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Multilayered Oversight: Electoral Administration in Indonesia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2021

Simon Butt  and
Fritz Siregar
Simon Butt*
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
Fritz Siregar
Affiliation:
Indonesia Jentera School of Law, Indonesia
*
Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Electoral administration in Indonesia is complex. The Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) is responsible for planning and running five-yearly elections for one national and two regional legislatures, and one additional national regional representative body, as well as direct presidential, gubernatorial, mayoral and regent elections. Because candidates and parties often have significant financial stakes in their outcome, these elections are hotly contested and the results quite commonly disputed, including in Indonesia's Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi). Electoral contestants often point to mistakes in administration and vote counting, which appear to be natural consequences of the great logistical challenges these elections present. For example, on 17 April, 2019, well over 150 million citizens attended one of over 800,000 polling stations to vote for candidates to fill 19,817 legislative seats in national and subnational parliaments. Many of these elections are said to be marred by attempts by candidates and their parties to gain illegal advantage, whether through misuse of incumbency or vote buying. There is also said to be much potential for corruption amongst electoral administrators themselves in registering candidates, verifying parties, procuring equipment for polling stations, and counting and tallying votes on election day. Given the potential of mistakes and illegality to jeopardise the legitimacy of election results, lawmakers in Indonesia have created multi-layered oversight mechanisms to oversee the planning and running of the elections by the Electoral Commission, as well as to oversee the Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu, Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum) itself, which is charged with supervising that Commission. This article examines the work and performance of these institutions, and the Electoral Administration Honour Council (DKPP, or Dewan Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilu), which hears allegations of breaches by the Commission and the Board.

Keywords

Electoral Administration
Type
Article
Information
Asian Journal of Comparative Law , Volume 16 , Supplement S1 , December 2021 , pp. S121 - S135
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the National University of Singapore

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References

1 Adnan Buyung Nasution, ‘Inaugural Professorial Lecture: Towards Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia’ (Adnan Buyung Nasution Papers on Southeast Asian Constitutionalism, Melbourne Law School 2011) <https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1547630/NasutionPaper111020_web2.pdf> 19.

2 Cities and counties are of the same level, with cities being units of government in primarily urban areas and counties comprising the remainder.

3 Previously, under the 1999 Regional Government Law, regional heads were appointed and dismissed by their corresponding local parliament (DPRD): Regional Government Law 1999, art 34. However, this process had degenerated into a bidding war in some parts of Indonesia, where some DPRD members appointed candidates who offered them the most money: Maribeth Erb & Pri Sulistiyanto, Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada) (ISEAS 2009) 18.

4 This was justified, at least partly, on the requirement of a presidential nomination threshold - that is, candidates could only be nominated by parties that held a particular number or percentage of seats in the national parliament.

5 Constitutional Court Decision 14/PUU-XI/2013.

6 Tempo, ‘Simultaneous Elections’ Tempo (3 September 2012).

7 The first wave of these (269 regions, comprising 9 provinces, 36 cities, and 224 counties) took place on 9 December 2015; the second (101 regions, comprising 7 provinces, 18 cities, and 76 counties) on 15 February 2017; and the third (171 regions, comprising 17 provinces, 39 cities, and 115 counties) on 27 June 2018; and the fourth (270 regions, comprising 9 provinces, 37 cities, and 224 counties) on 9 December 2020.

8 Isra, Saldi, Pemilu Dan Pemulihan Daulat Rakyat (Themis Publishing 2017) 14Google Scholar.

9 As the Law itself states, in its preamble (part d), the Law consolidates Law 42 of 2008 on the Election of the President and Vice-President, Law 15 of 2011 on Election Administrators, and Law 8 of 2012 that deals with national and regional legislative elections to become the basis for simultaneous elections.

10 In fact, some form of electoral commission has existed in Indonesia since 1955. Initially called the Indonesian Election Committee (Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia), it changed its name to the General Election Institute (Lembaga Pemilihan Umum) in 1970. Then, in 1999, it was restructured and renamed as the General Electoral Commission.

11 GEL, art 8.

12 The tasks and authority of Bawaslu are contained in Articles 93-96 of the GEM.

13 Bawaslu has offices in all of Indonesia's 34 provinces, 98 cities, and 416 counties.

14 GEL, Chapter II, arts 89–184.

15 Febriansyah, Muhammad, Ismail, Muhamad Takiyuddin & Noor, Norazam Mohd, ‘Competing Not Complementing: KPU, Bawaslu, and the Dynamic of Election Monitoring in PEMILU 2019’ 28(3) Asian Journal of Political Science 275Google Scholar.

16 The tasks and authority of the DKPP are regulated in Article 159 of the GEL. In April 2014, the Council was chaired by former Constitutional Court Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie who reported that the Council had already removed 129 officials from KPU and Bawaslu for various breaches: ‘Sudah 129 Anggota Penyelenggara Pemilu Diberhentikan’ Hukumonline (19 April 2014).

17 Law 15 Year 2011 on Election Administration, art 109.

18 Butt, Simon, The Constitutional Court and Democracy in Indonesia (Brill 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Simon Butt, ‘Indonesian Constitutional Court Decisions in Regional Head Electoral Disputes’ (Centre for Democratic Institutions, Australian National University 2013).

20 GEL, art 481.

21 GEL, art 470.

22 Rumah Pemilu, Brief Overview of the 2014 Elections in Indonesia (Rumah Pemilu 2014) <www.rumahpemilu.com>.

23 See GEL, arts 12–14.

24 GEL, art 14.

25 ibid.

26 ibid.

27 GEL, arts 15–17.

28 GEL, arts 1(9)–1(15), 6 and 7(1).

29 GEL, arts 18–20.

30 GEL, arts 53(1) and 53(3).

31 GEL, art 60.

32 GEL, art 62.

33 GEL, art 58.

34 GEL, art 56.

35 GEL, art 64.

36 GEL, arts 68 and 70.

37 GEL, art 66.

38 Komisi Permilihan Umum, ‘Report No 51/HK.03-Kpt/03/KPU/II/2018 on the Second Amendment to the Decision of the General Election Commission No 63/Kpts 2015 Strategic Plan of the General Election Commission for 2015–2019’ https://jdih.kpu.go.id/data/data_kepkpu/SK%2051%20THN%202018.pdf pp. 15–16. However, the KPU itself estimates that it needs at least 16,000 employees: Ardian Fanani, ‘KPU Kekurangan 10 Ribu Pegawai Organik Di Seluruh Indonesia’ Detiknews (20 October 2016) <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-timur/d-3325450/kpu-kekurangan-10-ribu-pegawai-organik-di-seluruh-indonesia>.

39 Comprising three from government, four from academia, and four from the community (GEL, art 22(2)); with good reputations and track records, credibility and integrity, knowledge of electoral issues, and with abilities in recruitment (GEL, art 22(3)); and ‘considering representation of at least 30 percent’ for women (GEL, art 22(1)).

40 GEL, art 22.

41 Refer to GEL, arts 10(1)(b)-(c). We note that the number of city and county KPU members was a matter of dispute in a recent Constitutional Court case (31/PUU-XVI/2018). This case involved a challenge to Article 10(1)(c) of the GEL that allowed city and county KPUs to have three, four, or five members, depending on the ‘characteristics’ of each region. Previously, under Law 15 of 2011, five members were required. The Court reinstated the five-member requirement, holding Article 10(1)(c) to be constitutionally invalid, and pointing out that the upcoming simultaneous elections made it irrational to reduce the number of members. After the decision, city and county KPUs and the PPK have ensured that they comprise five members: ‘Komisioner KPU Karimun Ditambah Jadi 5 Orang’ Batampos (7 August 2018) <https://batampos.co.id/2018/08/07/komisioner-kpu-karimun-ditambah-jadi-5-orang/>; ‘Anggota PPK Ditambah Dua Orang’ Radar Tasikmalaya (3 January 2019) <https://www.radartasikmalaya.com/anggota-ppk-ditambah-dua-orang/>; Abdul Basri, ‘Jumlah PPK Kembali Ditambah, KPU Sumenep Lakukan Rekrutmen’ JawaPos (12 November 2018) <https://radarmadura.jawapos.com/read/2018/11/12/103230/jumlah-ppk-kembali-ditambah-kpu-sumenep-lakukan-rekrutmen>.

42 GEL, arts 28–30.

43 GEL, arts 37(1) and 37(3).

44 GEL, art 37(2). The KPU can terminate members of the PPK, PPS, KPPS, and PPLN, and members of the KPPSLN can be dismissed on similar grounds: GEL, arts 74(1) and 74(2).

45 GEL, art 451(1).

46 Andrian Pratama Taher, ‘Ironi Anggaran Untuk KPU: Melimpah Tapi Tak Selesaikan Masalah’ tirto.id (15 April 2019) <https://tirto.id/ironi-anggaran-untuk-kpu-melimpah-tapi-tak-selesaikan-masalah-dmbE>.

47 Rina Widiastuti, ‘Dana Pilkada Terus Naik, Berikut Anggaran Tiga Tahun Terakhir’ Tempo (21 November 2017) <https://pilkada.tempo.co/read/1035588/dana-pilkada-terus-naik-berikut-anggaran-tiga-tahun-terakhir>.

48 Ringkang Gumiwang, ‘Alibi Di Balik Lonjakan Anggaran Pemilu 2019: Dana BIN Hingga Hoax’ Tirto.id (27 August 2018) <https://tirto.id/alibi-di-balik-lonjakan-anggaran-pemilu-2019-dana-bin-hingga-hoax-cUHz>.

49 ce1/sat/JPC, ‘KPU Galau, Anggaran Pemilu Minus Rp 3 Triliun’ JawaPos (22 December 2017) <https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/pemilihan/22/12/2017/kpu-galau-anggaran-pemilu-minus-rp-3-triliun/>.

50 See, for example, Imron Arlado, ‘KPU Ancam Hentikan Pilkada’ Radarmojokerto (12 February 2020) <https://radarmojokerto.jawapos.com/read/2020/02/12/178945/kpu-ancam-hentikan-pilkada>.

51 ‘Pemotongan Anggaran Pilkada Berisiko’ Media Indonesia (7 November 2017) <https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/130864/pemotongan-anggaran-pilkada-berisiko>; Dian Erika Nugraheny, ‘Ketua KPU: Ada Pemda Pangkas Anggaran Pilkada Tanpa Libatkan Penyelenggara’ Kompas (22 January 2020) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/01/22/06283251/ketua-kpu-ada-pemda-pangkas-anggaran-pilkada-tanpa-libatkan-penyelenggara>.

52 Dian Dewi Purnamasari, ‘Pilkada Tetap 2020, KPU Minta Tambahan Anggaran’ Komas (27 May 2020) <https://kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2020/05/27/dilaksanakan-desember-2020-pilkada-butuhkan-tambahan-anggaran/>.

53 Fossati, Diego, ‘The Resurgence of Ideology in Indonesia: Political Islam, Aliran and Political Behaviour’ (2019) 38(2) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 119, 120CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54 ibid; Dylan Aprialdo Rachman, ‘Pemilu 2019, Jumlah Kursi Anggota DPRD Berjumlah 19.817’ Kompas (18 April 2018) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/04/18/13240581/pemilu-2019-jumlah-kursi-anggota-dprd-berjumlah-19817>; Kompas Cyber Carina, ‘Setelah Putusan MK, Jumlah TPS Pemilu 2019 Bertambah 829 Jadi 810.329’ Kompas (8 April 2019) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/04/08/19475721/setelah-putusan-mk-jumlah-tps-pemilu-2019-bertambah-829-jadi-810329>.

55 Ben Bland, ‘The Mind-Boggling Challenge of Indonesia's Election Logistics’ (The Interpreter, 3 April 2019) <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/mind-boggling-challenge-indonesian-election-logistics>.

56 Nuryanti, Sri, ‘Data Kependudukan Dan Problematika Pengelolaan Data Pemilih Pemilu Legislatif 2014’ in Amalia, Luky Sandra (ed), Evaluasi Pemilu Legislatif 2014: Analisis Proses dan Hasil (Pustaka Pelajar 2016) 29Google Scholar; Chusna Farisa Farisa, ‘Penjelasan KPU Soal 31 Juta Data Pemilih Siluman’ Kompas (14 December 2018) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/12/14/06303141/penjelasan-kpu-soal-31-juta-data-pemilih-siluman>.

57 Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Elections, Resilient Democracy’ (2009) 45 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 317; Nasution (n 1).

58 Syariful Alam, ‘600 Petugas KPPS Meninggal, MER-C Bentuk Tim Investigasi’ rri.co.id (16 May 2019) <https://rri.co.id/1455-pemilu-2019/672637/600-petugas-kpps-meninggal-mer-c-bentuk-tim-investigasi>; Bayu Septianto, ‘KPU: Cukup Sekali Pemilu Serentak Seperti Ini’ Tirto.id (23 April 2019) <https://tirto.id/kpu-cukup-sekali-pemilu-serentak-seperti-ini-dmYe>; Insi Nantika Jelilta, ‘KPU Akan Evaluasi Pemilu Serentak’ Media Indonesia (21 April 2019) <https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/230839/kpu-akan-evaluasi-pemilu-serentak>; ‘Dilema Sistem Pemilu Serentak’ Hukumonline (18 May 2019) <https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5cdef3179f31b/dilema-sistem-pemilu-serentak/>; Sania Mashabi, ‘Refleksi Pemilu 2019, Sebanyak 894 Petugas KPPS Meninggal Dunia’ Kompas (22 January 2020) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/01/22/15460191/refleksi-pemilu-2019-sebanyak-894-petugas-kpps-meninggal-dunia>.

59 Fadhly Fauzi Rachman, ‘Anggaran Pemilu 2019 Capai Rp 25 T, Kok Bisa?’ Detikfinance (27 March 2019) <https://finance.detik.com/berita-ekonomi-bisnis/d-4485687/anggaran-pemilu-2019-capai-rp-25-t-kok-bisa>.

60 News Desk (The Jakarta Post), ‘BPK Suspects Corruption at KPU’’ Jakarta Post (21 April 2005); Jakarta Post, ‘Audit Report Indicates Massive Corruption at KPU’ Jakarta Post (23 April 2005).

61 Jakarta Post, ‘Poll Commission Chief Charged with Corruption’ Jakarta Post (9 August 2005); Hukumonline, ‘Divonis Tujuh Tahun, Nazaruddin Nyatakan Pemilu Harus Diulang’ Hukumonline (15 December 2005).

62 New Desk (The Jakarta Post), ‘KPK Member Could Face Life Sentence for Graft’ Jakarta Post (13 October 2005); Tempo, ‘Rusadi Kantaprawira Divonis Empat Tahun Penjara’ (2006) Tempo <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/ang/min/02/09/nas1.htm.>. Indelible ink is used in Indonesia to stain the fingers of people who have already voted, and thus prevent them from voting again.

63 Liputan6.com, ‘Daan Dimara Divonis Empat Tahun Penjara’ Liputan 6 (15 September 2006) <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/129224/daan-dimara-divonis-empat-tahun-penjara>.

64 detikNews, ‘MA Tetap Vonis Daan Dimara 4 Tahun Penjara’ Detik (21 March 2007) <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-756942/ma-tetap-vonis-daan-dimara-4-tahun-penjara>.

65 Dani Prabowo, ‘Wahyu Setiawan, Komisioner KPU Kelima Yang Jadi Tersangka KPK’ Kompas (10 January 2020) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/01/10/06470011/wahyu-setiawan-komisioner-kpu-kelima-yang-jadi-tersangka-kpk>.

66 John McBeth, ‘Bribes, Lies and a Dead Man's Vote Rock Indonesia’ Asia Times (30 January 2020) <https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/bribes-lies-and-a-dead-mans-vote-rock-indonesia/>.

67 DKPP Decision 01-PKE-DKPP/I/2020, 15.

68 Ardito Ramadhan, ‘Eks Komisioner KPU Wahyu Setiawan Divonis 6 Tahun Penjara’ Kompas (24 August 2020) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2020/08/24/15511171/eks-komisioner-kpu-wahyu-setiawan-divonis-6-tahun-penjara>.

69 DKPP Decision 371-PKE-DKPP/X/2019; ‘KPU Commissioner Evi Novida Dismissed for Manipulating Vote Results in West Kalimantan’ Jakarta Post (19 March 2020) <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/03/19/kpu-commissioner-evi-novida-dismissed-for-manipulating-vote-results-in-west-kalimantan.html>.

70 See MK Decision 154-02-20/PHPU.DPR-DPRD/XVII/2019, p. 276.

71 DKPP Decision 317-PKE-DKPP/X/2019 points [4.3.3], pp. 34–35.

72 Budi Sutrisno, ‘Court Cancels Jokowi's Dismissal of KPU Commissioner’ Jakarta Post (25 July 2020) <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/07/25/court-cancels-jokowis-dismissal-of-kpu-commissioner.html>.

73 Presidential Decree 80/P/2020; News Desk (The Jakarta Post), ‘KPU Commissioner Restored to Position after Jokowi Revokes Decree on Her Dismissal’ Jakarta Post (24 August 2020) <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/24/kpu-commissioner-restored-to-position-after-jokowi-revokes-decree-on-her-dismissal.html>.

74 Election Organization Ethics Council, ‘DKPP Berhentikan Arief Budiman Dari Jabatan Ketua KPU RI’ DKPP website (13 January 2021) <https://dkpp.go.id/dkpp-berhentikan-arief-budiman-dari-jabatan-ketua-kpu-ri/>.

75 DKPP Decision Number 123-PKE-DKPP/X/2020, paragraph [4.3.1].

76 For a full discussion of these types of disputes, see Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy in Indonesia (n 18).

77 It is unclear whether the Constitutional Court has the power to issue orders to the KPU. Article 7(3) of the GEL states that, in the administration of the election, the KPU is to be free from the influence of all parties (pengaruh pihak mana pun) in relation to the performance of its tasks and exercise of its powers. It might be argued that, strictly speaking, the Constitutional Court cannot directly order the KPU to respond to its decisions, but can issue decisions and hope that the KPU voluntarily follows them.

78 Presidential Election Law 2008, arts 28 and 111(1).

79 The Court held, in subsequent cases, that voter registration requirements for other types of elections were also invalid (see Constitutional Court Decision 85/PUU-X/2012) and the requirements were removed by the legislature for legislative elections (see Article 150 of the 2012 General Election Law).

80 Constitutional Court Decision 20/PUU-XVII/2019.

81 The Office of Population and Civil Registration conducts registration and issues electronic identity cards. However, the production of such cards has not been properly distributed amongst the regions. As a result, there are people who are registered but have yet to receive an electronic identity card; ‘MK Sahkan Suket Perekaman E-KTP Sebagai Syarat Pencoblosan Pemilu 2019’ Constitutional Court of Indonesia webpage (28 March 2019) <https://www.mkri.id/index.php?page=web.Berita&id=15173>; Article 9 KPU Regulation 9 of 2019 on Voting and Counting Mechanisms.

82 GEL, art 383(2).

83 Achmad Fachrudin, ‘Dampak Putusan MK Nomor 20 Tahun 2019’ Detik (8 April 2019) <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-4501189/dampak-putusan-mk-nomor-20-tahun-2019>.

84 Carina (n 54).

85 Dian Erika Nugraheny, ‘Dampak Putusan MK, Anggaran Verifikasi Parpol Bertambah’ Republika (13 January 2018) <https://republika.co.id/share/p2hfho330>; Yustinus Paat, ‘KPU Minta Tambahan Anggaran Rp 68 Miliar Untuk Verifikasi Faktual Parpol’ Berita Satu (14 January 2018) <https://www.beritasatu.com/iman-rahman-cahyadi/nasional/473278/kpu-minta-tambahan-anggaran-rp-68-miliar-untuk-verifikasi-faktual-parpol>.

86 Rakhmat Nur Hakim, ‘Tak Dapat Tambahan Dana Verifikasi Faktual, Ini Yang Dilakukan KPU’ Kompas (18 January 2018) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/01/18/20055811/tak-dapat-tambahan-dana-verifikasi-faktual-ini-yang-dilakukan-kpu>.

87 Constitutional Court Decision 14-17/PUU-V/2007.

88 Constitutional Court Decision 15/PUU-VI/2008.

89 Constitutional Court Decision 4/PUU-VII/2009.

90 The applicant was convicted under Articles 365 and 351(3) of the Criminal Code and Article 1(1) of Emergency Law 12/Drt/1951.

91 Constitutional Court Decision 4/PUU-VII/2009, 79.

92 KPU Regulation 20 of 2018, art 4(3).

93 Supreme Court Decision 46 P/HUM/2018, 73–74.

94 Febriansyah, Ismail & Noor (n 15) 283.

95 Constitutional Court Decision 30/PUU-XVI/2018.

96 KPU Regulation 26/2018 concerning the Second Amendment to KPU Regulation 14/2018 concerning the Candidacy of Individuals Participating in the DPD Election, art 60A.

97 KPU decision 1130-PL.01.4- KPT/IX/2018.

98 008/LP/PL/ RI/00/XII/2018.

99 This was likely at the behest of Wiranto, a founder of Hanura, who was serving in the national cabinet at the time: Febriansyah, Ismail and Noor (n 15) 283.

100 Apparently on the basis that the DPD nomination process had commenced the month before the Constitutional Court's decision was handed down: Fabian Januarius Kuwado, ‘Putusan MK Soal Pengurus Parpol Dilarang Ke DPD Dinilai Langsung Berlaku’ Kompas (28 July 2018) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/07/28/17385621/putusan-mk-soal-pengurus-parpol-dilarang-ke-dpd-dinilai-langsung-berlaku>.

101 Specifically, the Court held that Article 60A of KPU Regulation 26/2018 contradicted Articles 5 and 6 of Law 12 of 2011 on Lawmaking.

102 For another example of election-related conflict between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, see Simon Butt, ‘Two at the Top: The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court’ (2009) XI (8) Van Zorge Report on Indonesia 12.

103 Fitria Chusna Farisa, ‘KPU Jelaskan Besaran Honor KPPS, PPS, Dan PPK’ Kompas (25 April 2019) <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/04/25/16284881/kpu-jelaskan-besaran-honor-kpps-pps-dan-ppk?page=all>; Detri Aritonang, ‘808.856 Orang Pengawas TPS Dilantik Serentak’ Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum website (26 March 2019) <https://bawaslu.go.id/id/berita/808856-orang-pengawas-tps-dilantik-serentak>.

104 Rini Kustiani, ‘Ahli Usulkan Perbaikan Desain Penyelenggara Pemilu’ Kompas (19 January 2021) <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2021/01/19/ahli-usulkan-perbaikan-desain-penyelenggara-pemilu-j/>.