1. See also CRIDDLE, Evan J. and FOX-DECENT, Evan, “A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens” (2009) Yale Journal of International Law 331 at 346−347Google Scholar; on the general importance of clarity in the sources of public international law, see WOODS, Michael, “What Is Public International Law? The Need for Clarity about Sources” (2011) 1 Asian Journal of International Law 205–216CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment of 20 July 2012, [2012] I.C.J Rep. at 9.

3. See e.g. (from the UK) R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (Amnesty International intervening) [1999] 2 All ER 97 at 176; (from Kenya) Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists v. Attorney General and Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and Kenyans for Justice and Development Trust (joining), Final Judgment, [2011] eKLR, ILDC 1804 (KE 2011), 28 November 2011, High Court; (from Colombia) Gallón Giraldo and 104 others representing themselves or non-governmental organizations, Constitutional Complaint, Judgment No C-370/2006, File D-6032, ILDC 660 (CO 2006), 18 May 2006, Constitutional Court; (from Australia) R., DMJ Bennett QC (Solicitor General of the Commonwealth) (intervening) and SP Donaghue (on behalf of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth) (intervening) v. Tang, Appeal Decision, [2008] HCA 39, (2008), ILDC 1519 (AU 2008), 28 August 2008, High Court.

4. BENVENISTI, Eyal and DOWNS, George W., “National Courts, Domestic Democracy and the Evolution of International Law” (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 59 at 68Google Scholar; also CASSESE, A., “For an Enhanced Role of Jus Cogens” in Antonio CASSESE, ed., Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 158 at 170CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. See, for example, two cases from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights dealing with the right to life, Victims of the Tugboat “13 de Marzo”, Case 11.436, Report No. 47/96 (1997), para. 79 [Tugboat case]; Mangas v. Nicaragua, Report No. 52/97, Case 11.218, Report No. 52/97 (1998), para. 145.

6. For the drafting history of art. 53, see HANNIKAINEN, Lauri, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law, Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Co, 1988) 166−174Google Scholar.

7. DANILENKO, Gennady M., “International Jus cogens: Issues of Law-Making” (1991) European Journal of International Law at 53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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9. When put to the vote at the Vienna Conference in 1969, the provision (then art. 50) was passed 87–8–12, Hannikainen, supra note 6 at 166.

10. Ibid., at 170–1.

11. Ibid., at 171.

12. Second Report on the Law of Treaties (1963) 2 International Law Commission Yearbook, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 at 53.

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15. See e.g. from Kosovo Advisory Opinion (No. 141), Jordan, Oral Statement, 9 December 2009 (CR 2009/31) at para. 24; and Albania, Oral Statement, 2 December 2009 (CR 2009/26) at para. 4.

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17. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Written Statement of the Netherlands, 17 April 2009, 3.2.

18. Ibid.

19. For a recent survey of the field, see ZEMANEK, Karl, “The Metamorphis of Jus Cogens: From an Institution of Treaty Law to the Bedrock of the International Legal Order” in Enzo CANNIZZARO, ed., The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 381–410CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also KOLB, Robert, “The Formal Source of Jus Cogens in Public International Law” (1998) 53 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 69−105Google Scholar.

20. For comments at the First Session, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, 1969, pointing to natural law, consider, for instance, the statements made by Mexico (294) and Ecuador (320); for comments suggesting a link to the moral beliefs of mankind, consider the statements made by Uruguay (303) and Ivory Coast (320); for comments in support of a customary law basis, consider Greece (295) and Poland (302).

21. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1963) at 63, 66–7; see also VERDROSS, Alfred, “Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law” (1966) 60 American Journal of International Law 55CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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23. See O'CONNELL, Mary Ellen, “Jus Cogens: International Law's Higher Ethical Norms” in Donald Earl CHILDRESS, ed., The Role of Ethics in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 94Google Scholar.

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26. See ibid. at 388 (who argues that the closest is the ICJ); see also FORD, Christopher A., “Adjudicating Jus Cogens” (1994–95) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 145Google Scholar.

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30. See American Branch of the International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary International Law, “The Role of State Practice in the Formation of Customary and Jus Cogens Norms of International Law” (19 January 1989) at 20; SIMMA, Bruno and ALSTON, Philip, “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General Principles” (1992) 17 Australian Yearbook of International Law 82 at 103Google Scholar; GREEN, James, “Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of The Use of Force” (2011) 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 215 at 244−252Google Scholar.

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32. Belgium v. Senegal case, Separate Opinion of Cançado Trindade, supra note 2 at 158.

33. Ibid., at 182.

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35. See the Opinions of Judge Abraham (notes that the comments were obiter dictum); Ad hoc Judge Sur (points to the inclusion of jus cogens as superfluous).

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44. Indeed, Kammerhofer, supra note 43, notes that “[a]s far as the present author is aware, there are as yet no studies on the influence that international legal scholarship wields over the making of international law”.

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48. Ibid., at 349 (although the authors note that communication might sometimes be to the disadvantage of the coherence of international law, at 363); and see also Yuval SHANY, “One Law to Rule Them All: Should International Courts Be Viewed as Guardians of Procedural Order and Legal Uniformity?” in Fauchald and Nollkaemper, supra note 47, 15 at 34: “in their current configuration most international courts have only a limited appetite for coordination and harmonisation across legal regimes, other—non-judicial—methods for institutional coordination and normative harmonisation ought to be explored.”

49. Although the vast increase in scholarly output relative to earlier times has also informed concerns about fragmentation, TRIGGS, Gillian, “The Public International Lawyer and the Practice of International Law” (2005) 24 Australian Year Book of International Law 201–218CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 203.

50. For an account that is focused only on judicial interaction, see WEBBS, Philippa, “Immunities and Human Rights: Dissecting the Dialogue in National and International Courts” in Fauchald and Nollkaemper, supra note 47, 245–265Google Scholar.

51. Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, 35763/97, European Court of Human Rights, 21 November 2001.

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55. See e.g. Jones v. Saudi Arabia (2006) UKHL at para. 22; Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Italian Court of Cassation (2004).

56. See e.g. AKANDE, Dapo and SHAH, Sangeeta, “Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts” (2011) 21 European Journal of International Law 815 at 828Google Scholar.

57. See also Andrea BIANCHI, “On Certainty” Blog of the European Journal of International Law (16 February 2012), online: EJIL Talk 〈http://www.ejiltalk.org/on-certainty/#more-4504〉 (suggesting other factors that might help to explain why the approach of the ICJ in this case was predictable, such as the concern the ICJ has traditionally shown for the systemic effects of its rulings, and a concern not to offend its broader audience of states).

58. See TALMON, Stefan A.G., “Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguished” (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 979–1002CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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62. The main interest is in the plenary judgment of a court, as this is most likely to attract the attention of scholars. However, reference is also made to separate opinions of judges, as these are often more open on sources consulted and thereby offer a useful means of gaining insight into the thinking and resources that have underpinned the main judgment.

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64. See, though, CIAMPI, Annalisa, “Invalidity and Termination of Treaties and Rules of Procedure” in Enzo CANNIZZARO, ed., The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 360 at 374–376Google Scholar; SIVAKUMARAN, Sandesh, “Impact on the Structure of International Obligations” in Menno T. KAMMINGA and Martin SCHEININ, eds., The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 133 at 147Google Scholar.

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66. See e.g. Boumediene and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008), ECtHR, para. 60; Judgment on Preliminary Objections (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment of 24 May 2007, [2007] I.C.J. Rep at 28, in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo.

67. VANNESTE, Frédéric, General International Law Before Human Rights Courts: Assessing the Specialty Claims of Human Rights Law (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2010) at 431−432Google Scholar; see also NEUMAN, Gerald L., “Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights” (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 101 at 118Google Scholar (and at 117 identifying the role of jus cogens identification in relevant cases); Antonio Augusto CANÇADO TRINDADE, “Jus Cogens: The Determination and the Gradual Expansion of its Material Content in Contemporary International Case-Law”, XXXV Course of International Law, organized by the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 2008, 3–29, online: 〈http://www.oas.org/publications_digital_catalogue_course2008.htm〉; SHELTON, Dinah, “International Law and Relative Normativity” in Malcolm D. EVANS, ed., International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 141 at 149–154Google Scholar.

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71. Often no reference to another judicial body is provided; see e.g. Maritza Urrutia case, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C, No. 103 (2003), at para. 92; Congo v. Rwanda, Judgment of 3 February 2006, para. 64.

72. See e.g. Al-Adsani case (citing International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and UK House of Lords); the ICTY Furundžija case (10 December 1998) para. 153 note 170 (citing the UN Human Rights Committee and United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).

73. E.g. Case Of Hirsi Jamaa And Others v. Italy (Application no. 27765/09), February 2012, ECtHR, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque, at 65; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment of 31 January 2006, IACtHR, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, at para. 64.

74. Although the approach set out by the IACtHR in Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrant Workers, Advisory Opinion OC-18/30, 17 September 2003, at paras. 97–101, has been the subject of a number of critiques, this has not generally been in the context of scholars working on the method for jus cogens identification; see e.g. Neuman, , supra note 67 at 118−122Google Scholar (in the context of an assessment of the Court's general working practices); BIANCHI, Andrea, “Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens” (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 491–508 at 506Google Scholar (in the context of a general assessment of the role and condition of the jus cogens concept in international law).

75. PETERSEN, Niels, “Lawmaking by the International Court of Justice—Factors of Success” (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1295−1316CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 1316; see also TAMS, Christian J. and TZANAKOPOULOS, Antonios, “Barcelona Traction at 40: The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development” (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 781 at 796Google Scholar.

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78. See, for instance, Sivakumaran, , supra note 64 at 143Google Scholar; there are also potentially more problematic consequences, see Bianchi, , supra note 74 at 507Google Scholar (noting that positing encourages the perception that jus cogens status is simply a rhetorical label, employed purely on the basis of opinion to emphasize the importance of a particular norm).

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84. In this respect, it should be noted that work that includes a specific focus on the method for identification often goes little beyond a collection of broad directives, for instance, ALEXIDZE, Levan, “The Nature of Jus Cogens” 172 Recueil des Cours (1981-III) 227−270Google Scholar at 261; but it should also be noted that certain specific issues related to method have been explored in depth, for example Linderfalk's study on the potential for difficulty to arise in the specification of the content of the target norm: LINDERFALK, Ulf, “The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora's Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?” (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 853CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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94. Giorgio GAJA, “Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention” (1981-III) 172 Recueil des Cours 279 at 287.

95. Examples of just posit from other international judicial bodies that have identified jus cogens include: the ICTY, Delalić et al. case ((I.T-96-21) (November 1998), para. 454; the ICJ in the Congo v. Rwanda case (although see Separate Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Dugard, para. 10); the ECtHR in Case of Jorgic v. Germany, (Application no. 74613/01), Judgment, 12 July 2007, para 68; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24 (U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), at para. 10; Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2, CAT/C/GC/2 24 January 2008, at para. 1; Maritza Urrutia case, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C, No. 103 (2003), at para. 92.

96. Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union & Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of 21 September 2005, [2005c] ECR II-3649; see also WET, Erika DE, “Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes” in Dinah SHELTON, Oxford Handbook on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)Google Scholar 541 at 547 (categorizing it as a natural law approach).

97. IACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrant Workers, supra note 704 at para. 101 (see also paras. 97–101); see also the Separate Opinion appended by the Court's President, Judge A.A. Cançado Trinidade, esp. at para. 87.

98. Tugboat case, supra note 5 at para. 79.

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107. Ibid., at 1948.

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122. See also Fauchald and Nollkaemper, , supra note 47 at 351Google Scholar.

123. See also Byers, , supra note 24 at 222Google Scholar.

124. See also Stone-Sweet, supra note 112 at 15 (suggesting that a dispute resolver can help to preserve legitimacy by anticipating the disputants and the community's reaction to the decision, through attempting to adapt the process and content of a decision to be in line with what would be acceptable to both).

125. Debated effects of jus cogens status beyond the VCLT include those directly within a human rights regime (such as non-derogability, no reservation, and precedence over conflicting norms (human rights or otherwise)), as well as beyond (such as limits on the authority of the UN Security Council, direct limits on national legislative authority, and an obligation on all states to “cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach” (ILC Articles on State Responsibility)); see Cassese, , supra note 4 at 160–163Google Scholar; Orakhelashvili, , supra note 70Google Scholar; Vidmar, , supra note 29 at 24Google Scholar.

126. See also Von Bogandy and Venzke, , supra note 115 at 15–16Google Scholar.

127. See also Stone-Sweet, , supra note 115 at 74Google Scholar.

128. Stone-Sweet, , supra note 112 at 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar: see also Dothan, , supra note 112 at 14Google Scholar.

129. Michael Domingues/United States, Report No. 62/02, Merits, Case 12.285, 22 October 2002; at para. 50, the Commission (citing scholarly work) explained that: “while based on the same evidentiary sources as a norm of customary international law, the standard for determining a principle of jus cogens is more rigorous, requiring evidence of recognition of the indelibility of the norm by the international community as a whole. This can occur where there is acceptance and recognition by a large majority of states, even if over dissent by a small number of states.”

130. See also Roach and Pinkerton 1987 Resolution N° 3/87, Case 9647, United States, 22 September 1987, para. 55.

131. See US response, Domingues, paras. 93–107. Para. 101: “The State claimed in this regard that the only argument presented in favor of this finding in the Commission's report is the assertion that the execution of Mr. Domingues would ‘shock the conscience of humankind.’ The State considered this assertion to be ‘specious at best,’ and argued to the contrary that the ‘acts of Mr. Domingues should shock the consciousness of humankind, not the punishment those acts have earned him.’ ”

132. See also De Wet, supra note 96 at 7.

133. See also Fauchald and Nollkaemper, , supra note 47 at 351Google Scholar.

134. Relevant factors could include the extent to which a court counts individuals amongst its main audience (so even if legitimacy is reduced from the perspective of states, it might still remain legitimate for individuals and thereby continue to be utilized); the nature of the audience of states (broader audience, more careful, as harder to predict reception); length of operation of the court (longer existence, able to build up more legitimacy); the powers of the court (e.g. just recommendatory, might see more value in including jus cogens in the decision to help strengthen the compliance pull); the level of entrenchment of the court (e.g. easily closed down, might lead court to be more cautious).

135. To be clear, the suggestion here is not that it will be possible to find a satisfactory method, but that it might be possible. The suggestion is also not that method is detachable from the underlying theory, but rather that having a theory does not entail a self-evident, workable method; see also d'Aspremont, supra note 116 at 14 and 24.

136. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, In the Matter of El Sayed, Case No. CH/PRES/2010/01, Order of the President Assigning Matter to Pre-Trial Judge, 15 April 2012, paras. 28−9; see also Cassese, , supra note 4 at 165–166Google Scholar; FABRI, H. RUIZ, “Enhancing the Rhetoric of Jus Cogens” (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 1049CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

137. As Cassese notes, supra note 4 at para. 35: “Whether or not it is held that the international general norm on the right to justice has been elevated to the rank of jus cogens (with the consequence that States may not derogate from it either through treaties or national legislation), it is axiomatic that an international court such as the STL may not derogate from or fail to comply with such a general norm.”