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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2025
‘Possibly the most important (challenges) are Indonesia's declining oil and gas production and the fast increasing domestic requirements for oil and gas; the persistent electricity and petroleum subsidies and price controls; and the limited clarity in Indonesia's energy sector governance, co-ordination and decision making regime.‘
International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Policy Review of Indonesia (2008)
[1] International Energy Agency (IEA) (2008), Energy Policy Review of Indonesia, OECD Publishing.
[2] Japanese loans to Indonesia have been channelled directly through Japanese donor agencies, and indirectly through the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
[3] John Riady, ‘Cutting Off Indonesia's Coming Energy Crisis’, Jakarta Globe, July 21, 2010.
[4] Novia D. Rulistia, ‘Japanese firms lodge protest over blackouts’, Jakarta Post, July 9, 2008.
[5] Arghea Desafti Hapsari, ‘Census may indicate population boom, ‘Jakarta Post, August 19, 2010.
[6] Such figures remind Indonesians that one of Suharto's major achievements was reducing population growth from an annual average of 2.31% to 1.49% during his 33 years in power.
[7] IEA (2008).
[8] Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Data Warehouse.
[9] Hanan Nugroho, ‘Energy and economic growth’, Jakarta Post, July 15, 2010.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Luiz de Mello (2008), ‘Indonesia: Growth Performance and Policy Challenges’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 637.
[12] Jorn Brommelhorster, ‘Asian Development Outlook 2008 Update’, Asia Development Bank, 2008.
[13] Those living in more remote regions of Indonesia do not enjoy the same benefits of the fuel subsidy as those living in the core islands of Java and Bali. As the subsidy is dispensed at fuel depots to the distributors, who then add the cost of transportation to the outer islands, residents of more remote areas inevitably pay much higher prices than those living in the centre. The reluctance of the central government to adjust the subsidies to reflect this reality is due to the fact that export-oriented manufacturing and related higher-value services are largely concentrated on Java and Bali, along with around 60% of the population.
[14] Reva Sasistiya & Yessar Rossendar, ‘Indonesia to End Energy Subsidies by 2014‘, Jakarta Globe, March 22, 2010.
[15] Only business customers and residential customers who had a power subscribing capacity of more than 900 volt amperes would be subject to the planned hikes between 2011 and 2014. According to PLN data, only 5.1% of its customers fit into this category. Camelia Pasandaran, Faisal Maliki Baskoro, Arti Ekawati & Dion Bisara, ‘Indonesian Government Puts Cap On Electricity Rate Hike’, Jakarta Globe, July 20, 2010.
[16] Riady (2010).
[17] Indonesia placed 111th in the 2009 Human Development Index (HDI), compiled annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which combines health, income and education statistics to rank 182 countries for whom sufficient data is available. Neighbours Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines were listed 66, 87 and 105 respectively.
[18] Tables taken from US Embassy Jakarta (2008), Petroleum Report Indonesia 2008.
[19] UPI, ‘Setback for Japan in LNG project’, July 14, 2009.
[20] IEA (2008), p. 118–19.
[21] KOGAS has also been negotiating to buy a 15% stake in the Gladstone LNG project in Queensland, Australia being developed by Santos with estimated annual LNG output 7.2 million MT. South Korean LNG consumption, used mainly for heating and power generation, is set to increase to 15.1% of all energy requirements in 2012, up from 10.1% in 2000 and 13% in 2009.
[22] Eric Watkins, ‘Indonesia rejects development plan for LNG project’, OGJ, February 2, 2010.
[23] XE, ‘Indonesia: Inpex to Start Abadi FLNG Construction in 2011‘, August 19, 2010.
[24] Petroleum Economist, ‘Rising Indonesian gas demand threatens LNG export projects’, August 2009.
[25] Muklas Ali, ‘Tangguh LNG plant ready to supply receiving terminal’, Reuters, June 11, 2010.
[26] JILCO is a consortium consisting mainly of Japanese utilities. Shareholders include Kansai Electric 19.3%, Chubu Electric 13.75%, Kyushu Electric 12%, Osaka Gas 10.38%, Toho Gas 2%, TEPCO 2%; trading houses Nissho Iwai 10%, a coordinating committee of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Itochu, Tomen and Marubeni a combined 9.6%; Nippon Steel holds 4.28% and Far East Oil Trading, a Pertamina affiliate, 6.66%. The remaining 7.49% is shared among a group of Japanese banks.
[28] In addition to inconsistent gas output, a lack of investment incentives has also hampered Bontang in the last half decade. For instance, its LNG export contracts contain no penalties if suppliers fail to meet contracted sales obligations. Moreover, ongoing investment in the aging facility has also been slowed by questions regarding who is responsible for plant maintenance, and uncertainty over Pertamina's charging regime.
[29] Reuters, ‘Indonesia to offer LNG to Singapore's terminal’, July 9, 2010.
[30] RIA Novosti, ‘Japan May Increase LNG Purchases from Russia in 2011‘, September 30, 2010.
[31] Nikkei, ‘Australia May Become Japan's No.1 LNG Supplier’, August 19, 2010.
[32] Table 1 and Figure 1 taken from Petroleum Economist, ‘Rising Indonesian gas demand threatens LNG export projects’, August 2009.
[33] Jakarta Post, ‘Indonesia set to be the first CBM-LNG producer’, June 6, 2010.
[34] Ibid. Australia's Curtis LNG project in southern Queensland, expected to come online in 2014, is aiming to be the world's first to produce LNG feedstock from coal-seam gas.
[35] Wood Mackenzie, ‘Race for Supply - The Future of China's Gas Market’, August 2010.
[36] Wood Mackenzie, ‘Wood Mackenzie says Unconventional LNG will play a limited role in the future of the LNG industry’, press release, April 20, 2010.
[37] Since Yudhoyono now has a much stronger hand in parliament than during his first term, in theory reform should be easier to push through. Moreover, Jusuf Kalla, a staunch defender of domestic big business, has been replaced as vice president by technocrat Boediono, who largely subscribes to the IMF's prescription of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy.
[38] Michael Boyd, Anne Devero, Jennifer Frias, Jeff Meyer and Greg Ross, ‘A Note on Policies for the Oil and Gas Sector’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2010, p.246.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid, p.241.
[41] Muklis Ali, ‘Indonesia's Pertamina eyes expired oil blocks’, Reuters, April 1, 2010)
[42] Boyd et al (2010), p.242-243.
[43] Ibid, p.243-244.
[44] World Bank 2009.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Boyd et al (2010), p.241.
[47] See Transparency International's annual Corruption Perceptions Index.
[48] Boyd et al (2010), p.242.
[49] Terry Lacey, ‘The Threat to Indonesian Energy Development’, Asia Sentinel, February 27, 2010.
[50] Former Minister of Energy and Mining Purnomo Yusgiantoro has stated that nowadays some 40% of economic decisions are taken by regional governments.
[51] Lacey (2010).