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Fundamental Human Rights and ‘Traditional Japanese Values’: Constitutional Amendment and Vision of the Japanese Society

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 February 2018

Shigenori MATSUI*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, [email protected]
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Abstract

Ever since the Constitution of Japan was enacted in 1946, conservative Japanese people must have been unhappy with it. Their past attempts to enact a new constitution or to make radical revisions have been unsuccessful, but they might finally accomplish their goal under the current Abe Cabinet. Why are conservative people unhappy with the Constitution? It is because the Constitution prevents Japan from becoming a ‘normal state’, and it is deemed not in line with ‘traditional Japanese values’. The fundamental human rights provisions are their main target. Therefore, conservative people want to restore ‘traditional Japanese values’ by amending the bill of rights of the Constitution. This article will examine the reasons why conservative people are upset with the Constitution, how they would like to amend it, and whether their arguments are persuasive. It will conclude that their arguments, just like the ‘Asian values’ theory, are hardly justifiable and could completely undermine the foundation of individual rights protection.

Type
Article
Copyright
© National University of Singapore, 2018 

I The Constitution of Japan and ‘Traditional Japanese Values’

Ever since the 1946 Constitution of Japan (Constitution of Japan)Footnote 1 was enacted, conservative Japanese people must have been unhappy with it. Despite missing an opportunity to revise it during the occupation, they came to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955, a political party dedicated to pushing for the enactment of a new constitution or fundamental revisions to the Constitution.Footnote 2 Although the LDP won the 1955 election, it failed to achieve its goal to amend the constitution. Ever since then, the LDP has almost always formed the government and has continuously pushed for constitutional amendment. But this seemed impossible for a long time. However, the LDP might finally accomplish its goal under the current Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Why does the LDP argue for a fundamental revision to the current constitution? Simply put, it is because the Constitution of Japan, aside from preventing Japan from becoming a ‘normal state’,Footnote 3 is not consistent with ‘traditional Japanese values’. According to the LDP, the Constitution of Japan was forced on the Japanese people, denying Japanese people armed forces, and it destroyed inherent, valuable, and traditional values in Japanese society. They thus believe it necessary to restore the destroyed ‘traditional Japanese values’. For them, perhaps the most egregious part of the Constitution that is against tradition is the bill of rights, ie the fundamental human rights provisions. It follows that they insist on amending the Constitution so that the fundamental human rights provisions will conform to ‘traditional Japanese values’.

But what kinds of amendments do they envision? Are their arguments persuasive? This article purports to examine the vision of Japanese society, the individual rights provisions dealt with in the LDP’s amendment proposals, and their implications for the future of Japan. Part II will outline why the LDP is extremely unhappy with the current Constitution of Japan. Part III will closely examine the LDP’s constitutional amendment proposals as well as alternative proposals from other conservative organizations to see the kinds of amendments they wish to enact. Part IV will explore the vision of Japanese society and the individual rights provisions underlying the LDP’s proposals. It will critically examine whether the LDP’s arguments are persuasive. The article will conclude by suggesting that a call to restore ‘traditional Japanese values’ is merely anachronistic nostalgia for the Meiji era. It shows that what they call ‘traditional Japanese values’ were created only one hundred and fifty years ago, and that they have not provided any compelling reasons as to why Japan should follow these traditions. Moreover, what the LDP considers ‘traditional Japanese values’ might not truly be ‘traditional Japanese values’, and instead might destroy true ‘traditional Japanese values’.

The issue surrounding possible amendments to the Constitution of Japan has been closely followed, and it has even received international attention.Footnote 4 In particular, significant attention has been placed on the pacifism clause of Article 9.Footnote 5 This article intends to highlight that the protection of individual rights needs to be seriously considered as well. Moreover, while the concept of ‘Asian values’ is alien to Japan, there are certain similarities between the arguments in favour of ‘traditional Japanese values’ and arguments in favour of ‘Asian values’. The arguments for ‘traditional Japanese values’, therefore, have the same deficiencies that the ‘Asian values’ theory is likely to have. This article concludes that arguments in favour of ‘traditional Japanese values’, just like the ‘Asian values’ theory, are hardly justifiable and risk undermining the protection of individual rights.

II Why Are Conservative JAPANESE PEOPLE Unhappy with the Constitution?

A Process of Enactment

The enactment process of the Constitution of Japan is one of the reasons why conservative people have been unhappy with it.Footnote 6 After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan underwent rapid modernization, a process which included the adoption of a Westernized legal system. The Japanese government needed to build a new legal system from scratch, since there was previously no well-established notion of legal rights or property rights.Footnote 7 To accomplish this, Japan enacted major legislation such as the Civil Code and the Criminal Code. After successfully enacting these pieces of legislation, in 1889 Japan enacted its first modern constitution: the 1889 Meiji Constitution (Meiji Constitution).Footnote 8 Under the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor was sovereign,Footnote 9 and he had all the power to govern Japan, just as he had before the enactment of the Meiji Constitution.Footnote 10 Indeed, the Emperor simply promised to abide by the Meiji Constitution voluntarily.Footnote 11 Furthermore, while the Meiji Constitution protected the rights of the public by affording rights to the subjects of the Emperor, such protection was granted only by the grace of the Emperor, and it was protected only within the confines of statute.Footnote 12 Therefore, the Emperor could infringe the rights of the public without any constitutional restriction. Moreover, there was no system of judicial review. Consequently, the protection of rights and freedoms granted to the people was not very effective. Under the Meiji Constitution all Japanese citizens, as subjects of the Emperor, were expected to sacrifice themselves for the Emperor and for the Empire of Japan.

When Japan lost the Pacific War, Japan was placed under occupation in order to build a liberal democracy for the purpose of ensuring that Japan would never become a threat to international order. The occupation forces established the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ) in Tokyo and General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), led the occupation forces. These occupation forces ordered the Japanese government to abrogate various statutes that restricted individual freedoms and to immediately release political prisoners.Footnote 13 The occupation forces strongly believed that strong protection of individual rights was essential for Japan to become a liberal democracy.Footnote 14

The occupation forces introduced a number of legal reforms as well. One of the reforms they introduced was constitutional reform. From the beginning of the occupation, MacArthur and the occupation forces believed that the Meiji Constitution needed to be fundamentally revised.Footnote 15 The Japanese government insisted that formal revisions were unnecessary and any necessary changes could be accomplished by revising its enforcement of the Meiji Constitution. Despite the constant pressure from the occupation forces for constitutional amendment, the Japanese government resisted changes to the constitution. However, the government eventually decided to establish a committee to discuss whether constitutional amendment was necessary.Footnote 16 Yet, even at this stage the government was unwilling to pass a constitutional amendment.Footnote 17 Only upon further pressure did the committee finally prepare proposals for constitutional amendment.Footnote 18 Still, the constitutional amendments they were contemplating were only relatively minor revisions to the Meiji Constitution.Footnote 19

When a draft of the constitution that the committee was discussing was leaked and reported by the press,Footnote 20 the occupation forces realized that any amendments eventually proposed by the committee would be insufficient.Footnote 21 As a result, the occupation forces decided to make their own draft and hand it over to the Japanese government for further consideration.Footnote 22 Therefore, when both parties met to discuss the proposal the Japanese government had submitted, the Japanese officials were stunned to receive a totally different draft made by the occupation forces.Footnote 23

Although the occupation forces did not force the Japanese government to enact the draft as it was, remarks made during the meeting were intimidating enough for the government to accept it.Footnote 24 Courtney Whitney, chief of the government section at GHQ, who was responsible for constitutional reform, pointed out that MacArthur had defended the Japanese Emperor against possible prosecution as a war criminal, and he suggested that it would be best for the Japanese government to support the Emperor by accepting the draft.Footnote 25 The Japanese officials took this remark as a threat to prosecute the Emperor as a war criminal should they decide to reject the draft.Footnote 26 Instead of refusing the provided draft, therefore, the Japanese government decided to accept it and try to soften or weaken the implications of the draft. Although the occupation forces were prepared to accept minor revisions, they had no intention of accepting fundamental changes to the draft. Eventually, the Japanese government managed to make minor revisions to the draft, proceeded to create its own official draft based on this draft,Footnote 27 and started the constitutional amendment process. Finally, using the amendment provision of the Meiji Constitution, the 1946 Constitution of Japan was enacted.Footnote 28

Based on the abovementioned process of enactment, conservative Japanese people believe that the Constitution of Japan is a constitution forced upon the Japanese people.Footnote 29 This is the reason why they want to enact a new constitution based upon the free and voluntary will of the people or, at least, to make fundamental revisions.

B Constitution of Japan

The Constitution of Japan’s preamble presently states:

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution.Footnote 30

It is clear that the Constitution was enacted by ‘[w]e, the Japanese people’ and not by the Emperor. Article 1 also declares that sovereign power resides with the people.Footnote 31 The Emperor, who used to hold all government powers in Japan under the Meiji Constitution, is now a symbol of the state and represents the unity of the people,Footnote 32 and does not have any political power.Footnote 33

Article 9 of the Constitution also renounces war as a sovereign rightFootnote 34 and prohibits the maintenance of armed forces.Footnote 35 Together with its commitment in the preamble to ‘the right to live in peace’,Footnote 36 this pacifism clause came to be viewed as one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. Many believed that Article 9 prohibited the maintenance of armed forces even for the purpose of defending Japan against foreign invasion. As a result, although the government established the Self Defense Forces (SDF), it is unclear whether the SDF are justified under Article 9. Moreover, since the SDF have been proclaimed as the minimum force necessary to defend Japan, there is a strict limitation on what they can do. Consequently, the SDF’s ability to participate in international peacekeeping missions has been seriously restricted.

The Constitution of Japan has an elaborate bill of rights. It protects individual rights as ‘fundamental human rights’, and such protection is indeed viewed as one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution. The necessity of protecting fundamental human rights was already a policy of the occupation forcesFootnote 37 and was embodied in one of the three fundamental principles contained within the notes prepared by MacArthur for the occupation forces’ draft.Footnote 38 The idea of ‘fundamental human rights’ was rooted in the natural law philosophy that saw a resurgence after World War IIFootnote 39 and was consistent with the position found in the Universal Declaration of Human RightsFootnote 40 that every person has certain universal human rights. Indeed, the very notion of ‘fundamental human rights’ itself was a clear manifestation of the universal nature of human rights.

Article 11 reflects this understanding. It declares that ‘[t]he people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights’.Footnote 41 Moreover, Article 97 states that ‘[t]he fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate’.Footnote 42 Therefore, unlike the rights of subjects under the Meiji Constitution, fundamental human rights are conferred upon every individual as natural rights that existed before the enactment of the Constitution. They are universal and inherent to all persons as human beings.Footnote 43

Moreover, the declaration that ‘[a]ll of the people shall be respected as individuals’ in Article 13Footnote 44 prompted the view that the Constitution of Japan placed individuals ahead of the state or society, a total departure from the past when members of the society had to sacrifice themselves for the state or for society. Individualism has been viewed as a guiding principle of the Constitution. Furthermore, respect for the individual has been viewed as mandating respect for the human dignity of all individuals, thus placing human dignity as the highest value in the new constitution.Footnote 45

The protection of fundamental human rights does not carry any specific limitation within its protection.Footnote 46 However, Article 12 states that ‘[t]he freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare’.Footnote 47 Article 13 further states that the people’s ‘right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs’.Footnote 48 Although the Supreme Court of Japan has invoked these two articles so as to allow the government to restrict fundamental human rights in order to protect public welfare,Footnote 49 many people believe that fundamental human rights should never be restricted merely for the benefit of society.

The protection of fundamental human rights is also extremely comprehensive and strong. Following its commitment to individualism and human dignity in Article 13, the Constitution of Japan protects religious freedomFootnote 50 and mandates the separation of religion and the state under Article 20. It prohibits religious organizations from receiving any privileges from the State or exercising any political authority, and it prohibits the government from providing religious education or engaging in ‘any other religious activity’.Footnote 51 Under the Meiji Constitution, religious freedom was guaranteed but was subject to any obligations that a subject owed to the Emperor.Footnote 52 Shinto, a religion native to Japan, was regarded not as a religion but as an obligation owed by subjects to the Emperor because the Emperor was not only sovereign but also the highest religious figure in Shinto. Therefore, the people did not have the freedom not to believe in Shinto. The government treated all Shinto shrines as public institutions and Shinto priests as public servants. It structured the entire Shinto organization to support the Emperor, including any military action, which was conducted in the name of the Emperor.Footnote 53 The occupation forces believed that this strong state support for Shinto was one of the reasons for the rise of extreme militarism in Japan. For this reason, they banned any and all government support for Shinto.Footnote 54 This historical decision was crystallized in the constitution as the guarantee of religious freedom and separation of religion and the state.

The Constitution also unconditionally protects freedom of expression under Article 21.Footnote 55 Under the Meiji Constitution, freedom of expression was subject to various restrictions. Some of the most vigorously policed expressions included insults to the Emperor and attacks on the fundamental structure of the government headed by the Emperor.Footnote 56 But all expression, no matter how minor, which were viewed by the government to be questioning the government, came to be impermissible.Footnote 57 Comprehensive censorship was also established to make sure that no newspaper or publisher could publish any illegal content.Footnote 58 Any assembly or association deemed threatening by the government was suppressed by the government.Footnote 59 The modern protection of freedom of expression included in the Constitution is meant to prevent such restrictions.

Furthermore, under Article 14, the Constitution takes a strong stance on the right to equality.Footnote 60 The Constitution also mandates that family law be based on the ‘individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes’ in Article 24.Footnote 61 Under the Meiji Constitution, family law was built upon the notion of the ie (the house). The house-master was granted great power over all other members of the house.Footnote 62 Women were deprived of the power to manage property and were subject to the control of the house-master, who was usually their father or husband. Women were often not allowed to marry freely, not allowed equal access to education opportunities, and were often forced to work in accordance to the decision of the house-master. Article 24 appears to be included in order to remove all such discriminatory treatment against women.

The Constitution of Japan declares itself to be ‘the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity’.Footnote 63 Therefore, even a statute passed by the Diet, the national legislature, cannot infringe upon fundamental human rights protected by the Constitution. The Constitution also specifically accepts the system of judicial review by stipulating that ‘[t]he Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act’.Footnote 64 The Supreme Court of Japan can thus review the constitutionality of any statute and strike it down as unconstitutional and void if it infringes upon fundamental human rights. Moreover, the Constitution of Japan is designed to place limits on government powers. Therefore, it provides that ‘[t]he Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution’Footnote 65 but it does not require the people themselves to abide by the Constitution.Footnote 66 Seemingly, the Constitution exists for the protection of fundamental human rights and not for the imposition of obligations upon the people.

C What is Wrong with the Constitution of Japan?

The LDP and the Japanese conservatives are also deeply dissatisfied with the contents of the Constitution. First, many complain that the text of the Constitution reads like a direct translation from English to Japanese – reflective of the origin of the draft.Footnote 67 Critics have also argued that the language of the Constitution is not sufficiently elegant or poetic within the Japanese tradition.Footnote 68

Second, they claim that the preamble lacks reference to the long history and tradition of Japan.Footnote 69 The conservative think tank Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference) criticized the current constitution for ignoring the tradition of Japan and for portraying a self-deprecating version of history, by accepting unfounded blame for so-called atrocities allegedly committed by the Japanese military forces during the war and for denying the achievement of the Meiji era, which resulted in a loss of faith domestically and a loss of respect and trust internationally.Footnote 70 Because of this, the Japan Conference suggested that the new preamble should state that in pursuing the ‘vision of the state’, the government should be informed by historical traditions.Footnote 71 The Japan Conference explained that the Japanese have historically aspired for harmony among fellow citizens, recognized the co-existence of diverse values, absorbed and accepted foreign culture while respecting traditions, created a unique culture that emphasizes co-existing with nature, and developed a country through the cooperation of the people and the Emperor together. It thus argued that the Constitution should state that the people of Japan enacted the Constitution based on the unique qualities of Japan in order to build upon the history and spirit of constitutionalism that has been developing since the Meiji era and to create a new country where citizens have a deep understanding of their responsibility as members of society. It also argued that this should be done while respecting the liberty and rights of the people and also fulfilling the international responsibility to contribute to international peace and co-existence.Footnote 72

Third, the LDP and many other conservative people criticized the Constitution for stripping the Emperor of his high status and power. They claim that it is necessary to clarify the status of the Emperor as the head of state.Footnote 73 Moreover, they criticized the renunciation of war and the ban on armed forces found in Article 9 as too idealistic and devoid of a realistic understanding of international politics. The LDP argues that it prevents Japan from having armed forces to defend itself against a foreign invasion.Footnote 74 Many also are critical of Article 9 because it prevents Japan from being able to fully participate in international peacekeeping missions.Footnote 75 Moreover, critics are dissatisfied with the current constitution since there is no provision which would allow the government to take emergency measures during a crisis.Footnote 76

Fourth, the LDP criticizes the fundamental human rights provisions for over-emphasizing liberty and rights, while staying silent on the expectations and responsibilities of members of the community. They thus criticize the Constitution for failing to impose on citizens the responsibility to respect each other and the social order.Footnote 77 There are also other commentators who criticize the protection of fundamental human rights for its alleged overemphasis on individuals,Footnote 78 with little regard for social responsibilities. They also criticize the Constitution for the difficulty of placing limitations on individual rights. The Japan Conference thus argued that achieving an appropriate balance between human rights and public welfare would require the Constitution to protect human rights (as it does), but also to have the Constitution allow the government restrictions on rights if such rights pose a threat to public welfare. They argue that individuals should exercise their human rights with self-restraint and responsibility.Footnote 79 They point out, however, that under the current Constitution it is unclear what circumstances would justify restrictions on human rights, and as a result there may be some difficulties in enforcing the restrictions.Footnote 80 The absence of constitutional protection for the family and the omission of a provision that dictates respect for the family have also drawn criticism.Footnote 81 Indeed, critics are unhappy to witness the unraveling of family ties in the wake of increased assertions of individual freedoms. Many also criticize the Constitution for not imposing more duties and obligations on its citizens, especially the lack of an obligation to defend the country.Footnote 82

Fifth, many criticize the Constitution for not including some ‘new rights’.Footnote 83 These include the right to enjoy the environment (ie, environmental rights), the right to know (ie, the right of access to government information), the right to privacy, the right of access to mass media, rights of crime victims, intellectual property rights, and the right to a dignified life.Footnote 84

Finally, many point out the fact that the Constitution of Japan has not been amended for seventy years since its enactment, which has resulted in many discrepancies between the text of the Constitution and its enforcement.Footnote 85 They thus argue that the Constitution must be updated.

D Past Attempts to Revise the Constitution

The Constitution of Japan was enacted on 3 November 1946, and it took effect on 3 May 1947. The government actively defended the Constitution during the enactment process and made every effort to praise and publicize it after enactment. MacArthur gave Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida an opportunity to reconsider the Constitution after one year. As nobody called for reconsideration, Yoshida decided not to revise the Constitution.Footnote 86

Japan successfully concluded the Peace Treaty of San Francisco in 1951,Footnote 87 marking the end of the occupation. Shortly after, the frustration of conservative politicians surfaced, with vocal calls for the enactment of a new constitution or, alternatively, radical changes to the present one. Two conservative parties joined together in 1955 to form the LDP, with its primary party goal to answer these calls. However, a constitutional amendment must be approved by a two-thirds majority in both Houses of the Diet, and subsequently approved by majority vote in a public referendum.Footnote 88 Despite their success in the 1955 election, the LDP failed to win the necessary two-thirds of the seats in both houses to initiate a constitutional amendment. Ever since then, although the LDP has almost always formed the government and pushed for constitutional amendments, it has consistently failed to obtain a two-thirds majority in both houses. During the 1980s, therefore, the prospect of constitutional amendment seemed almost impossible and the call for constitutional amendment was seen as little more than lip-service with little hope of realization.

In the 1990s, however, the tide suddenly turned in favour of a constitutional amendment. Despite the Japanese government’s commitment to spend 9 billion USD to support the multi-national forces led by the United States to aid Kuwait during the Gulf War, Japan’s contribution was criticized as too small because of its failure to send troops.Footnote 89 In response, many came to support a constitutional amendment that would allow the SDF to participate in international peacekeeping missions more actively. People rushed to propose various constitutional amendments. The Yomiuri Newspaper, which has the largest circulation in Japan, published its draft of a new constitution in 2004.Footnote 90 In 2005, the LDP officially proposed a draft of a new constitution.Footnote 91 In 2007, the government enacted a statute detailing the framework for the referendum necessary to pass a constitutional amendment,Footnote 92 established the commission on constitutional amendment in both houses of the Diet, and started discussions on constitutional amendment.Footnote 93

Although the LDP lost an election in 2009 to its rival, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), it bounced back in 2012 to capture the government in a landslide victory with its coalition partner, the Kōmei Party.Footnote 94 With the inauguration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the LDP strongly endorsed constitutional amendment, with its 2012 draft of constitutional amendments published before the election.Footnote 95 Then, with a critical victory in the 2016 House of Councillors election, the LDP coalition finally obtained a sufficient number of seats in both houses to initiate the constitutional amendment process.Footnote 96 With the Japanese government likely to begin the long-awaited first constitutional amendment procedure, the LDP’s dream might finally come true.

So far, most observers have focused their attention on the possible amendments to the pacifism clause and Article 9.Footnote 97 However, possible amendments to the fundamental human rights provisions are no less significant, as such amendments run the risk of undermining the protection of individual rights.Footnote 98

III FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS THAT THE LDP IS SEEKING

A Concept of Fundamental Human Rights and its Protection Scheme

What kinds of constitutional amendments have the LDP proposed for the bill of rights? How does the LDP want to change the constitutional bill of rights provisions? In order to understand the historical development and the current position of the LDP, it is necessary to examine both the 2005 and the 2012 drafts, as well as previous discussions within the LDP. Also, in order to place the LDP’s position appropriately within the context of the various conservative forces in Japan, it is also necessary to look at the drafts of other influential conservative organizations.

The LDP intends to maintain the fundamental human rights protections in the Constitution, albeit within the context of a different understanding of Japanese society as laid down in the proposed preamble. While the preamble of the 2005 draft declares the continued acceptance of democracy, liberalism, and respect for fundamental human rights as ‘unchanging values’, it also states that Japanese citizens ‘share the responsibility to support and defend the country and society they belong to by themselves with affection, sense of responsibility and strong spirit, attempt to develop the liberal, fair and vibrant society and realization of national welfare, and emphasize the facilitation of education, creation of culture and development of local self-governance’.Footnote 99

Similarly, the preamble of the 2012 draft states that ‘Japan is a nation headed by the Emperor as a symbol of the integration of the nation, having a long history and unique culture’.Footnote 100 It also declares that the citizens of Japan intend ‘to defend the country and homeland with honour and a strong spirit; and, while respecting fundamental human rights, to respect harmony and to create the nation by helping one another through the family and the society as a whole’.Footnote 101 It further reveals a commitment to ‘take liberty and discipline seriously, facilitate education and scientific technology while defending our beautiful homeland and natural environment, and promote the development of the country through vibrant economic activity’.Footnote 102 Moreover, it concludes by stating that ‘Japanese citizens hereby enact this constitution in order to hand over the good tradition and our country to our off-springs forever’.Footnote 103

The LDP’s questions and answers on the draft amendments (LDP Q&A), published to provide background information on the 2012 draft, points out that the preamble should be based on the ‘history, tradition, and culture of our country’, something which the current preamble has failed to do.Footnote 104 The reference to the respect for harmony reflects the first principle of the Seventeen-Article Constitution, Japan’s first constitution written in 604 AD by Prince Shotoku. This constitution, containing moral imperatives for public officials rather than legal restrictions on government powers, mandated that harmony needed to be respected.Footnote 105 This first principle is often regarded as imperative to Japanese society.

These proposals are consistent with other constitutional amendment proposals by other conservative groups such as the Japan Conference, which insists on the enactment of a constitution based on ‘our tradition running through eternal history’.Footnote 106 The Yomiuri Newspaper draft similarly declared in its preamble that ‘the Japanese people shall commit to succeed the long history and tradition of the nation, defend the beautiful homeland and cultural heritage, promote cultural and academic advancement by cultivating them in the future, and build a highly creative nation’.Footnote 107 The 2013 draft of Sankei Newspaper, another conservative newspaper, similarly declared that ‘the state of Japan has an eternal history following its ancestors and is a constitutional country headed by the Emperor’.Footnote 108 It also provides:

[T]he Japanese citizens have created the modern state with dignity, relying upon the Emperor as the basis for their national integration, while avoiding despotism and emphasizing public deliberation. They have built a distinctive Japanese culture as a maritime nation, surrounded by the mountains, rivers, and natural environment. Wishing the surrounding waters to be a friend, and with the spirit of respecting harmony, they have nurtured the gallantness to face various national difficulties.Footnote 109

It further declares that ‘the Japanese citizens recognize the existence of various value perspectives and produce the inherent traditional culture that accepts the novelty of, and cooperation with, different cultures’.Footnote 110 Apparently, the Constitution should be designed to follow these traditions.

B Different Understanding of Fundamental Human Rights

While the 2005 draft did not propose any significant changes to Article 11, the 2012 draft proposed to change the nature of fundamental human rights protections, in that it would no longer declare that they were conferred as inviolable and eternal rights to current and future citizens. Instead, the Constitution would simply state that such rights were inviolable and eternal.Footnote 111 It also would remove Article 97 in the chapter on the supremacy of the Constitution, which declared that fundamental human rights are conferred on citizens.Footnote 112

The LDP Q&A explains the overall policy of the new draft as follows:

Rights are gradually generated from the history, tradition, and culture of the community. Accordingly, human rights provisions need to be based on the history, culture, and tradition of our country. There are some provisions in the current constitution that could be viewed as being derived from the European idea that human rights are granted by God. We believe that these provisions need to be revised.Footnote 113

Therefore, according to the LDP, the protection of fundamental human rights is not universal but instead is rooted in the history, tradition, and culture of Japan. These fundamental human rights are not something granted or conferred. This was a reason why the LDP wanted to remove language in Article 11 that suggests human rights are conferred, although the LDP still views human rights as natural rights inherent to all citizens as human beings.Footnote 114 It also justifies the removal of Article 97 on grounds of redundancy, given the existence of Article 11.Footnote 115

However, many suspect that the real reason for the revision of Article 11 and the removal of Article 97 is to abrogate the Constitution’s strong commitment to the protection of fundamental human rights — especially its commitment to the universal norm of fundamental human rights.Footnote 116

Additionally, the 2012 draft would revise Article 13 to declare that all citizens are to be respected as ‘persons’ instead of as ‘individuals’.Footnote 117 Other conservative proposals also suggest similar revisions.Footnote 118 Of course, the implication is to deny the primacy of individuals; instead, the state and society are placed ahead of individual members of society. It would thus completely change the basic philosophy of the protection of individual rights.Footnote 119

C Limitation on Rights

With respect to limitations on individual rights, the 2005 draft would have revised Article 12 to require citizens to exercise their rights in a manner that does not violate the ‘public interest and public order … mindful that liberty and rights accompany responsibility and obligations,’ thus replacing ‘public welfare’ with ‘public interest and public order’.Footnote 120 The 2012 draft also followed this pattern.Footnote 121

The 2005 draft also revised Article 13 to mandate respect for fundamental human rights so long as it does not violate ‘public interest and public order’.Footnote 122 The 2012 draft would also revise Article 13 to demand the greatest respect for a citizen’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, so long as ‘it does not violate public interest and public order’, instead of ‘public welfare’, as it was worded originally.Footnote 123

The LDP Q&A succinctly explains that ‘public welfare’ is ambiguous and has been viewed by some as allowing the restriction on fundamental human rights only when they conflict with another’s human rights. The LDP wanted to clarify that there was no such limitation, and human rights could be restricted whenever public interest and public order were at risk.Footnote 124 This concept of ‘public order’ also includes the ‘order of the society’. The LDP Q&A explains that it is natural that one should not frustrate the social life of others when exercising human rights. The new draft was meant to make this natural limit clear.Footnote 125

Other conservative proposals show a similar inclination. The Yomiuri Newspaper draft would revise Article 12 by mandating citizens to respect the liberty and rights of others, keeping balance with ‘national security, public order, a national healthy environment, and other public interests’, as well as mandating citizens not to abuse their rights.Footnote 126 This draft also replaces ‘public welfare’ in Article 13 with ‘public interest’.Footnote 127 The Sankei Newspaper draft declares:

[R]ights are accompanied with obligations. Citizens shall respect the freedoms and rights of each other and shall not abuse them. The exercise of their freedoms and rights could be subject to restrictions by law in order to protect national security, public interest or public order.Footnote 128

It appears that these amendments were meant to clarify that fundamental human rights could be restricted for the benefit of the public, thereby making it much easier for the government to limit the exercise of fundamental human rights.Footnote 129

D Addition of New Rights

The LDP drafts and other conservative drafts were partly concerned with introducing new rights,Footnote 130 in addition to strengthening the protection of some existing rights.Footnote 131 For instance, the 2005 draft proposed to add the right to privacy of information by stating that ‘no one should be allowed to obtain personal information improperly, retain it, or to use it.’Footnote 132 The 2012 draft also endorses this privacy right.Footnote 133

The 2005 draft also proposed to add a provision that reads ‘the State has a responsibility to explain all governmental actions to the citizens’.Footnote 134 The 2012 draft also endorsed the inclusion of this provision.Footnote 135 This proposal was in response to the argument for the right to know or access government information.

There have been many calls for the addition of a right to enjoy the environment. This right was first proposed in response to government projects destroying or threatening to destroy the environment. This led to the 2005 draft proposing a new provision that would obligate the government to preserve the environment: ‘the state must strive to preserve the environment for citizens to enjoy it’.Footnote 136 The 2012 draft had a similar endorsement although it added a reference to ‘cooperation of the citizens’.Footnote 137

The current constitution does not have any provisions protecting victims of crimes. Since the current constitution was enacted, countries around the world have increased rights protection for crime victims. The LDP has adopted a tough-against-crime attitude and has been active in promoting the rights of victims. As a result, the 2005 draft proposed to provide that ‘the victims of crime have a right to receive the treatment their dignity deserves’.Footnote 138 The 2012 draft also proposed that ‘the state must respect human rights and be respectful in the treatment of crime victims and their families’.Footnote 139

The LDP Q&A explains that the obligation to disclose government information, the obligation to preserve the environment, and the obligation to respect crime victims are added as responsibilities of the government, rather than rights of individuals because they are not widely accepted as specific enough to be recognized as individual rights.Footnote 140 This would mean that individual citizens would not be able to invoke these rights before the courts when challenging governmental actions.

The addition of new rights is widely supported by other parties as well. The Yomiuri Newspaper draft also supported the addition of personality rights,Footnote 141 environmental rights,Footnote 142 victim rights,Footnote 143 and the right of access to government information.Footnote 144 The Sankei Newspaper draft would also support the addition of the right to privacy,Footnote 145 the right of access to government information,Footnote 146 environmental rights,Footnote 147 and the rights of crime victims.Footnote 148

E Freedom of Expression

The LDP has been frustrated by the arguments made against restrictions on freedom of expression. The 2005 draft did not significantly revise Article 21.Footnote 149 However, the 2012 draft attempted to make it much easier for the government to restrict freedom of expression by proposing to add Article 21(2) which states that ‘notwithstanding the preceding section, no one should be allowed to engage in activity that is intended to harm public interest or public order or create an association for the same purpose’.Footnote 150 By allowing the government to restrict freedom of expression by merely invoking the ‘public interest’ and ‘public order’ rather than ‘public welfare’, the provision was clearly intended to broaden its ability to restrict freedom of expression.Footnote 151

The LDP Q&A explains that this revision is necessary, citing the difficulty of applying the Anti-Subversive Activities Act to Aum Shinrikyo.Footnote 152 Additionally, the draft only permits restricting activities or the creation of associations intended to harm public interest and public order. It asserts that the revision would not impose any other restrictions on freedom of expression.Footnote 153 However, the proposed amendment to Article 21 would surely allow far more extensive restrictions on freedom of expression than the mere denial of protection to Aum Shinrikyo.

F Religious Freedom

The LDP drafts were also meant to revise provisions on religious freedom, specifically the separation of religion and the state. The 2005 draft revised Article 20(3) to prohibit the state and local government from participating in:

[r]eligious education and other religious activity, which goes beyond the scope of social ceremony or customary practice, and which has religious significance and leads to an endorsement, facilitation or advancement or oppression or interference with a particular religion.Footnote 154

The 2012 draft further revised Article 20(1) to prohibit the state from granting privileges to religious organizations, instead of prohibiting religious organizations from benefiting from privileges granted by the state or exercising any political power as the current provision provides.Footnote 155 It also revised Article 20(3) in the following manner: ‘the state, local government, or other public organizations should not engage in education for a particular religion or other religious activities, except for those used in social ceremonies or customary practices’.Footnote 156

As mentioned above,Footnote 157 Shinto was granted a special status under the Meiji Constitution. After the occupation forces banned the government from endorsing Shinto and mandated the separation of religion and the state via the Constitution of Japan, the government has been unable to support Shinto, like any other religion. However, because of Shinto’s widespread influence, it has been difficult for the government to stay away from it entirely. Moreover, the LDP government, supported by the Shinto organization, wanted to re-establish the close relationship between the government and Shinto. The Supreme Court of Japan has allowed some kinds of relationships between Shinto and the government as long as the relationship remained within socially acceptable limits, thus allowing the government to engage in social customs such as the Shinto-style ground-breaking ceremony.Footnote 158 However, the Supreme Court of Japan has struck down some government connections with Shinto, such as government payment for prayers at Shinto shrines.Footnote 159 The LDP has criticized these decisions of the Supreme Court of Japan that struck down such practices for undermining the traditional connection between Shinto and the government.

The LDP Q&A explains that this amendment was meant to clarify the permissible connection between religion and the state based on guidance from the decisions of the Supreme Court.Footnote 160 However, it suggested that this amendment would also allow the government to pay for prayers at the Shinto shrines with tax money.Footnote 161 Therefore, it is apparent that the LDP revisions are meant to widen the ambit of permissible relationships between the government and Shinto.Footnote 162

G Family

The LDP has expressed deep dissatisfaction with how the Constitution of Japan views families. It thus attempted to restore the order within the family in the new constitution. While the LDP did not propose any significant revisions to Article 24 in the 2005 draft, the 2012 draft proposed to add Article 24(1), which provides that the ‘[f]amily needs to be respected as a natural and foundational unit of society. Members of the family must help each other’.Footnote 163 As the text of this proposed amendment suggests, in addition to mandating respect for the family as the foundational unit of society, it would also add a new obligation for family members to help each other. Moreover, it would change the current text that states that ‘[m]arriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes’, by omitting the word ‘only’.Footnote 164

The LDP Q&A explains that Article 24(1) is meant to address the concern that family ties have been weakening in recent years, despite the fact that the family is a fundamental element of society.Footnote 165 Along with the LDP, most conservative groups – including the Japan Conference,Footnote 166 the Yomiuri Newspaper,Footnote 167 and the Sankei NewspaperFootnote 168 – believe in the necessity of provisions mandating respect for the family.The LDP Q&A also explains that the proposed obligation to care for each other is simply a moral obligation and is not meant to allow the government to interfere with family structure.Footnote 169 Nonetheless, it is important to note that there is no definition of ‘family’ within this proposed constitution. Since the LDP draft relies on the long tradition and history of Japan, one can likely assume that ‘family’ refers to a traditional family – a heterosexual legal marriage sharing the same family name.

Many people fear that this amendment would prevent the existence of more diverse forms of family structures. Moreover, by making the family the foundational unit instead of the individual, the amendment might resurrect the pre-war ie system. It is even possible that this change could lead to the Emperor once again being placed at the top of society, as the ultimate father of Japan.Footnote 170 Furthermore, it is obvious that marriage needs to be based on the mutual consent of both partners, but by removing ‘only’ from the current text, the possibility arises that parents and other members of the family might be able to have a say on the matter, and possibly even possess the right to approve or reject the marriages of their children.Footnote 171

IV THE VISION OF JAPANESE SOCIETY AND ‘TRADITIONAL JAPANESE VALUES’

A The Vision of Japanese Society

It is apparent that the LDP drafts are premised upon a completely different vision of what Japanese society should look like under the constitution. The LDP’s drafts clarify that Japanese society is headed by the Emperor, and propose to amend the Constitution to declare that the Emperor is the head of state.Footnote 172 This position is consistent with the position of other conservative organizations such as the Japan Conference, which proposed that the Constitution needed to clearly state that Japan is a constitutional monarchy, with the Emperor as the head of the country, and as a symbol of the eternality of Japan as well as the integration of the people of Japan.Footnote 173 The Sankei Newspaper draft expresses similar ideas, as it also proposes to clarify that Japan is a country led by the EmperorFootnote 174 and that ‘Japan is a constitutional monarchy with the Emperor as a symbol of eternality of the nation as well as the integration of the nation’.Footnote 175

The commitment to follow history and tradition has also led to the acknowledgment of the public’s historical responsibility to defend their community and homeland with honour and a strong spirit.Footnote 176 As a result, many conservative critics argue that the Constitution should declare that citizens have a responsibility or obligation to defend Japan.Footnote 177 Naturally, this position leads conservative people to also support the creation of armed forces capable of defending the country from foreign attacks. Thus, the LDP’s draft would permit Japan to form an armed force called the ‘Self Defense Forces’, the existence of which would require a substantial amendment to Article 9.Footnote 178 Other conservative proposals are generally consistent in calling for the revision of this so-called pacifism clause.Footnote 179 Additionally, the desire to commit to international peacekeeping operations beyond non-military contributions requires most conservative proposals to allow the SDF to take a more active military role that goes beyond mere self defence, by amending Article 9.Footnote 180

Judging from the commitment of the LDP and other conservative people to clarify the high status of the Emperor, to establish an obligation to defend the country, and to permit the extended use of the armed forces, it seems apparent that these proposals are premised on the belief that the Meiji era was a golden era to be followed; on the other hand, the changes to the Constitution following World War II were an intolerable and unjustifiable departure from tradition. These conservative proposals are designed to return Japanese society to the Meiji era.

B The Vision of Individual Rights and the Role of the Constitution

In addition to changing the vision of Japanese society, the proposed amendments would also radically change the vision of individual rights that exists under the current constitution. The Constitution of Japan is based on the notion of the universality of human rights, reflecting the international commitment to the protection of human rights after the end of World War II.Footnote 181 By denying this universality and replacing it with history and tradition as the basis for human rights protection, it appears that the LDP is committed to a completely different vision of individual rights. While there has of course been on-going debates on the universality of human rights,Footnote 182 most people believe that the universality of human rights is the integral foundation of a liberal democracy. Therefore, this amendment would at least radically alter the way individual rights are viewed, and might even undermine the foundation of individual rights protection.

There is also a striking difference between the role of the current Constitution and the role that the LDP-drafted Constitution would play. The Constitution of Japan is designed to place limits on the government. On the other hand, the primary role of the LDP’s proposed constitution would be to impose obligations on citizens.Footnote 183 The LDP Q&A insists that there is nothing wrong with imposing some obligations on citizens.Footnote 184 The LDP asserts that in order to maintain society and the state, certain obligations must be included in the Constitution.Footnote 185

On top of the aforementioned obligations, the 2012 draft also proposes the addition of Article 102(1), which provides that all citizens must respect the Constitution.’Footnote 186 This is a fundamental change. The current constitution only requires public officials to respect it.Footnote 187 As the Constitution was enacted by the people, it was believed that there should not be any obligation for the people themselves to obey it. However, the LDP takes the opposing view that the Constitution must be obeyed by the people just like any other law.Footnote 188 Although the LDP’s proposed obligation is merely declaratory and carries no legal effect,Footnote 189 it is indicative of an entirely different understanding of the Constitution. Other conservative proposals are consistent in imposing an obligation on the people to observe the Constitution.Footnote 190

Based on the LDP’s focus on including so many new obligations on the people and mandating the people to obey the constitution, it is clear that the LDP’s proposed constitution would not be a law enacted by the people to restrain the power of the government.Footnote 191 Rather, it would be a law to bind the people and ensure that they perform their obligations.

C Reflections on ‘Traditional Japanese Values’

The LDP and other conservative people rely heavily upon history and tradition, which can essentially be seen as relying on ‘traditional Japanese values’. It is, after all, the values cherished in traditional Japanese society – ‘traditional Japanese values’ – that they want to preserve and restore.

The focus on ‘traditional Japanese values’ is reminiscent of the concept of ‘Asian values’ emphasized by Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1981–2003, and by Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore from 1959–1990.Footnote 192 ‘Asian values’ are often advocated as a justification to place limits on the protection of individual rights in order to pursue the promotion of economic development or the preservation of public order.Footnote 193 However, such arguments have been subject to various criticisms in the past.Footnote 194

Although no one in Japan talks about ‘Asian values’, the LDP’s idea of ‘tradition’ sounds similar to ‘Asian values’. Even though they were not primarily invoked to promote economic development, ‘traditional Japanese values’ are seemingly intended to place limits on the protection of individual rights and to secure public order. The LDP appears to be ensuring that the public interest could outweigh individual rights through a revision of the fundamental rights provisions.Footnote 195 As both theories have similar effects and objectives, it seems likely that there are also certain similarities in the justifications for them.

On the other hand, the fact that Japanese society is headed by the Emperor (whether symbolically or as the actual head of state) is a significant difference from other Asian countries. Moreover, the fact that the LDP wants to provide special support to Shinto may be another significant difference from other Asian countries. After all, although the LDP wishes to revise the principle of separation of religion and state in the constitution, the LDP expects the amendments to give Shinto, and Shinto alone, a closer connection with the government. Furthermore, the primary emphasis on ‘harmony’ – which stems from Prince Shotoku’s Seventeen-Article Constitution – as the most significant characteristic of Japanese society, could be viewed as a unique Japanese manifestation. These may be some of the main reasons why the LDP and other conservatives emphasize ‘traditional Japanese values’ and not ‘Asian values’.

In light of the LDP’s plan to revise Article 11, abolish Article 97, and omit the reference to individuals in Article 13, there can be no question that the strongest motivation for the LDP may indeed lie in its deep dissatisfaction with the concept of fundamental human rights itself and the idea that every human being must be respected as an individual. Both ideas are central to the protection of fundamental human rights. The LDP wants to repudiate the universality of the human rights protection and reject individualism as a primary principle, while emphasizing that every citizen, as a member of society, has responsibilities towards society. To the LDP, society is more important than the individual. This is perhaps the most apparent similarity between the ‘Asian values’ theory and the LDP’s argument for ‘traditional Japanese values’.

Having devoted so much focus to traditional Japanese values, however, it seems odd that no one has defined what exactly these ‘traditional Japanese values’ are. The LDP’s 2012 draft, for instance, never defines what is meant by the ‘inherent culture’ of Japan, or what qualifies as the ‘good tradition’ that should be followed. As a result, we are forced to speculate on what these ‘traditional Japanese values’ might be. This uncertainty can also be found in the proposals of other conservative groups. There is, however, at least one thing that we know. As we already saw, conservative people assume that the Meiji era was the period where these traditions were formulated. It is the tradition of this era that the LDP and other conservative politicians want to restore. What we can therefore see is that the call for ‘traditional Japanese values’ is nothing but an anachronistic nostalgia for the Meiji era.

What conservative people fail to see in this respect, is that Japan has a history spanning over two millennia filled with significant changes in society and government. The Meiji era is not the only source of Japanese tradition. While the Meiji Restoration brought significant changes in law, politics and culture, Japan’s rich culture and traditions clearly predated the Meiji Restoration. As a result, the Meiji tradition is naturally quite different from the traditions that existed before the Meiji Restoration. It is difficult to understand why only traditions after the Meiji Restoration should be defended, and not the older traditions. The logic of the LDP therefore seems to lack internal consistency, and it remains unclear whether the LDP and other conservative people would be able to explain why only the traditions from the Meiji era should be restored, and not traditions that existed prior to the Meiji Restoration.

Another point to consider is that the values that are being called ‘traditional Japanese values’ are actually quite modern since the Meiji Restoration occurred only roughly one hundred and fifty years ago. It is a tradition created by government elites rather than a tradition naturally developed by society over time. The image of Japanese society being governed by the Emperor, as envisioned by conservative people, is actually an image created by the Meiji government to justify the Emperor’s power after the Meiji Restoration. Prior to that, it is doubtful whether the Emperor actually governed Japan.Footnote 196 Additionally, while many conservative people claim that the public has a responsibility to defend the country, such an obligation was only introduced by the Meiji government in connection to mandatory conscription. There was no such obligation before that time.Footnote 197 This tradition, like many others, is not a long-standing tradition of Japan. It is simply a modern one.

Moreover, the LDP and other conservative people have failed to explain why such traditions deserve to be followed in the first place. For instance, as we already saw, the Meiji government established the family law system based on the supremacy of the ie, and with the ie being the most foundational building block of society. This ie system led to serious discrimination against women. In the 21st century, it should almost go without saying that there is no reason to follow such a tradition.

Finally, one must question whether the LDP’s understanding of ‘traditional Japanese values’ is consistent with true ‘traditional Japanese values’. True ‘traditional Japanese values’ respect diversity and minority groups within Japanese society, and emphasize harmony. While the LDP’s proposal also acknowledges the concept of harmony, the concept of harmony was not used to force minority groups to assimilate, or to silence them.Footnote 198 However, this is precisely what the LDP government wants to accomplish under the revised constitution. Therefore, the LDP’s insistence on ‘traditional Japanese values’ might actually destroy the true and long-standing ‘traditional Japanese values’.

Based on all of the aforementioned reasons, constitutional amendments based on ‘traditional Japanese values’ are unjustifiable. They would very likely undermine the very foundation of individual rights protection in Japan. These problems are the same ones which could be found in ‘Asian values’ theory. The LDP’s ‘traditional Japanese values’ theory, just like the ‘Asian values’ theory, would hardly justify what they are hoping to accomplish.

V. CONCLUSION

It is not certain whether the amendments that the LDP supports could be enacted as the draft presently stands. The LDP’s coalition partner, Kōmei Party, supports the addition of new rights such as environmental rights, but is not enthusiastic about a revision of the fundamental principles of the Constitution.Footnote 199 Other minority parties such as Ōsaka Ishin, which also supports constitutional amendment, is much more concerned with local government issues, and thus have not proposed any amendments affecting fundamental human rights except for the addition of a provision mandating free higher education.Footnote 200 Since a proposal for a constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet, further negotiations are required before the government can introduce a specific amendment proposal that will receive the required support.Footnote 201

Even more significant is the fact that constitutional amendments need to receive majority support in a referendum. Because the referendum addresses each individual amendment as a separate proposal rather than a package,Footnote 202 it is uncertain whether all of the proposals will be accepted even if the Diet gains the necessary support to propose an amendment. Public support for a constitutional amendment varies depending upon the polls.Footnote 203 It is completely unpredictable whether there is majority support for any or all of the proposals the LDP announced in 2012. In this sense, the LDP’s goal of replacing the human rights provisions of the current constitution with their revised provisions may still be just a dream. However, their proposals give us a glimpse into the LDP’s vision regarding the protection of individual rights and the role of society in Japan.

On 3 May 2017, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared that he wished to have a new constitution by 2020 by amending Article 9.Footnote 204 It is not clear whether he also wished to propose amendments for the fundamental human rights provisions.Footnote 205 Nonetheless, it is extremely important to follow this issue. Japan’s development has reached a watershed moment, and events in the near future could determine whether the constitutional protections for fundamental human rights can endure.Footnote 206

Footnotes

*

Professor of Law, University of British Columbia, Peter A Allard School of Law. This article was originally presented in the 14th ASLI conference at the University of Philippines, Manila, in 2017, on ‘A Uniting Force: “Asian Values” and the Law’.

References

1. Nihonkoku kenpō [Constitution of Japan] (promulgated on 3 November 1946).

2. Jiyū minshutō [Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)], ‘Rittō sengen/kōryō [Declaration of the Party Policy], Tō no shimei [Mission of the Party]’ (Jiyū minshutō) <www.jimin.jp/aboutus/declaration/index.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

3. The term ‘normal state’ was first used by Ichiro Ozawa, who used to be an influential member of the LDP but later left the party to become the leading member of the opposition. But this term is believed to show the basic ideas shared among conservative politicians. Of course, the special limitation introduced by the pacifism clause of the constitution, noted below, is the main culprit. Ichiro Ozawa, ‘Watashi no kihon rinen [My Fundamental Principles]’ (Minshutō [Democratic Party of Japan], 11 September 2006) <www.eda-jp.com/dpj/2006/ozawa0911.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

4. Hook, Glenn D and McCormack, Gavan, Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis (Routledge 2001)Google Scholar. See eg ‘Constitutional Revision Research Project’ (Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies) <https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/crrp> accessed 30 September 2017.

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7. There are some precedents, which suggest the existence of arguments similar to arguments about rights in Japan. Feldman, Eric A, The Ritual of Rights in Japan: Law, Society, and Health Policy (CUP 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But they had not been crystalized into the arguments of rights and it cannot be denied that the government had to invent the Japanese words for ‘right’ after the Meiji Restoration.

8. Dai-nippon teikoku kenpō [Constitution of the Empire of Japan] (promulgated on 2 November 1889) (Meiji Constitution).

9. ibid art 1. Indeed he was sacred and inviolable; ibid art 3. He was a ‘living God’.

10. ibid preamble.

11. ibid art 4.

12. ibid art 29 (protection of freedom of speech ‘within the limits of law’).

13. Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, ‘Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties’ (SCAPIN-93, National Diet Library 4 October 1945) <www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_l/M003/M003-001l.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

14. The Potsdam Declaration listed the mandate that ‘[f]reedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established’ as one of the terms of Japanese surrender. ‘Potsdam Declaration: Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender’ (National Diet Library 26 July 1945), art 10 <www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html> accessed 30 September 2017. One of the policies of the United States toward the Occupation was ‘the development in Japan of respect for fundamental human rights and of principles of liberal and representative government’. ‘United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan’ (Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, SWNCC150/1, National Diet Library), art 3 <www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/013/013_002l.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

15. Koseki (n 6) 9.

16. ibid 50.

17. ibid.

18. ibid 56.

19. ibid 56, 59–60.

20. ibid 60–61.

21. ibid 61, 76.

22. ibid 76.

23. ibid 99.

24. ibid 107–8.

25. ‘Record of Events on 13 February 1946 when Proposed New Constitution for Japan was submitted to the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, in Behalf of the Supreme Commander’ (National Diet Library 13 February 1946) <www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/077/077tx.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

26. Jōji Matsumoto, the chairperson of the government committee, left notes indicating that Whitney added that they could not guarantee the security of the person of the Emperor without the acceptance of the draft. Jōji Matsumoto, ‘2gatsu 13nichi kaiken ryakuki [February 13 memorandum]’ (National Diet Library), <www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/002_4/002_4_003l.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

27. Koseki (n 6) 133.

28. ibid 208.

29. Akira Momochi, ‘Sengo 70nen naze ima kenpō kaisei ga hitsuyō ka [After 70 Years from the End of War, Why Is the Constitutional Amendment Necessary?]’ (BLOGOS, 6 June 2015) <http://blogos.com/article/115200/> accessed 30 September 2017; Justin Williams, ‘Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look’ (1965) 59(3) American Political Science Review 665.

30. Constitution of Japan, preamble.

31. ibid art 1.

32. ibid.

33. ibid art 4(1).

34. ibid art 9(1).

35. ibid art 9(2).

36. ibid preamble.

37. n 14.

38. ‘Three basic points stated by the Supreme Commander to be the “musts” in constitutional revision’ (Alfred Hussey Papers Constitution File No 1 Document No 5, National Diet Library 3 February 1946) <www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/072shoshi.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

39. Mirabella, Daniel, ‘The Death and Resurrection of Natural Law’ (2011) 2 The Western Australian Jurist 251 Google Scholar.

40. United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (A/RES/3/217, 10 December 1948); de Shutter, Olivier, International Human Rights Law (CUP 2010) 31 Google Scholar , 50; Louis Henkin, ‘The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights’ (1989) 506 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 10; Kathleen Renée Cronin-Furman, ‘60 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Towards an Individual Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 25(1) American University International Law Review 175.

41. Constitution of Japan, art 11.

42. ibid art 97.

43. Nobuyoshi Ashibe (Kazuyuki Takahashi (supplemented)), Kenpō [Constitution] (6th edn, Iwanami Shoten 2015) 80.

44. Constitution of Japan, art 13.

45. Ashibe (n 43) 82.

46. Exceptions are the protection of the right to choose one’s occupation (Constitution of Japan, art 22) and the protection of the right to property (Constitution of Japan, art 29), which allow for restrictions for ‘public welfare’.

47. Constitution of Japan, art 12.

48. ibid art 13.

49. Matsui, Shigenori, Constitution of Japan: A Contextual Analysis ( Hart Publishing 2011 ) 164168 . Google Scholar

50. Constitution of Japan, art 20(1) (‘Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all.’).

51. ibid art 20(1) (‘No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority.’) and art 20(3) (‘The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.’).

52. Meiji Constitution, art 28 (protection of freedom of religion ‘within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects’).

53. Shimazono, Susumu, ‘State Shinto and the Religious Structure of Modern Japan’ (2005) 73(4) Journal of American Academy of Religion 1077 Google Scholar; Shimazono, Susumu, ‘State Shinto in the Lives of the People: The Establishment of Emperor Worship, Modern Nationalism and Shrine Shinto in Late Meiji’ (2009) 36(1) Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 93 Google Scholar. See also Murakami, Shigeyoshi, Tennōsei kokka to shūkyō [The Emperor and the Religion] (Kōdansha 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54. ‘The Shinto Directive’ (1960) 1(2) Contemporary Religions in Japan 85.

55. Constitution of Japan, art 21(1) (‘Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.’).

56. Shinbunshihō [Newspaper Act], Law No 42 of 1909 (abolished on 24 May 1949), art 23.

57. ‘Taisei yokusankai jissen yōkō [Basic Plan for Realizing the Taisei Yokusankai]’ (National Diet Library 14 December 1940) <www.ndl.go.jp/modern/img_r/084/084-001r.html> (accessed 5 December 2017). The ‘Taisei yokusan kai’ was an attempt to mobilize all Japanese people in the total and complete support for the imperial rule. No one was allowed to refrain from actively endorsing the government decision made in the name of the Emperor.

58. Mitchell, Richard H, Censorship in Imperial Japan (Princeton University Press 1983)Google Scholar.

59. Chian ijihō [Peace Preservation Act], Law No 54 of 1941 (abolished on 5 October, 1945), art 1; Kasza, Gregory, The State and the Mass Media in Japan, 1918-1945 (University of California Press 1993)Google Scholar.

60. Constitution of Japan, art 14(1) (‘All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.’).

61. ibid art 24(1) (‘Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.’) and art 24(2) (‘With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.’).

62. Tonooka, Monjuro, ‘The Development of the Family Law in Modern Japan’ (1965) 2(1) Waseda hikaku hōgaku [Waseda Comparative Law Review] 198 Google Scholar; Matsui, Shigenori, ‘The Constitution and the Family in Japan’ in Harry N Scheiber and Laurent Mayali (eds), Japanese Family Law in Comparative Perspective (The Robbins Collection Publications 2009) 33 Google Scholar.

63. Constitution of Japan, art 98(1).

64. ibid art 81.

65. ibid art 99.

66. The Constitution has, however, several provisions on obligation of the people; obligation to provide education to children (art 26(2)), obligation to work (art 27(1)), and the obligation to pay tax (art 30).

67. Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai [House of Representatives Commission on the Constitution], ‘Nihonkoku kenpō zenbun nikansuru kiso shiryō [Basic Resource Materials on the Preamble to the Constitution of Japan]’, (shu ken shi dai 32gō 46, Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai July 2003) <www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/chosa/shukenshi032.pdf/$File/shukenshi032.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

68. ibid; Jiyū minshutō kenpō chōsakai [LDP Constitution Committee], ‘Kenpōkaisei taikō sōan [Outline Draft of the Amendments to the Constitution]’ (Kenpō shiryōshū [Constitution Information Centre], 1972) <www.geocities.co.jp/WallStreet-Bull/8091/kenpousouan1972inaba.html> accessed 30 September 2017. The LDP published the major points for constitutional amendment in 2004 before the publication of the draft of the new constitution. The LDP insisted on the necessity of writing the constitution in beautiful Japanese languages. Jiyū minshutō Kenpō kaigi [LDP Constitution Council], ‘Kenpō kaisei no points [Major Points of Constitutional Amendment]’ (Kenpō kaigi, June 2004) <www.kenpoukaigi.gr.jp/seitoutou/200406jimin-kenpoukaiseinopoint.htm> accessed 30 September 2017.

69. Momochi (n 29). The LDP argued that they need to enact a new constitution ‘emphasizing our country’s inherent values (i.e. vision of the state) based on Japanese history, tradition and culture, holding highly the idea of a sound common sense, which includes the sense of morality Japanese people inherently aspire to, finding the identity of the country of Japan and Japanese in the Constitution, and breeding patriotism naturally through the Constitution.’ LDP Constitutional Council, ‘Major Points’ (n 68); Shūgiin, ‘Basic Resource Materials’ (n 67) 46.

70. Nippon kaigi [Japan Conference], ‘Shinkenpō no taikō [Outline of New Constitution]’ (Nippon kaigi, 11 November 2016) <www.nipponkaigi.org/opinion/archives/8502> accessed 30 September 2017. The Japan Conference is believed to have had a very strong influence on the LDP and Shinzo Abe.

71. ibid.

72. ibid.

73. LDP Constitution Committee, ‘Outline Draft’ (n 68); Japan Conference (n 70).

74. Momochi (n 29). They claim that it is necessary to clearly accept the Self Defense Forces as an armed force. LDP Constitution Committee, ‘Outline Draft’ (n 68); see also Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai [House of Representatives Commission on the Constitution], ‘Kenpō nikansuru omona ronten ni kansuru sankō shiryō [Materials on the Major Issues of the Constitution]’ (shu ken shi dai77gō, Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai May 2012), 1 <www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/shukenshi077.pdf/$File/shukenshi077.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

75. House of Representatives Commission on the Constitution, ‘Major Issues’ (n 74) 16.

76. Momochi (n 29). They argue the necessity of enacting a provision to help address an emergency; LDP Constitution Committee, ‘Outline Draft’ (n 68).

77. LDP Constitution Committee, ‘Outline Draft’ (n 68). They thus argue that it is necessary to expressly require citizens to have respect for others.

78. Hidetsugu Yagi, ‘Kindai kenpō ni okeru ningenzō nitsuite [On the Vision of Human Beings in the Modern Constitution]’ (1997) 20 Meiji seitoku kinen gakkai [Meiji Japan Society] 36 <www.mkc.gr.jp/seitoku/pdf/f20-3.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

79. Japan Conference (n 70).

80. LDP Constitution Council, ‘Major Points’ (n 68).

81. ibid.

82. Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai [House of Representatives Commission on the Constitution], ‘Kokumin no kenri oyobi gimu ni kansuru kore made no giron [Arguments Provided So far on the Protection of Right of Citizens]’ (shū ken shi dai63gō, Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai February 2005), 8 <www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/chosa/shukenshi063.pdf/$File/shukenshi063.pdf/> accessed 30 September 2017.

83. ibid 11.

84. ibid 11–13; LDP Constitution Council, ‘Major Points’ (n 68).

85. Momochi (n 29).

86. Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai [House of Representatives Commission on the Constitution], ‘Nihonkoku kenpō no seiteikatei nikansuru shiryō [Materials on the Enactment Process of the Constitution of Japan]’ (Shū ken shi dai90gō, Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai November 2016), 9 <www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/shukenshi090.pdf/$File/shukenshi090.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

87. United Nations, Treaty of Peace with Japan. Signed at San Francisco, on 8 September 1951, (No 1832 United Nations Treaty Series 46, 1952) < https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20136/volume-136-i-1832-english.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

88. Constitution of Japan, art 96.

89. Hiroshi Nakanishi, ‘The Gulf War and Japanese Diplomacy’ (Nippon.com, 6 December 2011) <www.nippon.com/en/features/c00202/> accessed 30 September 2017.

90. Yomiuri Newspaper, ‘Kenpō kaisei shian zenbun [Full Text of Draft of the Yomiuri Constitutional Amendment]’ Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo, 2004) <https://info.yomiuri.co.jp/media/yomiuri/feature/kaiseishian.html?> accessed 30 September 2017.

91. Jiyū minshutō [LDP], ‘Shin-kenpō sōan [Draft of the New Constitution]’ (Jiyū minshutō 2005), <www.kenpoukaigi.gr.jp/seitoutou/051122jimin-sinkenpousouan.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

92. Nihonkoku kenpō no kaisei tetsuduki nikansuru hōritsu [Act on Amendment Procedure of the Constitution of Japan], Law No 51 of 2007 (Referendum Act).

93. Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai [House of Representatives Commission on the Constitution], ‘Shūgiin Kenpō shinsakai [House of Representatives Commission on the Constitution]’ (House of Representatives 2014) <www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kenpou.nsf/html/kenpou/index.htm> accessed 30 September 2017 ; Sangiin Kenpō shinsakaii [House of Councillors Commission on the Constitution], ‘Sangiin kenpō shinsakai [House of Councillors Commission on the Constitution]’ (House of Councillors) <www.kenpoushinsa.sangiin.go.jp> accessed 30 September 2017.

94. After another landslide victory in 2014, the LDP obtained 291 seats and the Kōmei Party obtained twenty-five seats for a combined 326 seats of 475, which is sufficient to establish a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives.

95. Jiyū minshutō [LDP], ‘Nihonkoku kenpō kaisei sōan [Amendment Drafts of the Constitution of Japan]’ (Jiyū minshutō, 2012), <https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/news/policy/130250_1.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

96. As a result of the 2016 House of Councillors election, the LDP obtained 121 seats and Kōmei Party obtained twenty-five seats for a combined 146 out of 242 seats. The coalition did not obtain the two-thirds necessary to unilaterally pass the constitutional amendment proposal (162 seats). But with the support from some other minority parties such as Ōsaka Ishin (twelve seats) and some independent members, many believe that there is a possibility to pass constitutional amendment proposals.

97. Justin McCurry, ‘Japan Could Change Pacifist Constitution after Shinzo Abe Victory’ The Guardian (London, 11 July 2016) <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/11/japan-could-change-pacifist-constitution-after-shinzo-abe-victory> accessed 30 September 2017; Adam P Liff, ‘How Specifically Does Japan’s LDP Want to Revise the Constitution?’ The Diplomat (Tokyo, 14 July 2016) <http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/how-specifically-does-japans-ldp-want-to-revise-the-constitution/> accessed 30 September 2017; Jeffrey W Horning, ‘Constitutional Revision in Japan: Why Change Is Hard to Come by’ (Council on Foreign Relations 26 July 2016) <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-07-26/constitutional-revision-japan> accessed 30 September 2017.

98. Repeta, Lawrence, ‘Japan’s Democracy at Risk—The LDP’s Ten Most Dangerous Proposals for Constitutional Change’ (2013) 11(3) Asia Pacific Journal 1 Google Scholar; Goodman, Carl F, ‘Contemplated Amendments to Japan’s 1947 Constitution: A Return to Iye, Kokutai and the Meiji State’ (2017) 26 Washington International Law Journal 17 Google Scholar.

99. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) preamble.

100. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) preamble.

101. ibid.

102. ibid.

103. ibid.

104. Jiyū minshutō [LDP], ‘Nihonkoku Kenpō kaisei sōan Q&A (zōhoban) [Q&A on Amendment Drafts to the Constitution of Japan (updated)]’ 5 (Jiyū minshutō October 2013) <https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/pamphlet/kenpou_qa.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

105. ibid. See ‘The Constitution of Prince Shōtoku’ (Asia for Educators, Columbia University), art 1 <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/shotoku.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

106. Japan Conference (n 70).

107. Yomiuri Newspaper, ‘Full Text of Draft’ (n 90) preamble.

108. Sankei Newspaper, ‘Kokumin no Kenpō [Constitution for the Citizens]’ Sankei Shimbun (Tokyo, 26 April 2013), preamble <www.sankei.com/politics/news/141030/plt1410300023-n1.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

109. ibid.

110. ibid.

111. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 11.

112. ibid.

113. LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 13.

114. ibid 37.

115. ibid. The Sankei Newspaper draft does not have a clause declaring fundamental human rights as inviolable and eternal (Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 17(1)). The Yomiuri Newspaper draft as well as Sankei Newspaper draft also does not include a provision corresponding to current article 97. See Yomiuri Newspaper, ‘Full Text of Draft’ (n 90) and Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108).

116. Repeta (n 98); Goodman (n 98) 45–47.

117. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 13.

118. The Sankei Newspaper draft does not have a clause corresponding to the first sentence of Article 13 but declares that ‘human dignity should not be infringed’ (Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 22(1)).

119. Repeta (n 98).

120. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 12.

121. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 12.

122. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 13.

123. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 13.

124. LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 13.

125. ibid 14.

126. Yomiuri Newspaper, ‘Full Text of Draft’ (n 90) art. 17.

127. ibid art 18.

128. Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 18.

129. Repeta (n 98).

130. LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 13, 15.

131. The 2005 draft as well as 2012 draft proposed to add disability as one of the prohibited grounds for discrimination (LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 14; LDP, 2012 Amendment Draft (n 95) art 14), while the 2012 draft obligated the government to strive to provide an adequate environment for education (LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 26(3)).

132. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 19-2.

133. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 19-2.

134. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 21-2.

135. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 21-2.

136. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 25-2.

137. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 25-2.

138. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 25-3.

139. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 25-4.

140. LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) at 15.

141. Yomiuri Newspaper, ‘Full Text of Draft’ (n 90) art 20. The personality right means the right to integrity as a person or the right to personhood.

142. ibid art 30.

143. ibid art 47.

144. ibid art 50.

145. Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 31.

146. ibid art 32.

147. ibid art 43.

148. ibid art 51(2).

149. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 21(1).

150. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 21(2). The Sankei Newspaper draft would also add that ‘freedom of expression can be subject to restriction by statutes for the protection of morality and juveniles’ in addition to general restrictions for national security, public interest, or public order. Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 28(3).

151. Goodman (n 98) 53–54; Repeta (n 98).

152. LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 16. The Aum Shinrikyo is a religious cult group and was accused of having engaged in various illegal activities, including spreading deadly sarin gas inside Tokyo subway trains in 1995, killing thirteen people and injuring more than 6,000 others. The government wanted to apply the Anti-Subversive Activity Act to disband the organization but failed because of the strong opposition. Hakaikatsudō bōshihō [Anti-subversive Activities Act], Law No 240 of 1952, art 7. Instead, the Aum Shinrikyo lost the status of religious corporation under the Religious Corporation Act but religious organization itself survived. Shukyō hōjinhō [Religious Corporation Act], Law No 126 of 1951.

153. LDP, ‘Q & A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 16.

154. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 20(3).

155. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art 20(1).

156. ibid art 20(3).

157. See nn 52–53.

158. Supreme Court Grand Bench Judgment 13 July 1977, 31-4 Minshū 533.

159. Supreme Court Grand Bench Judgment 2 April 1997, 51-4 Minshū 1673.

160. LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 18.

161. ibid.

162. Goodman (n 98) 44.

163. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment Draft’ (n 95) art. 24(1).

164. ibid art 24(2).

165. LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 16.

166. Japan Conference (n 70).

167. Yomiuri Newspaper, ‘Full Text of Draft’(n 90) art 27(1).

168. Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 23.

169. ibid 17.

170. Goodman (n 98) 61.

171. The LDP 2012 draft also mandated the respect for human dignity and equality of sexes with respect to other matters on family, support, guardianship, marriage, divorce, property, succession, and relatives. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment draft’ (n 98) art 24(3).

172. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment draft’ (n 95) art 1. See also LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 7.

173. Japan Conference (n 70). On the other hand, the Yomiuri Newspaper draft does not include such a provision. Yomiuri Newspaper, ‘Full Text of Draft’ (n 90) art 1 (sovereignty of the people) and art 5 (symbolic status of the Emperor).

174. Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) preamble.

175. ibid art 1.

176. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) preamble; LDP, ‘2012 Amendment draft’ (n 95) preamble.

177. Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 19(1) (obligation to defend the country and to serve for the society and for the public).

178. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 9-2; LDP, 2012 Amendment draft (n 95) art. 9-2. Currently, the Self Defense Forces are not regarded as armed forces in Japan but a minimum force to defend Japan not reaching to an armed force.

179. Yomiuri Newspaper, ‘Full Text of Draft’ (n 90) art 12; Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 16(1).

180. LDP, ‘2005 Draft’ (n 91) art 9-2(3); LDP, ‘2012 Amendment draft’ (n 95) art 9-2(3); Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 16(1) (listing contribution to international peace as one of the purposes of holding armed forces).

181. See n 40.

182. Sullivan, Declan O’, ‘Is the Declaration of Human Rights Universal?’ (2000) 4(1) International Journal of Human Rights 25 Google Scholar; Franck, Thomas M, ‘Are Human Rights Universal?’ (2001) 80(1) Foreign Affairs 191 Google Scholar; Mullender, Richard, ‘Human Rights: Universalism and Cultural Relativism’ (2003) 6(3) Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 70 Google Scholar; Le, Nhina, ‘Are Human Rights Universal or Culturally Relative?’ (2016) 28 Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 203 Google Scholar.

183. The LDP draft ‘is totally at odds with the very purpose for which Japan’s Constitution is supposed to exist. Any constitution that is based on the principle of constitutionalism is essentially a set of rules for keeping the state power in check to protect the rights of citizens. But the LDP’s draft constitutional amendment clearly aims to impose various duties on the people and force a specific set of values on the people. In other words, it is meant to control the people, rather than to keep the state in check.’ Editorial, ‘LDP Amendment Draft Is a Flawed Perception of the Constitution’ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo, 19 October 2016) <www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201610190032.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

184. LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 6.

185. ibid.

186. LDP, ‘2012 Amendment draft’ (n 95) art 102(1).

187. Constitution of Japan, art 97.

188. LDP, ‘Q&A on Amendment Drafts’ (n 104) 37.

189. ibid 38.

190. Yomiuri Newspaper, ‘Full Text of Draft’ (n 90) preamble; Sankei Newspaper, ‘Constitution’ (n 108) art 112(2).

191. Goodman (n 98) 51.

192. Fareed Zakaria, ‘Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew’ (1994) 73(2) Foreign Affairs 109; Michal D Barr, ‘Lee Kuan Yew and the “Asian Values” Debate’ (2000) 24 Asian Studies Review 309; Yvonne Tew, ‘Beyond “Asian Values”: Rethinking Rights,’ (CGHR Working Paper 5, University of Cambridge Centre for Governance and Human Rights November 2012), <www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/245115/CGHR_WP_5_2012_Tew.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017 .

193. Amartya Sen, ‘Human Rights and Asian Values,’ (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 25 May 1996) <www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/morgenthau/254.html> accessed 30 September 2017; Surain Subramaniam, ‘The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal Democracy’ (2000) 27(1) Asian Affairs 19; Chang Yau Hoon, ‘Revisiting the Asian Values Argument Used by Asian Political Leaders and Its Validity’ (2004) 32(2) Indonesian Quarterly 154.

194. Christian Welzel, ‘The Asian Values Thesis Revisited: Evidence from the World Values Survey’ (2011) 12(1) Japanese Journal Political Science 1; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) ‘Demystifying Human Rights Protection in Asia’ (Background Paper N0 669a, FIDH November 2015) <www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/asie669anglaisbassdef.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017.

195. Editorial (n 183) (‘Underlying the LDP draft Constitution and running through it like a basso continuo is the philosophy that the interests of the state and groups supersede the human rights of individual citizens that are highly valued under the current Constitution.’).

196. Kunaichō [Imperial House Agency], ‘Tennō kōgō ryō heika gokekkon man 50nen ni saishite [On the 50th Anniversary of the Marriage of the Emperor and Empress]’ (Kunaichō 8 April 2009) <www.kunaicho.go.jp/okotoba/01/kaiken/kaiken-h21-gokekkon50.html> accessed 30 September 2017 (statement of the current Emperor of his belief that the status of the Emperor under the Constitution of Japan is more in line with the long history of the Emperor system). See also Yasumaru, Yoshio, Kindai tennōzō no keisei [Creation of the Image of the Modern Emperor] (Iwanami Shoten 2007)Google Scholar.

197. During the Tokugawa era ranging roughly three centuries before the Meiji Restoration, it was only the samurai warriors who were retained by the local lords that were required to defend the lord under feudal relationship. There was no mandatory military service for the public. The Meiji government introduced mandatory military service and conscription in 1873 and the Meiji Constitution stipulated that the Japanese subjects had an obligation for military service as provided by the law. Meiji Constitution, art 20.

198. The original Japanese word for ‘harmony’ in the Prince Shotoku’s Seventeen-Article Constitution was wa, which also meant peace and comfort. It mandated everyone to lose his or her sharp edges and is meant to teach everyone to fit oneself into the society. The concept also promoted kindness, mutual help, and caring for others. It is not an authorization for the government to suppress different opinions and different cultures. Yutaka Sakisaka, Wa no Kōzō [Structure of Harmony] (Hokuju Shuppan 1979); Takeshi Umehara, Shōtoku taishi 2 [Prince Shotoku 2] (Shūeisha 1993); Takeru Umehara, Nihon no dentō towa nanika [What is Japanese Tradition] (Minerva Shobō 2010).

199. Kōmeitō, Kenpō [Constitution], (Kōmeitō) <www.komei.or.jp/more/understand/constitution.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

200. Ōsaka ishin no kai [Osaka Restoration Association], ‘Kenpō kaisei gen-an [Constitutional Amendment Proposals]’ (Ōsaka Ishin no kai 24 March 2016) <https://o-ishin.jp/news/2017/images/90da581ba24723f77027257436ab13c1cec1a1ed.pdf> accessed 30 September 2017. Currently, only ‘compulsory education,’ public elementary and junior-high school education, is free. Constitution of Japan, art 26(2).

201. Even among the coalition parties, the opinion is split on whether the right to know and the environment right should be added as constitutional rights, since the LDP is more willing to provide them as a matter of government responsibility and not as constitutional rights. nn 134–140.

202. Constitution of Japan, art 96; Referendum Act (n 92) art 47 (a voter has one vote for each of the constitutional amendment proposal).

203. According to the Asahi Newspaper, 41% would support the constitutional amendment, while 50% would oppose it. ‘Genkō kenpō nihon nitotte yokatta 89% [89% welcomed the Current Constitution]’ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo, 2 May 2017), <www.asahi.com/articles/ASK4L528LK4LUZPS004.html> accessed 30 September 2017. On the other hand, according to the Yomiuri Newspaper, 49% would support the constitutional amendment, while the same 49% would oppose it. ‘Sekō 70nen, kenpō no yakuwai hyōka 89% [70 Years after Taking Effect, 89% Values the Role of the Constitution]’ Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo, 28 April 2017) <www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/TO000302/20170428-OYT1T50166.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

204. ‘Kenpō kaisei 2020nen ni sekō shitai: Shushō ga message [Wishing to Have a New Constitution by 2020: Message from Prime Minister]’ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo, 3 May 2017) <www.asahi.com/articles/ASK534KF0K53UTFK002.html> accessed 30 September 2017.

205. ibid. At least he added that he also wishes to add a clause mandating access to a free higher education for everyone. Apparently, this proposal was suggested to attract the support of the Ōsaka Ishin no kai. However, this proposal was never included in the LDP’s 2005 or 2012 draft. Together with his proposal to add a third clause to art 9 to constitutionalize the Self Defense Forces while leaving both the first and second clauses intact, which was never proposed in the 2005 draft or 2012 draft, his actions left everybody wondering whether he was still committed to the 2012 draft.

206. As a result of the un-expected general election in October 2017, the LDP obtained 284 seats and the LDP and Kōmei coalition obtained 313 seats out of 465 in the House of Representatives, more than two-thirds necessary to propose constitutional amendment. This landslide victory for Abe would surely clear the way for possible constitutional amendment.