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Introducing a 0.05% Financial Transactions Tax as an Instrument of Global Justice and Market Efficiency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2013

Ross P. BUCKLEY*
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales, [email protected]

Abstract

A financial transactions tax (FTT) is a tax on wholesale capital market transactions, which civil society has long advocated for on grounds of social justice. This so-called “Robin Hood Tax” would take from the rich and give to the poor. Revenue estimates for a global FTT of 0.05 percent are around US$500 billion per annum. One-quarter of this revenue stream can achieve the first six Millennium Development Goals relating to poverty, health, and education. Even if the developed countries retain all of the revenue raised, the impost would see financial services institutions making a fairer contribution to the societies in which they operate. Thus, as an instrument of justice, the potential of an FTT is great—but, most of all, such a tax will enhance the operations of contemporary financial markets substantially. This paper explores the potential of such a tax, the arguments for and against it, and its feasibility.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Asian Journal of International Law 2013 

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Footnotes

*

Scientia Professor and Centre for International Finance and Regulation (CIFR) King & Wood Mallesons Chair of International Finance Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia; Fellow, Asian Institute for International Finance Law, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. The author sincerely thanks the Australian Research Council for the Discovery Grant which supported this research; the two anonymous referees whose questions, comments, and insights greatly improved the final version; and the participants at the joint conference of the Asian and Australian and New Zealand Societies of International Law on “International Law and Justice” in Sydney on 25−26 October 2012 for their insightful comments on an earlier draft. The author would also like to thank Rebecca Stanley, Vivianne Schwarcz, and Laura Ferraro for their invaluable research assistance. The responsibility for any errors remains with the author.

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