case adjudication, a new analytical framework designed to “differentiate among types of cases, sources of interference, and levels of courts”Footnote 156 has also been developed to examine the Party’s influence in real judicial practice.

Moreover, the need for balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability to prevent judicial corruption is also used by some scholars to rationalize the Party’s influence on the judiciary. These scholars argue that the essence of judicial independence is to guarantee impartial adjudication; to that end, the CCP’s oversight has discouraged to some extent judicial corruption and judicial arrogance at least.Footnote 157 To explore these observations further, this school highlights the importance of institutional creation and argues that, rather than institutional transformation, China may develop institutions that function well within the Chinese context as the story of Meiji Japan shows.Footnote 158 Consequently, Zhu Suli argues that institutions such as adjudicative committees, or the political-legal committees, were developed to respond to particular needs, namely either to ensure that judicial decisions are keeping in line with macro-level development goals or to effectively resolve cases that frequently arise from inherent limitations in a country’s economy or social welfare system.Footnote 159

Second, in order to better understand the situation of judicial independence in China, this school notes the differences between urban and rural courts in the development of judicial independence.Footnote 160 The uneven level of professionalism and the often-corrupt attitudes of grassroots judges even make some scholars wonder how much independence should be given to the judiciary at the local level,Footnote 161 because they may not be professionally ready to act independently.Footnote 162

Third, reference to guanxi has also been noted by some scholars as being China’s most dominant culture. As Stanley points out, because Chinese society and Confucianism demand that “harmony be achieved through the maintenance of proper relations,”Footnote 163 it is common for Chinese judges to accommodate their decisions in cases “to maintain good relationships with powerful persons, institutions or companies.”Footnote 164

This school of thought also employs the institutional approach to study the institutional arrangements of the judicial system and its influence on judicial adjudicative independence. But, contrary to the “international best practice,” which is rooted in the US political model of separation of powers, this school focuses on specific case adjudication and highlights the connection of judicial independence to the essence of judicial independence—impartiality—to evaluate judicial independence. The essence of judicial independence is to guarantee impartial adjudication rather than “more independence more justice.” Moreover, this school sheds light on the importance of “keeping an open mind and understanding the development of the Chinese judiciary in its own historical and social context.”Footnote 165 This school also identifies factors in variables that are important to understand judicial independence in China’s historical, cultural, and political context. These include doing research in the framework of the leadership of the CCP and considering the differences between the urban and rural areas, and the importance of guanxi in influencing judges’ independent adjudication.

Although the second school has many advantages when studying judicial independence in China, this study finds that it fails to capture the interaction between the judicial system and other political or social actors, and thus has failed to capture the active role of the courts in developing judicial independence in China. Moreover, in examining the relationship between the leadership of the CCP over the judiciary, this school discovers the general trend of the CCP’s diminishing role on influencing judiciary; however, it does not capture the dynamic process of the CCP’s control on judiciary. Third, although this school identifies different factors that affect the independent adjudication in China, the degree of these different factors (especially the most important factors) that influence adjudicative independence is not clearly classified.

More importantly, apart from the deeply institutional research in China’s context, it seems that more fieldwork results are needed to support their research. To gain a realistic picture of the problems faced by courts in China and of possibilities for their reform, we have to first identify both the existence and the extent of the CCP’s influences on the impartiality of judicial behaviour. Second, we need to consider the courts’ and judges’ ways of handling these influences, and assess the costs and benefits of specific instances of such influences and of the practices as a whole.Footnote 166 Hence, there is a need for a more detailed empirical study of the various channels and methods of influence and the impact of those influences. In addition, given the wide variation in China, the study should be conducted in different regions and distinguish between different levels of courts and types of cases. As Suli argues, it is on empirical research, rather than some abstract notion of judicial independence, “that a study of Party-judiciary (and other) relations in contemporary China should proceed.”Footnote 167

3.3 The “Strategic Interaction” School

The third school shares the second school’s viewpoints about the need to study judicial independence based on China’s own historical and social context, but it absorbs the “competition theory”Footnote 168 to explain the situation of judicial independence in China. Drawing on Nagel’s notion of powerFootnote 169 in defining judicial independence, the third school regards courts in China as an actor of power, and discovers the crucial importance of the political environment to the manner in which the court uses its powersFootnote 170 ; moreover, it highlights the unified account of the multifaceted interactions between courts and other powers in a country.Footnote 171

Although the third school admits that the courts are a separate power, it still focuses on judicial adjudication to study how a stronger judicial power shapes the judicial independence in China.Footnote 172 It admits institutional independence is not yet sufficiently developed in China, and that judges are often subject to pressures exerted by their supervisor, the political-legal committees, and departments of justice in China.Footnote 173 However, as he contends, rather than an institutional approach, the best way to understand state power, including the role of the judiciary, is by examining the “interactions between various authorities at multiple levels”Footnote 174 to see how they interact with various social groups and how the judicial outcomes are influenced by these interactions.

Contrary to regarding the judiciary as simply a passive instrument of the various levels of governments and the Party, they assert that, during the judicial reform, with the professionalization of the personnel of the judicial institutions, a new “power centre” including judges and lawyers has been built in China.Footnote 175 In this new “power centre,” judges’ and lawyers’ interests lie in working to consolidate and boost their own organizations, even though they may also be CCP members or heed the pressure exerted by various outside powers.Footnote 176 In Cabestan’s words, “their sheer existence and the steady development of their activities have gradually forced the ‘traditional’ communist institutions to enter into new types of bureaucratic disputes and adjust, show occasional restraint, bargain, or even reform.”Footnote 177

This third school highlights the significance of judges’ professional qualifications, her/his identification with the requirements of the judicial role, especially the impartial adjudication of disputes, and the larger legal profession in keeping with judges’ impartiality.Footnote 178 As Galo argues, the extent to which courts actually play an impartial role in a political system depends in large part on the general organization of the judiciary and, more precisely, on the composition of the reference group of the judiciary.Footnote 179 The increasing professionalism of the judges is likely to support the development of a stronger judicial identity; at the same time, it results in the reference group of judges “being composed mostly of other lawyers, especially fellow judges and academics,” with the consequence that it will be difficult for the regime to control the cultural orientation of judges.Footnote 180

The particular significance of the influence of legal scholars is also noted here because it can support a corresponding evolution in judicial culture and help to form the predominant concept of the judicial role: particularly “the way judges think they should behave.”Footnote 181 As asserted by scholars and remarked by the Supreme Court, a series of judicial reforms are due to the efforts of Chinese academics who have challenged the role of the CCP on specific case adjudication.Footnote 182 At the same time, Suli and Cabestan’s research has revealed that the CCP is also interested in “pushing forward the establishment of a ‘rule by law’ and a professional and autonomous court system”Footnote 183 to open a more reliable avenue for dispute settlement, to keep social stability, and, in the end, to enhance the legitimacy of its leadership.Footnote 184 Moreover, although seldom noticed, some scholars are aware that there are strong mechanisms for the judiciary to utilize the “interpretations” issued by the Supreme People’s CourtFootnote 185 and local-level opinions together with occasional notices and opinions issued by individual court systems.Footnote 186 As a result, by interpreting the law creatively and strategically, the courts can advance their own institutional interests and compete in the struggle for power and legitimacy with other political actors.

While admitting the active role of judges in the judiciary, this school also argues for the need to be acutely aware of the political circumstances within which the judges execute their power.Footnote 187 Their “political embeddedness and resource constraints”Footnote 188 determine that, rather than pursuing an aggressive power-maximization strategy, it is better for courts to first rely on or co-operate with the CCP and/or government to carry out the social-control function demanded by the state.Footnote 189 Based on this fact, some scholars argue that, before questioning the courts’ independence in the adjudication of disputes, we need to ask whether they in fact have the ability to make decisions independently.Footnote 190 Moreover, according to a comparative study of East Asian countries (especially the Japanese model of judicial independence), these scholars highlight the instruments that emphasize “collective independence of the judiciary as a whole rather than the independence of individual judges,”Footnote 191 because the former can act with relative uniformity, and can compete for resources against other government agencies.Footnote 192

To a greater extent than hitherto recognized, the third school provides more complex and subtle insights into the judiciary’s active role in its relationships with other actors in China’s power structure. Scholars in this school emphasize that the courts do not simply yield to the pressures exerted on them by the Party, governments, or other external forces. As Xin He explains, “under the seemingly peaceful surface of iron control exists dynamic turbulences of conflict, repression, resistance, competition, compromise, and cooperation in which law, power, and politics interact.”Footnote 193

However, when the third school highlights the interaction between the judicial system and the political actors in China, especially the CCP and government, it overlooks the influence on adjudicative independence from social powers in China such as media and litigants. Moreover, while this school is applying the “strategic interaction approach” to explore the interaction between the courts and other political actors in shaping the extent of judicial independence in China, it seems that the real effects of the interaction between different roles need to be fleshed out with empirical research.

More importantly, when this school values the crucial role of political circumstances within which the judges execute their power in influencing the extent of judicial independence, it fails to capture the dynamic process of the evolving of judicial independence according to the judicial power the CCP delegated to or withdrawn from the court system in different stages of the CCP’s leadership. Therefore, this school offers no explicit explanation on the real source of judicial power, and correspondingly does not reveal the nature of judicial independence in China. Additionally, although this school touches the role of the legal scholar and the new “power centre” in judges and lawyers, the important role of the legal community in defending judicial independence is not fully examined.

The great debates over the issue of judicial independence also mark the different study approaches used by the three schools. Compared with the institutional approach, the second and third schools demonstrate new analytical frameworks with new research methods and highlight the importance of understanding and assessing China’s judicial independence based on the interactions between the judiciary and other powers in China’s historic and cultural context; these can certainly be usefully borrowed in studying judicial independence in China. Nevertheless, as Suli asserts, “conclusions about China’s judicial system cannot be reached simply through debates; they will come as the result of empirical research.”Footnote 194

Unlike the theoretical understandings, the very different findings drawn from the fieldwork also reveal the importance of studying judicial independence in an empirical way. For instance, Gechlik and Zhang Wei’s empirical work in Shanghai courts to check judicial fairness in China shows that judges in Shanghai suffer the least interference, which is due largely to Shanghai officials’ greater respect for law and additionally to the greater economic development and lower guanxi culture.Footnote 195 These differences lie on an often perceived but rarely studied fact that there is a gap between legal norms and social practices “which is the product of the foreign origin of the norms and the pre-modern nature of China’s native society.”Footnote 196 Nevertheless, as Clarke observes, compared with the great need for measurable data about the Chinese legal system, “empirical work of any kind is rare,” and attention to rural areas is virtually non-existent.Footnote 197 Clarke believed that the reason lies in the notion that “Chinese and foreign scholars are not interested in empirical data or field research.”Footnote 198 Thus, the debates between these three schools give rise to a great need for empirical work to study judicial independence in China.

3.4 Short Summary

This review of the relevant literature has examined the existing research on the situation of judicial independence in China. Applying different definitions and approaches to examine the nature and measure the extent of judicial independence in China, the three schools of thoughts reviewed above provide many useful insights for understanding judicial independence in China. Although the variation of definition and measuring approach resulted in the collision on nature and the extent of judicial independence in China, most of the research focused on the extent of impartial adjudication to assess judicial independence based on the country’s political structure. In Henderson’s words, the legal concept of judicial independence in China “has usually been interpreted to only apply to the judicial decision-making process related to individual cases—not the institutional independence of the judiciary.”Footnote 199

However, each of these three schools of thought has its shortcomings, especially in that they failed to capture the complicated nature and the dynamic process of the evolving of judicial independence according to the judicial power the CCP delegated to or withdrawn from the court system in different stages of the CCP’s leadership. Therefore, they offer no explicit explanation on the real source of judicial power, and correspondingly do not reveal the real nature of judicial independence in China. Moreover, the strength of the legal community in defending judicial independence is not fully explained, although the third school touches on it.

4. CONCLUSION

Due to China’s political system and legal culture, the judicial decision-making process in contemporary China is more complicated than conventionally appreciated, because it involves the interactions of aspects of law, politics, and power. Moreover, giving a chronological review of the development of the CCP’s judicial policies on courts, one can also notice that the extent of judicial independence in China is not fixed, but varies with the amount of judicial discretion afforded by the CCP to judges, and deeply influenced by China’s traditional legal philosophy and the CCP’s revolutionary and pre-revolutionary history.

Therefore, in order to portray the true extent of judicial independence in China’s judicial practices, this article argues that, based on China’s social and political environments, judicial independence should be defined in a narrow way, focusing on judicial adjudication independence (审判独立) to analyze different factors that are likely to affect judicial behaviour and how those factors influence and shape the judges’ decision-making process. At the same time, a detailed chronological review of the evolving of the Party’s judicial policy should be conducted to explore the dynamic process of the development of judicial independence in China and its implications. Furthermore, in order to seek a deeper understanding of the nature and extent of judicial independence in China, apart from the institutional arrangements, the actual—“on the ground”—functioning of China’s courts and other legal institutions should be studied and a number of factors including elements of law, different powerful interests, and politics also should be taken into account.

Footnotes

*

(赵言荣) PhD, Procedural Law, Civil, Commercial and Economic Law School, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China; PhD, International and Political Studies, School of Humanities and Social Science, University of New South Wales, Australia; Lecturer, Civil, Commercial and Economic Law School, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing, China. Correspondence to Yanrong Zhao, Civil, Commercial and Economic Law School, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing 100088, China. E-mail address: [email protected]. This article is part of the author’s PhD dissertation, “The Growth and Limits of Judicial Independence in China,” written at the University of New South Wales Australia, funded by the China Scholarship Council Scholarship and UNSW Tuition Fee Scholarship. This article is also supported by the Program for Young Innovative Research Team in China University of Political Science and Law. The author thanks Professor David Lovell and Associate Professor Zhang Jian for their valuable instruction and editing.

2 Cohen (Reference Cohen1969), p. 970.

3 Bailyn, supra note 1, p. 85.

4 Fairlie (Reference Fairlie1923), pp. 393–436; Stevens (Reference Stevens1999), pp. 365–402; Minegar (Reference Minegar2011), pp. 383–401.

5 The 1954 Constitution stipulated that “the people’s courts adjudicate cases independently, only subject to law” (人民法院独立进行审判,只服从法律). See 中华人民共和国宪法 [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], (c), Article 78, section VI (1954).

6 He (Reference He2003), p. 84; Avino (Reference Avino2003), p. 369; Peerenboom (Reference Peerenboom2009).

7 Dam (Reference Dam2007), p. 250; Michelson (Reference Michelson2007), p. 353.

8 Chen (Reference Chen1999), p. 34.

9 Avino, supra note 6, p. 376.

10 Ibid.

11 Wu (Reference Wu1997), pp. 91–2.

12 At the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping decided to end the class struggle policy and recreate a legal system that would not change as a result of changes in the leadership of the CCP, and ruled the country by law. Therefore, in the communiqué of the third plenary session of the CCP’s eleventh central committee, the “independence of the judiciary” and “faithfulness to the law and regulations” were highlighted. See People.com (1978).

13 Killion (Reference Killion2004), p. 546; Xin (Reference Xin2003), pp. 58–78.

14 According to the official English version of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China released by the NPC, Article 5, section 1.

15 He, supra note 6; Zhao (Reference Zhao2008), p. 3; Yang (Reference Yang2013), p. 3; Liang (Reference Liang2010); Dong (Reference Dong2005), p. 6.

16 He (Reference He2004), p. 213; O’Brien & Li (Reference O’Brien and Li2004), pp. 75–96; Lubman (Reference Lubman1999).

17 Michelson, supra note 7, p. 353.

18 Peerenboom, supra note 6, p. 21.

19 Liang, supra note 15.

20 Larkins (Reference Larkins1996), p. 607.

21 Ibid.

22 Peerenboom, supra note 6, p. 2.

23 Becker (Reference Becker1970), pp. 1–8.

24 Larkins, supra note 20, p. 607.

25 Kornhauser (Reference Kornhauser2002), pp. 45–54.

26 Trochim & Donnelly (Reference Trochim and Donnelly2001), pp. 64–5, 69–71.

27 Ibid.

28 Salzberger (Reference Salzberger1993), p. 350.

29 Russell (Reference Russell2001), pp. 6–8.

30 中华人民共和国宪法 [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], section 7.

31 Zhao, supra note 15.

32 The Cambridge Dictionary explains “judiciary” as “the part of a country’s government that is responsible for its legal system and that consists of all the judges in its courts of law.” See dictionary.cambridge.org.

33 See Ferejohn (Reference Ferejohn1999), pp. 353–84. Ferejohn claims that “in the United States, the judges are free to decide the cases but the federal judiciary is institutionally dependent on Congress and the president.”

34 Shetreet & Deschênes (Reference Shetreet and Deschênes1985), p. 6.

35 Peerenboom, supra note 6.

36 Tiede (Reference Tiede2006), p. 160.

37 Larkins, supra note 20, pp. 613–14.

38 Tiede, supra note 36, p. 131.

39 Salzberger, supra note 28, p. 350.

40 Evans (Reference Evans2004), p. 30.

41 Rosenberg (Reference Rosenberg1992), p. 369.

42 Kaufman (Reference Kaufman1980), p. 671.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Larkins, supra note 20, p. 608.

47 Kaufman, supra note 42, pp. 671–701; Gibson (Reference Gibson2009), pp. 1285–304; Nicholson (Reference Nicholson1993), p. 404; Shapiro (Reference Shapiro1981), p. 17; Fiss (Reference Fiss1993), pp. 57–76.

48 Shapiro, supra note 47, pp. 1–8.

49 Ibid.

50 See Dr Bonham’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 107, 118, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C. P. 1610) (“No man ought to be a judge in his own case”).

51 Kaufman, supra note 42, p. 692.

52 Shapiro, supra note 47.

53 See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 103 (1970) (“the power to direct trial judges in the execution of their decision-making duties … [is] a judicial power, one to be entrusted only to a judicial body”).

54 Fiss, supra note 47, pp. 59–60.

55 Valelly (Reference Valelly2009), p. 187.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Horsky (Reference Horsky1957), p. 1111.

59 Kaufman, supra note 42, pp. 687–8.

60 Ibid., pp. 686–7.

61 Shapiro, supra note 47, p. 32.

62 Garapon (Reference Garapon2009), p. 42.

63 Larkins, supra note 20, p. 611.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., p. 620.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid., p. 621.

68 Huntington (Reference Huntington2006), pp. 12–32.

69 Chen (Reference Chen2013), p. 1; Lubman, supra note 16; Avino, supra note 6.

70 中华人民共和国宪法 [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], Article 126.

71 Zhao, supra note 15.

72 “司法独立 [judicial independence], 是国际通行的法律术语,为国际法律文件所惯用。其含义一般是指法院和法官的审判独立.” See Chen, supra note 69, p. 1.

73 He (Reference He2007), pp. 203–25; Peerenboom, supra note 6; Liebman (Reference Liebman2005), pp. 1–157.

74 Clark & Staton (Reference Clark and Staton2011), p. 12.

75 Tiede, supra note 36, p. 136.

76 Ibid., p. 129.

77 Popova (Reference Popova2006), p. 15.

78 Vanberg (Reference Vanberg2008), p. 7.

79 Ibid., p. 15.

80 Tiede, supra note 36, p. 136.

81 Clark (Reference Clark1974), p. 405.

82 Guarnieri (Reference Guarnieri2001), pp. 111–30.

83 Henderson (Reference Henderson2009), p. 24.

84 Garapon, supra note 62, p. 38.

85 Clark & Staton, supra note 74, p. 12.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Ramseyer (Reference Ramseyer1994), pp. 721–2.

89 Casanova et al. (Reference Casanova, Salti and Horowitz1970), pp. 21–4.

90 Larkins, supra note 20, p. 617; Tiede, supra note 36, p. 149.

91 Political theory of law “is primarily a positive theory of rational strategic behavior in the presence of imperfect information that seeks to explain and predict the content of the law.” See McCubbins et al. (Reference McCubbins, Noll and Weingast2005).

92 Ibid.

93 Shapiro (Reference Shapiro1988).

94 Austen-Smith & Banks (Reference Austen-Smith and Banks1998), p. 259.

95 McCubbins et al. (Reference McCubbins, Noll and Weingast1994), p.6.

96 Epstein & Knight (Reference Epstein and Knight1997), p. 2.

97 Ibid., pp. 56–111.

98 McCubbins et al. (Reference McCubbins, Noll and Weingast2006), p. 109.

99 Ibid.

100 Tiede, supra note 36, p. 131.

101 Ibid., p. 134.

102 Ibid.

103 McCubbins et al., supra note 98, pp. 107–8.

104 Tiede, supra note 36, p. 134.

105 Huber & Shipan (Reference Huber and Shipan2002), pp. 44–7, 176–83.

106 Tiede, supra note 36, p. 134.

107 Ibid., p. 131.

108 Shapiro, supra note 93.

109 Tiede, supra note 36, p. 134.

110 Ibid., p. 134.

111 Ibid., p. 135.

112 Christie (Reference Christie1986), p. 747.

113 Westen (Reference Westen1983), p. 642.

114 Larkins, supra note 20, p. 618.

115 Ibid., p. 618.

116 Ibid., pp. 619–20.

117 Montesquieu (Reference Montesquieu1955); Bailyn, supra note 1; Hart & Wechsler (Reference Hart and Wechsler1953); Dawson (Reference Dawson1968).

118 Cohen, supra note 2; Bailyn, supra note 1.

119 Tay (Reference Tay1987), p. 564.

120 Xu (Reference Xu1997), pp. 1–28. See also Article 80 of the Constitution of the Republic of China.

121 中华人民共和国宪法 [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], Article 78, section VI (1954).

122 Through Google research, there is only one book in particular studying the situation of judicial independence in China, named Judicial Independence in China-Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion. In the introduction to this book, the editor, Randall Peerenboom, also comments: “this is the first book in English on judicial independence in China.” However, this book is actually a collection of articles written by 13 authors.

123 He (Reference He2002); Dam, supra note 7.

124 Henderson, supra note 83, p. 25; Avino, supra note 6, p. 370.

125 Clark & Staton, supra note 74, p. 12.

126 Ibid.

127 Henderson, supra note 83, p. 24.

128 Mcpherson (Reference Mcpherson2008), p. 795.

129 Ibid., p. 797; Chow (Reference Chow2015), p. 199.

130 Lee (Reference Lee1997), p. 380.

131 Avino, supra note 6, p. 380.

132 See UN Comm’n on Human Rights, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,” 1 24 UN Doc. E/CN. 4/2004/60/Add. 1 (4 March 2004).

133 Yardley (Reference Yardley2005).

134 Chow, supra note 129, pp. 197–8.

135 Upham (Reference Upham2005), p. 1703.

136 Lubman, supra note 16, p. 394; Avino, supra note 6, p. 381.

137 Song (Reference Song2007), pp. 141–8.

138 Ginsburg (Reference Ginsburg2010), p. 257.

139 Avino, supra note 6, p. 382.

140 Henderson, supra note 83, p. 28.

141 Garapon, supra note 62, p. 43.

142 Zhu (Reference Zhu2009), p. 64.

143 Peerenboom (Reference Peerenboom2001), p. 471.

144 中华人民共和国法官法 Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 11, section 5.

146 Garapon, supra note 62, p. 43.

147 Dirlik (Reference Dirlik1985).

148 Henderson, supra note 83, pp. 24–5.

149 Clark & Staton, supra note 74, p. 10.

150 Fu & Peerenboom (Reference Fu and Peerenboom2009), p. 95; Peerenboom, supra note 6, p. 90.

151 Zhu (Reference Zhu2006), pp. 559–60.

152 Ibid.

153 He, supra note 123; Dam, supra note 7; Michelson, supra note 7.

154 Zhu, supra note 142, p. 68.

155 Ibid.

156 Fu & Peerenboom, supra note 150, p. 68.

157 Ibid., p. 98.

158 Ginsburg, supra note 138, p. 253.

159 Zhu, supra note 142, p. 66.

160 Michelson (Reference Michelson2008).

161 Balme (Reference Balme2010), p. 154.

162 Ibid., p. 155.

163 Lubman, supra note 16, p. 396.

164 Finder (Reference Finder1995), pp. 63–73.

165 Zhu, supra note 142, p. 53.

166 Fu & Peerenboom, supra note 150, p. 100.

167 Zhu, supra note 142, p. 60.

168 From the perspective of democratic theory and evolutionary economics, valid institutional development and innovation arise from competition. The vicissitudes along the road of social development are not pre-determined. See Zhu (Reference Zhu2006), p. 556.

169 Nagel (Reference Nagel1976).

170 Li (Reference Li2000), pp. 20–34.

171 He, supra note 73, pp. 203–25.

172 Guarnieri (Reference Guarnieri2009), pp. 242–5; Xin, supra note 13, pp. 203–25.

173 Li, supra note 170, pp. 20–34.

174 He, supra note 73, p. 204.

175 Li, supra note 170, pp. 20–34.

176 Cabestan (Reference Cabestan2005), p. 47.

177 Ibid.

178 Guarnieri, supra note 172, p. 240.

179 Ibid., p. 243.

180 Ibid., pp. 240–1.

181 Ibid.

182 He (Reference He1998); 人民法院五年改革纲要 [The People’s Court Five-Year Reform Plan], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin FayuanGongbao, no. 6 (1999).

183 Cabestan, supra note 176, p. 48.

184 Ibid., p. 48.

185 The bureaucratic instructions liberally issued in the PRC court system that constitutes the “explanations” issued by the Supreme People’s Court. As many Chinese academics, lawyers, and judges note, the Supreme People’s Court regulations are a condition precedent to the application of certain provisions of law or doctrine by courts, which implies that the important provisions of law cannot be applied until regulations specifically addressing use of the provision have been issued; see Howson (Reference Howson2009).

186 Although the local-level opinions are normatively not as authoritative as Supreme People’s Court regulations, in reality, they can be more powerful in the handling of actual cases at the non-central level, as acknowledged by the local judges; see ibid., pp. 149, 151.

187 He, supra note 73, pp. 222–3.

188 Ibid.

189 Ibid.

190 Li (Reference Li2009), p. 220.

191 Ginsburg, supra note 138, p. 253.

192 Ibid., p. 253.

193 He (Reference He2009), p. 193.

194 Zhu, supra note 168, p. 536.

195 Gechlik (Reference Gechlik2005), p. 97; Zheng (Reference Zheng2004).

196 Clarke (Reference Clarke2003).

198 Clarke, supra note 196, p. 3.

199 Henderson, supra note 83, p. 28.

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