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The United States and East Asia: The decline of long-distance leadership?

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The election of Barrack Obama was a remarkable event in many ways. Not only was the election of a black, Democratic president a domestic milestone, but it was a potentially transformative moment for foreign policy, too. The administration of George W. Bush was responsible for some of the most divisive and counter-productive foreign policies of recent times. The standing and authority of the US had been steadily undermined as a consequence. It is clear that the election of Obama has already seen a dramatic improvement in sentiment toward the US around the world, something that bodes well for the US's ‘soft power’ and influence. One might expect, therefore, that US policymakers will once again be able to assert themselves in East Asia, a region in which the US has had a powerful presence and influence since the Second World War. While the region is not unique in this regard—the US as the world's sole remaining superpower has been a major factor in the development of every other region, too—East Asia's post-war trajectory, both as the epicentre of international wars between 1945 and 1975, and as a rapidly advancing economic region throughout the era, has been especially marked by American influence. Indeed, East Asia's recent development history, its intra-regional relations and its place in the overall international system might have been profoundly different were it not for its engagement with the United States.

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References

Notes

1 An earlier version of this paper appeared in Dent, Christopher, ed., (2008) China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). I would like to thank Mark Selden for some very constructive and insightful suggestions. The usual caveats apply.

2 See Pew Global Attitudes Project here.

3 There is an extensive literature and debate about the nature of unipolarity and the possibility of decline. See, for example, Ikenberry, G.J., Mastanduno, M. and Wohlforth, W.C. (2009) ‘Introduction: Unipolarity, state behavior, and systemic consequences’, World Politics, 61(1): 1-27; Joffe, J (2009) ‘The default power’, Foreign Affairs, 88 (5).

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31 Beeson, M. (2007) Regionalism, Globalization and East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development, (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Such Cold War structures replicate the earlier colonial divisions between core and periphery that proved such an obstacle to regional economic and political integration. I am indebted to Mark Selden for this observation.

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42 Smith, America's Mission.

43 Woo-Cumings, M. (2005) ‘Back to basics: Ideology, nationalism, and Asian values in East Asia’, in Helleiner, E. and Pickel, A. (eds.) Economic Nationalism In a Globalizing World, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press): 91-117. Nor should American scholars and policymakers be surprised at this seemingly contradictory outcome: increased militarization and the preoccupation with security had a similar, if less marked impact on the US itself. See, Hogan, M.J. 1998. A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

44 Beeson, M. and Islam, I. (2005) ‘Neoliberalism and East Asia: Resisting the Washington Consensus’, Journal of Development Studies, 41 (2): 197-219.

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51 Brenner, R. (2002) The Boom and the Bubble, (London: Verso).

52 Calder, K.E. (1997) ‘Assault on the Bankers’ Kingdom: Politics, markets, and the liberalization of Japanese industrial finance’, in M. Loriaux and et al. (eds.), Capital Ungoverned : Liberalizing Finance in Interventionist States, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press): 17-56.

53 Katz, Richard (1998) Japan: The System That Soured, (Armonk: M.E. Sharp)

54 Dickie, M. and Russell, A. (2009) ‘Okada seeks to redefine Japan-US relations’ Financial Times September 17.

55 George, A. (1997) ‘The role of foreign pressure (gaiatsu) in Japan's agricultural trade liberalization.’ The Pacific Review 10:165-209.

56 Deudney, D.I. and G.J. Ikenberry. (1999) ‘The nature and sources of liberal international order.’ Review of International Studies 25:179-196.

57 The potential influence of outside influences drew particular attention in the cases of Japan and more recently, Israel. See, Choate, P. (1990) Agents of Influence: How Japan Manipulates America's Political and Economic System, (New York: Simon & Schuster); Mearsheimer, J. and S. Walt. (2006) ‘The Israel lobby’, London Review of Books 28. It is also important to recognise that there are powerful and competing domestic influences on American foreign policies, too. See, Trubowitz, P. (1998) Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

58 Beeson, M. And Broome, A. (forthcoming) ‘Hegemonic instability and East Asia: Contradictions, crises and American foreign policy’, Globalizations.

59 Robison, R. et al. eds. (2000), Politics and Markets in the Wake of the Asian Crisis, (London: Routledge); Haggard, Stephan (2000) The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis, (Washington: Institute for International Economics).

60 Higgott, R. (1998) ‘The Asian economic crisis: A study in the politics of resentment.’ New Political Economy 3: 333-356.

61 Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. (New York: Norton).

62 Wade, R. and F. Veneroso (1998) ‘The Asian crisis: the high debt model versus the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex.’ New Left Review 228:3-23.

63 For the views of prominent advocates of American primacy, see Sutter, R.G. (2006) China's Rise: Implications for US Leadership in Asia. Policy Studies 21. (Washington: East-West Center); Armitage, R.L. and Nye, J.S. (2007) The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020, (Washington: CSIS).

64 Grimes, W.W. (2009) Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial Regionalism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

65 See, for example, Lincoln, Edward J (2004) East Asian Economic Regionalism, (Washington: Brookings Institution).

66 Heginbotham, E. and Twomey, C.P. (2005) ‘America's Bismarkian Asia Policy’, Current History 104 (683), p 246.

67 Breslin, S. (2008) ‘Towards a Sino-centric regional order? Empowering China and constructing regional order(s)’, in Dent, C. (ed.), China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar): 131-155.

68 King, M.R. (2001) ‘Who triggered the Asian financial crisis?’ Review of International Political Economy 8:438-466.

69 Significantly, Japan has persisted in efforts to provide regional economic leadership through a number of initiatives for monetary cooperation—initiatives that are occurring despite US opposition—adding to the impression of declining US influence. See Katada, S.N. (2002) ‘Japan and Asian monetary regionalisation: Cultivating a new regional leadership after the Asia financial crisis.’ Geopolitics 7:85-112.

70 Ziegler, Dominic (2007) ‘China and Its Region: Reaching for a renaissance’, The Economist, March 29.

71 The Economist (2007) ‘Test of stamina’, April 14, p 87.

72 Murphy, R.T. (2006) ‘East Asia's dollars.’ New Left Review 40:39-64; Ravenhill, J. (2006) ‘US economic relations with East Asia: From hegemony to complex interdependence?’ in M. Beeson (ed.) (2007) Bush and Asia: America's Evolving Relations with East Asia. (London: Routledge): 42-63.

73 Arrighi, G. (2005) ‘Hegemony unravelling-2’, New Left Review 33:83-116.

74 Kurlantzick, J. (2007) Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World, (New Haven: Yale University Press).

75 Lampton, D.M. (2007) ‘The faces of Chinese power’, Foreign Affairs 86(1): 115-127.

76 Daadler, Ivo H and James M Lindsay (2003) America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, (Washington: Brookings Institution).

77 Agnew, J. (2005) Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), p 220.

78 Mann, J. (2004) Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. (New York: Viking).

79 Krauthammer, C. (1990-1991) ‘The unipolar moment.’ Foreign Affairs 70:23-33.

80 Ikenberry, G.J. (2004) ‘The End of the NeoConservative Moment.’ Survival 46:7-22; Beeson, Mark and Higgott, Richard (2005) ‘Hegemony, institutionalism and US foreign policy: Theory and practice in comparative historical perspective’, Third World Quarterly, 26 (7): 1173-88.

81 In Europe and Asia, the numbers of those holding ‘favourable views’ of the US has also dropped sharply. Even in apparently stalwart allies like Australia, positive feeling toward the US and China were about the same, as were expectations that they would behave ‘responsibly’ in international affairs. See respectively, Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006) America's Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas (PewResearchCenter: Washington). Available here; Cook, Ivan (2006) Lowy Institute Poll 2006: Australia, Indonesia and the World, (Lowy Institute: Sydney). The latest survey results demonstrate just what a difference the Obama administration has made to international attitudes toward the US. From a low of 55% approval in the UK and 39% in France, favourable views have grown to 69% and 75% respectively under Obama. There have been similarly dramatic transformations in approval ratings among Muslim publics in key countries such as Turkey and Indonesia. See Confidence in Obama Lifts US Image Around the World, (Pew Research Centre: Washington), available here.

82 See, Beeson, M. (2004) ‘US hegemony and Southeast Asia: The impact of, and limits to, American power and influence’, Critical Asian Studies 36(3): 323-354.

83 See, Ramo, J.C. (2004) The Beijing Consensus, (London: The Foreign Policy Centre).

84 Crook, C. (2009) ‘In search of an Obama doctrine’. Financial Times April 19.

85 Friedman, T.L. (2009) ‘Paging Uncle Sam ‘. New York Times February 25.

86 Landler, M. (2009) ‘Rising powers challenge U.S. on role in I.M.F. ‘ New York Times March 30. The ‘BRICs’ are Brazil, Russia, India and China. See Armijo, L.E. (2007) ‘The BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as analytical category: Mirage or insight?’ Asian Perspective 31(4): 7-42.

87 Friedberg, Aaron (1993/94) ‘Ripe for rivalry: Prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia’, International Security 18 (3): 5-33.

88 In addition to Asean+3, which includes Japan, China, and Korea as well as the ASEAN countries, there have been discussions about and/or meetings of an East Asian Summit, an East Asian Community, and various permutations of ASEAN plus or minus. See Pempel, T.J. (2006) ‘The race to connect East Asia: An unending steeplechase’, Asian Economic Policy Review 1239-254.

89 De Santis, H. (2005) ‘The dragon and the tigers: China and Asia regionalism.’ World Policy Journal:23-36.

90 Wesley, Michael (2006) ‘The dog that didn't bark: The Bush administration and East Asian regionalism’, in Beeson, M. (ed.), Bush and Asia: America's Evolving Relations with East Asia, (London: Routledge): 64-79.

91 Kang, D.C. (2003) ‘Getting Asia wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks.’ International Security 27:57-85. Arrighi et al. view the issue in 500-year perspective. See, Arrighi, G., Hamashita, T. and Selden, M. eds., (2003) The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Prespectives. (London: Routledge).

92 Mearsheimer, J.J. (2006) ‘China's unpeaceful rise’, Current History (April): 160-162; Sutter, R.G. (2006) China's Rise.

93 Christensen, T.J. (2006) ‘Fostering stability or creating a monster?: The rise of China and US policy toward East Asia’, International Security 31(1), p 83. On the more general tension between those American commentators and officials who favour containment of engagement, see Shambaugh, D. (1996) ‘Containment or engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's responses’, International Security 21(2): 180-210; Tkacik, J.J. (2006) ‘Revenge of the Panda Hugger ‘, Weekly Standard 11(23).

94 Gaulier, G., Lemoine, F. and Unal-Kesenci, D. (2006) China's Emergence and the Reorganisation of Trade Flows in Asia, (Paris: CEPPI); Woodall, P. 2006. ‘The new titans: A survey of the world economy.’ The Economist, September 16; Ravenhill, ‘US economic relations’.

95 Pilling, D. (2009) ‘Japan's poodle strains at the American leash’. Financial Times September 23; Maiden, S. (2009) ‘Rudd grilled on timing of Afghanistan troop pullout’. The Australian October 21.

96 Stephens, P. (2009) ‘Diplomatic feint that looks to leave Japan in the cold’. Financial Times February 26.

97 Rachman, G. (2009) ‘China makes gains in its bid to be top dog’. Financial Times September 14; Leonhardt, D. (2009) ‘The China puzzle’. New York Times May 17, Das, D.K. (2009) ‘A Chinese renaissance in an unremittingly integrating Asian economy’, Journal of Contemporary China 18(59): 321–338.

98 See, Beeson, M. and Bell, G. (2009) The G20 and international economic governance: Hegemony, collectivism or both?’, Global Governance, 15 (1): 67-86.

99 Brzezinski, Z. (2009) ‘The Group of Two that could change the world’. Financial Times January 13.

100 A danger of which China's policymakers are increasingly conscious. See, Bradsher, K. (2009) ‘China slows purchases of U.S. and other bonds ‘. New York Times April 13. Also see the special economic-financial section at The Asia-Pacific Journal, especially R. Taggart Murphy's various contributions.

101 Cha, A.E. and Shin, A. (2009) ‘Geithner tells China its holdings are safe’. Washington Post June 2.

102 There are growing numbers of prominent commentators subscribing to this view. See, Mahbubani, K. (2008) The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, (New York: Public Affairs); Jacques, M. (2009) When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World, (London: Allen Lane).