I lived in the United States from the age of 15 until I turned 19. When Japan went to war with America, I became a “hostile alien.” In 1942, I was sent to a detention center – a relocation camp.

I knew I was being detained unjustly, but fortunately I was treated fairly throughout my years of captivity. I was never tortured or abused.

In fact, I felt I was walking into a much worse prison when I returned to wartime Japan to find the nation completely in the grip of emperor worshipping totalitarianism.

At the very beginning of the long dialogue between thinkers that makes up western political theory there is Plato's Republic, and at the very beginning of the Republic there is this strange and interesting exchange. Socrates asks an old man, Cephalus, if he can define justice. Cephalus says, Of course, justice means to tell the truth and to return anything you have borrowed. Socrates then asks, Suppose you have borrowed a sword from a man, and while the sword is in your possession the man goes mad. In this state of madness (mania) the man comes and asks for his sword. Does justice require that you return it?

The Nanjing (or Nanking) Incident (also known as the Rape of Nanjing, the Nanjing Massacre and the Nanjing Atrocities) remains a highly controversial episode in Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, it remains so controversial, especially in Japan, that a neutral definition of the event, and even its name, has yet to be agreed upon. However, most researchers would perhaps agree on the following. The Nanjing Incident refers to the killing and raping of large numbers of Chinese together with widespread looting and arson over a relatively short period of time (usually given as six to seven weeks) by the Japanese military prior to and following the capture of the city of Nanjing on 13 December 1937. Sadly for the historian, the Nanjing Incident is not only an important episode in Sino-Japanese relations, but is also emerging as a foundation stone in the construction of the modern Chinese national identity. As a result, the historian's interest in and analysis of this event can be interpreted as an attack on the contemporary Chinese identity, while a refusal to accept the ‘orthodox’ position on Nanjing - however defined - can be construed as an attempt to deny the Chinese nation a legitimate voice in international society - or, in Iris Chang's words, as a ‘second rape’. In the highly emotional and deeply politicised environment in which the history of Japanese imperialism is constructed, the temptation to vilify all who disagree with accepted orthodoxies has proved irresistible to those on both extremes of the debate - extremes advocated by individuals who, here, will be labelled ‘corpse minimisers’ and ‘corpse maximisers’. On the one hand, to show too much scepticism is to risk being tarred as a nationalist revisionist or denier, an apologist for Japanese fascism and imperialism. On the other hand, any demonstrated interest in Nanjing can be viewed in some circles in Japan as ‘Japan-bashing’ or even anti-Japanese racism (in the case of foreign researchers) or ‘self-flagellation’ (in the case of Japanese). In this environment, the debate can become highly emotionally charged, and the historian's struggle to weigh the evidence can quickly fall victim to the demands of contemporary politics.

As the Japanese government moves to beef up the country's military preparedness, once again the issue of the protection of foreigners’ rights has been raised.

With the passage of military contingency legislation in June, the government has begun to prepare the civilian population for, and protect it against, an attack on Japan, military or terrorist.

This comes at a time of growing fears of possible strikes by terrorist networks, fueled in part by the ongoing crisis over North Korea.

[Introduction: Six decades into the nuclear age, it is worth reflecting on the fact that the United States remains the only nation to have detonated a nuclear weapon in combat, that Japan alone among nations has experienced nuclear attack, and that for all the terror unleashed in subsequent wars, no nation has launched nuclear weapons on an enemy since 1945. What forces have prevented nuclear war, and what lessons can be drawn from this experience for the future? Lawrence Wittner finds important answers to these questions in the world anti- nuclear movement.

2004 is the fiftieth anniversary of the Hydrogen Bomb test at Bikini that has rendered the island and nearby atolls uninhabitable ever since. Two earlier Japan Focus articles (http://japanfocus.org/094.html and http://japanfocus.org/097.html) portrayed the impact of the blast on the crew of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon, and the subsequent course of the anti-nuclear movement. The two articles presented here detail the consequences of atomic and hydrogen bomb testing on Bikini and neighboring atolls, including the consequences for displaced people, the continued failure of the U.S. government to clean up the radioactive islands, and the long stalled negotiations with the U.S. government to compensate the people of Bikini.

[John Embry and Andrew Hepburn provide a valuable entry into the world of finance. The two analysts illuminate the shadowy trail of the “Plunge Protection Team” in its apparent mission to rig the American stock markets. Their account is backed up by considerable indirect evidence as well as statements by credible insiders. If their account is correct, it means that US markets look a lot like the Japanese markets that were long derided for being a site of repeated official manipulation. A more important conclusion may be that US markets are even shakier than many believe.

SEONGNAM, South Korea – The image of a South Korean hostage, Kim Sun Il, blindfolded and kneeling at gunpoint before his death in Iraq last week was a chillingly familiar one for us back in his homeland – despite the orange jumpsuit, the masked faces and the foreign tongue.

Who enshrines the dead? A widely held international principle, that surviving family members determine the disposition of the dead, including those who die in combat, is being tested anew in Japanese courts. Nearly 50,000 Taiwanese and Korean soldiers who died in Japanese uniforms have been enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine without consultation with family members. On May 13, 2004, the Osaka District Court issued its verdict in one of seven lawsuits filed in response to Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro's pilgrimages to Yasukuni Shrine. It was the first case to address Japan's oppression of indigenous peoples and their mandatory enshrinement at Yasukuni during the nation's colonial rule of Taiwan (1895-1945). Chief Justice Yoshikawa Shin'ichi not only dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition for reparations, but also came up with a novel way of judging whether the Prime Minister's pilgrimages are public or private.

This is a very busy year for the still unresolved issue of postwar compensation, especially for wartime forced labor. Although the Sapporo District Court dismissed the claims of the Chinese forced laborers’ Hokkaido Lawsuit on 23 March, three days later the Niigata District Court returned a landmark judgment in a suit brought by ten Chinese and the bereaved relatives of an eleventh against the Japanese state and the Hong Kong Transportation Company (Rinko Corporation, based in Niigata City), ordering the payment of 8 million yen per person, with a total award of 88 million yen.

TOKYO – It was supposed to help revive Japan's troubled nuclear program – and curb the country's heavy reliance on energy imports. But as Tokyo considers long-term plans to switch to an experimental, recycled nuclear fuel, it is also facing new allegations that officials misled the public in the past about less pricey alternatives.

Review of Utsumi Aiko, Sugamo Prison: The Peace Movement of the War Criminals (Sugamo purizun—senpantachi no heiwa undo). Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2004.

“Sugamo Prison” became Sugamo Keimusho (jail) at the end of the occupation when it passed from American to Japanese-government control. Until that time, it was the place of confinement for convicted war criminals and suspects. Although located inside Japan, it was an abnormal space—one might call it a foreign country—where Japanese had their freedom restricted by the Occupation authorities. If we view it from a stance critical of “the Tokyo Trial view of history” (e.g., the new nationalist history), “Sugamo Prison,” was a space in which victims were confined by “victors' justice”. However, viewed through the eyes of those “who were visited with the horrors of war” (to quote the Preamble to the Constitution), this prison was a space for implementing “justice” in which aggressors were confined.

How will the history of the US-led military aggression against Iraq be told? In many ways this question for tomorrow was answered yesterday: it's done. The history that glorifies military aggression, racism and state violence has been written. It is being taught, absorbed and institutionalized in various ways as historical fact. Not only is this history taught, but it is experienced.