Existing literature suggests a strong relationship between a vibrant venture capital market and an active stock market: venture capital flourishes when venture capitalists can readily exit from successful portfolio companies through IPOs, and IPOs are in turn facilitated by active and efficient stock markets. This article uses China as a case study to explore the connection between the stock market and venture capital market. Through empirical studies, this article confirms the existing literature by demonstrating a close connection between the stock market and venture capital market in China. It also refines the existing literature by finding that, for venture capital availability, laws and policies also matter in China. Strong and sustained law reforms and government policies aimed at improving the institutional structure and regulatory environment of the stock market can facilitate venture capital-backed exits, which in turn lead to an increase in new venture capital availability in China. Nonetheless, numerous IPO closures have led to freeze-ups in China’s venture capital market. Also, there remain a multiplicity of institutional impediments to the efficient operation of the stock market and the effective implementation of IPO reforms in China. These may in turn hinder the development of the Chinese venture capital industry.

This article critiques the current Chinese corporate governance framework and the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD Principles) on which the Chinese framework is largely based through detailed analysis of public disclosures by four prominent Chinese internet and communications technology (ICT) firms. These include State-controlled firms (China Telecom & China Mobile), mixed ownership (ZTE), and privately-controlled firms (Huawei Technologies). The article argues that neither Chinese nor international corporate governance norms deal adequately with the complex group structures that are so common among large Chinese firms. It also reveals deficiencies in the rules on independent directors, supervisory committees, and Chinese Communist Party committees as they are applied by Chinese ICT firms. The article concludes with reform proposals that would provide more useful information and better protection to outside investors and public stakeholders in the unique Chinese corporate environment.

This article examines the likely role of competition in the regulatory analysis of bank mergers in China. Despite financial reforms, the banking sector remains subject to a complex web of financial regulation, with industrial policy favouring stability to facilitate national economic development. While there are currently no Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) bank merger determinations under the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), examples of MOFCOM’s merger analysis in other sensitive industries diverge from a pure competition-based analysis, favouring grounds linked to national economic development broadly within the terms of the AML. Given the importance of banking to the Chinese economy, this article argues that competition is unlikely to play a large part in any assessment of bank mergers by MOFCOM, particularly where a foreign bank is involved. Instead, issues linked to ‘national economic development’ and stability are likely to play the most important role, leading to less predictable merger approval outcomes.

The evolution of China’s trade and investment regime since the late 1970s has been a process of constant liberalization of FDI control with a special focus on national development and self-determination. This so-called Beijing Consensus presents a sharp contrast with the neo-liberalist Washington Consensus. A theoretical analysis of this contrast from the law and development critique reveals that, while setting forth itself as the development model and excluding other development alternatives, the legitimacy deficit of the Washington Consensus stems from a self-sufficient ontological myth of legal voluntarism. The Beijing Consensus, with its attention to local conditions and emphasis on self-determination, gains its legitimacy through the dynamic process of selective adaptation of limit-transgression through which it challenges and at the same time enriches international development legitimacy. This article suggests that the Beijing Consensus’ roots in the African Continent’s Agenda 2063 and its First Ten-year Implementation Plan offer positive future prospects.

The definition of consideration in Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act 1872 substantially anticipated the far-reaching reforms to the orthodox doctrine of consideration that were proposed by the English Law Revision Committee (1937). These included making enforceable, through the doctrine of promissory estoppel, promises without consideration in the traditional sense that were meant to and did induce reliance; making enforceable a promise to perform a pre-existing duty; and making binding a promise to keep an offer open. The pivots of the definition in Section 2(d) were: a ‘subjective’ conception of consideration on which value was to be measured by the desire of the contractors alone, as opposed to an external standard; a concomitant purging of the traditional requirements of benefit and detriment; and the recognition of induced reliance as a form of consideration. The definition was designed to mark the vanishing point of consideration without having to formally abolish it. This design, however, went awry as courts and scholars in India projected the orthodox English model of consideration, replete with benefit and detriment, and external standards of value, upon this provision. Consequently, an ingenious piece of draftsmanship came to be eclipsed by orthodoxy.

The increasing integration of regional markets in Southeast Asia has led to the need for a regional framework for financial consumer protection. Access to affordable redress mechanisms is essential for consumer confidence in ASEAN’s burgeoning regional financial markets. Drawing on established channels of regional cooperation among ASEAN Member States, this article proposes a framework based on international best practices and existing financial consumer dispute resolution mechanisms in ASEAN 5 countries. It explores the need for cross-border cooperation to facilitate the effective resolution of financial consumer disputes arising from cross-border transactions. Key proposals include requiring ASEAN CIS passport operators to submit to the jurisdiction of host country financial consumer alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The ASEAN Committee on Consumer Protection, with its contact points in each Member State and website on available consumer redress mechanisms across ASEAN, provides a platform for the strengthening of cross-border cooperation and facilitating financial consumer access to affordable redress in cross-border transactions.